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I. INTRODUCTION
T RADEMARKS are used to identify the sources of products or
services. Regardless of what form trademarks take, they en-
able consumers to select favored products or services.' Well-es-
1. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985); 1
J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 2:5(D), 2:12(A) (2d ed.
1984). Both federal and state law provide protection to trademarks. For a dis-
cussion of this protection, see infra notes 37-42, 113-30, 132-38 and accompany-
ing text.
In its narrowest sense, the word "trademark" refers to a word, name, sym-
bol, or device that identifies the source of goods. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
The term "service mark" contemplates the same sort of identifier of the source
of services. Id. The common law sometimes distinguishes between trademarks
and "trade names," the latter being available for use as to goods or services or
as the name of a business. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 716 comment a (1938)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. In this article, the legal treatment given to trade-
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tablished trademarks are thus valuable marketing tools, and
companies spend substantial sums of money to develop, promote,
and preserve them.2
As a result of these expenditures and promotional efforts,
some trademarks have assumed a pervasive presence in our lives. 3
In the process, trademark owners have experienced a conse-
quence they neither intended nor desired: their marks have been
used by others in parodies and satires. Both parody and satire
"conjure up" a recognizable "original" but alter it in a humorous
and sometimes caustic fashion. 4 This is done at the least to enter-
tain and often to engage in commentary on a public issue or an
aspect of life.5 The familiarity of certain trademarks makes them
natural targets for the work of parodists and satirists. 6
Trademark parodists are sometimes direct competitors of the
trademark owners. 7 More often, however, they fall in one of two
other categories: (1) commercial entities that sell goods or pro-
vide services of a different type than those of the trademark own-
ers (and hence are, at most, indirect competitors);8 or
marks, service marks and trade names is the same. Therefore, for purposes of
convenience, the term "trademark" or the shorter term "mark" will be used
herein, even where a service mark or trade name is involved.
2. See, e.g., Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198,
203 (D. Md. 1988) (fast food giant McDonald's Corp. spent approximately $917
million in advertising and promotion in fiscal 1987); see also Carter, The Trouble
with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 761-62 (1990) (discussing importance of trade-
marks to goodwill of business).
3. See, e.g., Quality Inns, 695 F. Supp. at 203, 211-12 (various McDonald's
Corp. trademarks enjoy "instant recognition among virtually all members of our
society;" surveys show Ronald McDonald character recognized by 100% of chil-
dren between ages two and eight, "a figure matched only by Santa Claus");
Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
("one would have to be a visitor from another planet not to recognize immedi-
ately" the Coca-Cola Co. trademark in its familiar script).
4. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 822 (1964).
5. See II THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 119-
20, 489 (1971); Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trademark, and
Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U.L. REV. 923, 923-24 (1985).
6. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir.), appeal
dismissed, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987) (quoting Dorsen, supra note 5, at 939).
7. See, e.g., Crazy Eddie, Inc. v. Lois Pitts Gershon, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 537,
539 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (defendant and plaintiff direct competitors in sale of audio
and video electronic equipment); Wendy's Int'l, Inc. v. Big Bite, Inc., 576 F.
Supp. 816, 824 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (defendant and plaintiff direct competitors in
"fast food" sales).
.8. See, e.g., Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398 (8th Cir.
1987) (plaintiff, not defendant, involved in insurance business), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 933 (1988); Grey v. Campbell Soup Co., 650 F. Supp. 1166, 1174 (C.D. Cal.
1986) (plaintiff marketed and produced gourmet chocolates for human con-
3
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(2) magazine publishers or other similar parties who seek to en-
tertain or make an editorial comment. 9
Sometimes the parodies are humorous, though not necessar-
ily to the trademark owner,' 0 and generally in good taste. For
example, McDonald's Corporation has sued other companies that
used "Mc"-prefixed trade names in order to capitalize on McDon-
ald's substantial goodwill." Similarly, Toys R Us, Inc. has
adopted an aggressive enforcement policy concerning other par-
ties' uses of "R Us" in business names.' 2 Other times, the paro-
dies' humor and comment appear in a context that the trademark
owner finds distasteful or scandalous. Consider, for instance,
Coca-Cola Company's successful suit against the producer of an
"Enjoy Cocaine" poster,'3 and L.L. Bean, Inc.'s unsuccessful suit
against an adult magazine whose parody used the plaintiff's
trademark in a setting L.L. Bean considered unwholesome and
offensive. 14
When such an alteration of the original trademark appears in
a parody or satire, the mark's owner may not be content simply to
grin and bear it. Trademark owners have become increasingly in-
sumption; defendant marketed dog biscuits), aff'd without opinion, 830 F.2d 197
(9th Cir. 1987); Tetley, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 785, 787
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (plaintiff sold tea products; defendant sold bubble gum and
children's novelty products).
9. See, e.g., L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 27 (plaintiff marketed products through
catalog sales; defendant published adult magazine); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way
Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 133-34 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (plaintiff adver-
tised and distributed food products; defendant published pornographic maga-
zine); Reddy Communications, Inc. v. Environmental Action Found., 477 F.
Supp. 936, 939, 941 (D.D.C. 1979) (plaintiff provided public relations services to
public utilities; defendant, non-profit corporation, educated public on environ-
mental issues); Girl Scouts of United States v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304
F. Supp. 1228, 1230 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (plaintiff operated non-profit character
building organization for girls; defendant printed and distributed posters).
10. Just as persons do not wish to be the subject ofjokes, trademark owners
prefer not to see their marks used as vehicles for another's humor. 2 J. MCCAR-
THY, supra note 1, § 31:38.
11. See, e.g., Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198,
201 (D. Md. 1988) (suit to enjoin hotel chain from using name "McSleep Inn");
McDonald's Corp. v. McBagel's, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268, 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(suit to enjoin bagel bakery and restaurant from using name "McBagel's"). For
discussion of these cases, see infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
12. See Power, Don't Sue: We P*omise to be Mo*e Ca*eful About Ou* Lette*, Wall
St. J., Dec. 2, 1986, at 35, col. 1 (eastern ed.).
13. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y.
1972). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 96-100 and accompanying
text.
14. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.), appeal
dismissed, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987). For discussion of L.L. Bean, see infra
notes 159-62, 174-77, 321-37 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 36: p. I
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clined in recent years to seek relief against these unconsented
uses of their marks through "trademark parody" suits.' 5 Pursued
on various legal theories, these suits are designed to stop actions
that, according to trademark owners, threaten to destroy not only
the strength and distinctiveness of their marks, but also the posi-
tive connotations the marks previously produced in the minds of
consumers. 16 Because weakened or tarnished trademarks are
likely to be less effective in the marketplace, the suits also seem to
be motivated by the owiers' desire to continue receiving reason-
able returns on the investments they have made in their
trademarks. 17
The rights of trademark owners, however, are not the only
interests at stake in these cases. Because parody and satire neces-
sarily involve expression, trademark parody litigation pits the first
amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and press against
trademark owners' property rights. The resolution of cases in
which trademark parodists have raised first amendment defenses
has been especially difficult for courts.' 8 Judicial treatment of the
free expression aspects of these cases has generally been unprin-
cipled and less than insightful. 19 There is a need for a useful
means of assessing first amendment defenses in trademark par-
ody litigation.
This article examines the proper role of the first amendment
in the resolution of trademark parody cases. Section II discusses
the legal theories used by trademark owners when they seek to
enforce their property rights against parodists.2 0 To facilitate a
15. For convenience, the term "parody" will be used in this article to refer
to parody, satire, burlesque, farce and similar forms of expression. The techni-
cal differences among these forms of expression do not result in different legal
treatment.
16. See Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124,
135 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (plaintiff alleged defendant's parody in pornographic maga-
zine caused trademark to become distasteful or repulsive to some consumers);
see also Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398 (8th Cir. 1987)
(manufacturer alleged trademark disparaged by parody), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
933 (1988); L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 27 (lower court found that parody under-
mined "goodwill and reputation" associated with trademark).
17. See, e.g., Jordache Enters. Inc., v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1483
(10th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff investing $30 million annually in advertising product
sued to stop defendant from using parody of plaintiff's trademark as name of
defendant's blue jeans); Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F.
Supp. 198, 203 (D. Md. 1988).
18. For a discussion of trademark parody cases involving first amendment
defenses, see infra notes 298-337, 364-73 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 298-320 and accompanying text.
20. The primary theories used by trademark owners are trademark infringe-
5
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proper evaluation of the free expression arguments sometimes
made by parodists, section III discusses the levels of first amend-
ment protection given to different sorts of speech. Section IV
analyzes the courts' attempts to address these first amendment
arguments of parodists. 2'
Section V proposes an approach designed to take adequate
account of trademark parody plaintiffs' strong interests in trade-
mark preservation and defendants' competing constitutional in-
terests in free expression. The suggested approach depends
heavily upon distinguishing between parodies that are commer-
cially motivated and parodies that cannot credibly be considered
commercial in nature. This article proposes that commercial par-
odies should receive a minimal level of first amendment protec-
tion, and indeed no first amendment protection if they are likely
to cause confusion concerning the source of a product or service.
Noncommercial parodies, however, should receive substantial
protection under an approach that restricts the application of ba-
sic trademark rights theories and balances freedom of expression
interests against potential harm to the trademark owner.22 The
approach urged in section V stems from the Supreme Court's
longstanding distinction between commercial and noncommer-
cial speech-a distinction so far applied chiefly in cases other than
trademark rights cases.23 Moreover, as will be demonstrated, the
suggested approach is consistent with major first amendment de-
cisions of the Supreme Court during the past three terms.
Although none of these decisions involved a trademark parody,
taken together they emphasize the high level of first amendment
protection given to noncommercial speech (including noncom-
mercial speech of an offensive nature), and demonstrate a widen-
ing gulf between the respective levels of protection given
commercial and noncommercial speech.24
ment and dilution. Section II discusses these theories as well as various other
legal claims of a secondary nature.
21. Free speech concerns become especially significant in dilution-based
suits. See infra notes 326-28, 453-54, 481-90 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of guidelines for making the distinction between com-
mercial and noncommercial parodies, as well as an explanation of how the re-
spective first amendment interests of commercial and noncommercial parodists
should be accommodated and implemented, see infra notes 385-490 and accom-
panying text.
23. For cases discussing the distinction between commercial and noncom-
mercial speech in situations not involving trademarks, see infra notes 250-60 and
accompanying text.
24. See Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028
(1989); Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989); Hustler Magazine Inc. v.
[Vol. 36: p. I
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II. TRADEMARK OWNERS' RIGHTS AND CLAIMS ASSERTED
AGAINST PARODISTS
A. Nature and Sources of Legal Protection for Trademarks
Trademark law is part of unfair competition law, which
brings together under a single heading a wide range of legal doc-
trines that deal with relations between business competitors. 25
Nevertheless, trademark law also possesses strong consumer pro-
tection elements, as demonstrated by the notion that trademarks
enable consumers to identify favored products without fear of
confusion concerning the source of those products.2 6 Traditional
trademark law thus hinges liability for an allegedly unfair compet-
itive act upon whether harm to consumers is likely to result from
the act.2 7
Unlike patent and copyright law, trademark law is not exclu-
sively a creature of federal statute. 28 Trademark law began as
common law, a still-existing source of protection. 29 Trademark
law acquired significant federal stature in the Lanham Act of
1946, recently refurbished by the Trademark Law Revision Act of
1988.30 Although federal law is now the preeminent source of
trademark protection, the federal system of trademark registra-
tion is permissive rather than mandatory.31 Common law protec-
tion for trademarks thus persists without being preempted by
federal law.3 2 Some states extend protection to trademarks in
statutes whose provisions are similar to those of the Lanham Act
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). For a discussion of Fox, see infra notes 282-94 and
accompanying text.. For a discussion of Johnson, see infra notes 238-47 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion of Falwell, see infra notes 232-37, 399-404
and accompanying text.
25. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:2.
26. See id. § 2:12(A).
27. See id.; Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Implications of the Emerging Ratio-
nales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 158, 160, 161-63.
28. Unlike trademark law, article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution and
the federal patent statute, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988), leave no room for the
states to regulate on the subject of patents. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). Additionally, the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.
§ 301 preempts state copyright law. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
29. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 5:2-:4; Denicola, supra note 27, at 160-
62.
30. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982),
amended by Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1128
(1988).
31. See 1J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 32:1.
32. Id.; Carter, supra note 2, at 759-60. For a discussion of the standards for
registration of a mark pursuant to federal law, see infra note 38 and accompany-
ing text.
7
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or the common law,33 or in anti-dilution statutes.3 4
Under these various sources of trademark law, trademarks
are classified as intangible property, and trademark owners ac-
quire significant property rights in their marks.35 These rights,
however, are not absolute. Instead of giving trademark owners
monopoly protection and a legal ability to stop all unconsented
uses of their trademarks, state and federal laws permit trademark
owners to enjoin unconsented uses and recover damages only
when those uses contravene certain recognized standards set
forth in the available theories of recovery.3 6 Therefore, the ele-
ments of proof imposed by these theories of recovery must be
examined.
B. Infringement
1. Elements of Infringement
Trademark infringement is the leading theory relied upon by
mark owners in suits for unconsented uses of the owners'
marks.37 Regardless of whether the trademark is entitled to pro-
tection under federal law,3 8 the common law,3 9 or a state trade-
33. These statutes are essentially duplicative of the common law or of fed-
eral law, and thus add little to the substantive law of trademarks. See Denicola,
supra note 27, at 161.
34. Anti-dilution statutes are a special breed of enactment, protecting
against dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark, regardless of the likelihood
of consumer confusion. For a discussion of these statutes, see infra notes 132-
40, 164-66 and accompanying text.
35. 1 J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.03[5] (1988); 1
J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:6. For instance, if the mark qualifies for registra-
tion on the Principal Register created by federal law, the mark's validity is virtu-
ally incontestable after five years of registration. The registration amounts to
nationwide constructive notice of the registrant's claim to ownership of the
mark, and the registrant obtains nationwide protection against infringing uses of
the mark. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1072, 1114 (1988).
36. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:6; Denicola, supra note 27, at 165.
37. See Shire, Dilution Versus Deception-Are State Antidilution Laws and Appropri-
ate Alternative to the Law of Infringement? 77 TRADEMARK REP. 273 (1987). But as
will be seen, the dilution theory is increasingly being relied upon by trademark
owners as a means of policing the marketplace for unconsented uses of their
marks. See infra notes 152-63, 167-77, 453-54 and accompanying text.
38. The owner of a trademark is not entitled to the protections of federal
law unless the mark has been registered on the Principal Register created by the
federal trademark statute. I J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 32:2(A). Subject to
certain limitations and conditions that are not germane to the purposes of this
article, a mark is registrable if it is a word, name, symbol, device, or combination
thereof, that is capable of distinguishing the owner's goods or services from
those of another. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052-1053 (1988).
39. Protection of a trademark or trade name under the common law is ac-
quired through use of the mark or name, as there is obviously no registration
scheme under the common law. I J. GILSON, supra note 35, § 104[2], at 1-47.
[Vol. 36: p. I
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mark statute, the plaintiff must prove two essential elements in
order to establish that there has been infringement of his mark.
First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that, without his consent, the
defendant used the plaintiff's protected trademark or something
substantially similar thereto.40 Second, the plaintiff must prove
that this use by the defendant created a likelihood of confusion
among consumers. 41 Proof of actual confusion is not required. 42
The necessary likelihood of confusion may be as to the
source or origin of the product or service. 43 In other words, if the
public is likely to believe that the plaintiff, rather than the defend-
ant, provided the defendant's goods or services, then the likeli-
hood of confusion element would be satisfied.44 The likelihood
of confusion element, however, is not restricted to probable con-
fusion concerning the narrow source or origin question. It may
be satisfied by proof of a probability that consumers could be-
come confused as to whether the plaintiff sponsored or endorsed
the defendant, its goods, or its services, or as to whether the
plaintiff was affiliated or associated with the defendant or its busi-
ness activities. 45
Known as the "keystone" of trademark law, the likelihood of
confusion element usually becomes the critical issue in a trade-
mark infringement case. 46 This requirement imposes a significant
limitation on the property rights enjoyed by trademark owners
because a defendant's unconsented use of the plaintiff's trade-
mark is not an infringement if the use does not create a likelihood
of confusion. Thus, for example, a florists association's use of
The protection afforded by the common law is generally restricted to the geo-
graphic area of actual use of the mark or name. See Carter, supra note 2, at 766.
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1988); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 717. In a
trademark infringement claim with at least a remote claim to validity, this first
element is virtually a given.
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1988); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §§ 717-28;
2J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23:1; Denicola, supra note 27, at 160-66. If the
plaintiff succeeds in proving infringement, possible remedies include injunctive
relief, damages, and recovery of the infringer's profits attributable to the in-
fringement. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(2), 1117 (1988); RESTATEMENT, supra §§ 745-47.
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1988); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 728 com-
ment a; 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23:2(A). Nonetheless, the plaintiff who
possesses evidence of actual confusion will want to produce it at trial because
instances of actual confusion obviously constitute strong, if not the best, evi-
dence of likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak,
836 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988).
43. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:3(B).
44. See id.
45. See id. § 24:3(B)-(C); Denicola, supra note 27, at 163-64.
46. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:3.
9
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"THIS BUD'S FOR YOU" in advertisements for rosebuds and
fresh-cut flowers was held not to infringe Anheuser-Busch, Inc.'s
beer slogan "This Bud's for you" because the requisite likelihood
of confusion was lacking. 47
Various federal appellate courts have developed lists of fac-
tors for determining whether a likelihood of confusion was cre-
ated by a defendant's use of the plaintiff's trademark.48 A typical
list 4 9 called for consideration of the following factors: (1) the
strength of the plaintiff's trademark; 50 (2) the degree of similarity
between the plaintiff's mark and the defendant's use; 5' (3) the
"competitive proximity" of the products or services with which
the plaintiff and defendant have used the mark;5 2 (4) the intent, if
47. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Florists Ass'n, 603 F. Supp. 35, 36-39 (N.D.
Ohio 1984). Although its slogan was not a federally-registered trademark,
Anheuser-Busch claimed common law trademark protection of the slogan. Id. at
36. Despite the defendant's verbatim use of the plaintiff's slogan, the court
thought it "absurd," given the advertisements' context and the vast difference
between beer and flowers, to believe that consumers were likely to be confused
concerning source, origin, sponsorship, or affiliation. Id. at 37-39. But see
Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.
1962) (court found infringement of Anheuser-Busch's protected slogan "Where
there's life there's Bud"; likelihood of confusion created as to defendant's use of
"Where there's life ... there's bugs" in commercials for combination floor wax-
insecticide), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963).
48. The same factors tend to be applied regardless of whether the infringe-
ment case involves a mark registered pursuant to federal law or an unregistered
mark protected under the common law. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak,
836 F.2d 397, 399 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988); Jordache
Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1484 (10th Cir. 1987); Pizzeria
Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984); Sun-Fun Prods., Inc.
v. Suntan Research & Dev. Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981);
Squirt Co. v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980); RESTATEMENT,
supra note 1, § 729. Although the actual application of the factors may vary de-
pending upon the facts of the particular case, it is possible to make a few gener-
alizations about their usual application. See infra notes 50-55.
49. This list was set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit. See Mutual of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 399 (citing Squirt Co., 628 F.2d
at 1091).
50. The first factor rests on the premise that the stronger the plaintiff's
mark, the more probable it is that the defendant's use would create a likelihood
of confusion. See, e.g., Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp.
198, 209-12 (D. Md. 1988). Ordinarily, marks that are truly distinctive in the
sense of being arbitrary, fanciful, or unique (such as "Polaroid") are considered
to be stronger than marks that describe the product or service being provided
(such as "Apple Raisin Crisp," a breakfast cereal brand name). See General
Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622, 625-26 (8th Cir. 1987); Polaroid Corp.
v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830, 837 (7th Cir. 1963).
51. There is a common-sense rationale for this factor: the stronger the sim-
ilarity between the plaintiff's mark and the defendant's use, the more probable it
is that the public could become confused. See, e.g., McDonald's Corp. v.
McBagel's, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268, 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
52. This factor involves consideration of not only the geographic areas in
[Vol. 36: p. I
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any, of the defendant to pass off his goods or services as those of
the plaintiff;53 (5) the amount of actual confusion, if any, among
consumers as a result of the defendant's actions; 54 and (6) the
which the plaintiff and defendant operate, but also the extent of similarity be-
tween the products or services with which the plaintiff and defendant have used
the mark. The greater the similarity in products or services and the greater the
overlap in geographic areas of doing business, the more likely it is that there
could be public confusion arising from the defendant's use of the same or sub-
stantially similar mark. See Mutual of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 399; McBagel's, 649 F.
Supp. at 1276-77. Thus, if the parties operate in completely different territories
and/or provide quite dissimilar products or services, the third factor would tend
to point toward a finding of no likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., Florists Ass'n,
603 F. Supp. at 37; Tetley, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 785,
790-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). This is not to say, however, that the plaintiff cannot
prevail in a trademark infringement action unless the defendant's use pertained
to a product or service directly competitive with the plaintiff's. There have been
numerous decisions in which likelihood of confusion was found even though the
plaintiff's and defendant's goods or services were not sold in competition with
each other. See Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198
(D. Md. 1988) (fast food and lodging); Grey v. Campbell Soup Co., 650 F. Supp.
1166 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (chocolate candy and dog biscuits), aff'd without opinion,
830 F.2d 197 (1987); Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Hallmark Dodge, Inc., 634 F.
Supp. 990 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (greeting cards and automobiles).
53. It is important to note the proper role of this factor in trademark in-
fringement litigation. The trademark owner is not required, as an element of an
infringement claim, to demonstrate that the defendant intended to infringe or to
trade on the reputation associated with the plaintiff's mark. 2 J. MCCARTHY,
supra note 1, § 23:31 (A). If, however, the defendant intended to have the public
mistake his goods or services for those of the plaintiff, that intent is probative of
whether the intended confusion would be likely to occur. Id. § 23:31(B). Some
courts, therefore, have concluded that an inference of likelihood of confusion
may arise from proof that the defendant intended to create confusion concern-
ing the source or origin of his goods or services by using the plaintiff's mark or
something closely resembling it. See Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d
1522, 1535 (4th Cir. 1984); Quality Inns, 695 F. Supp. at 206, 211. A defendant's
intent to use the plaintiff's mark, does not necessarily translate into an intent to
cause confusion, however. Accordingly, standing alone, such an intent should
not give rise to an inference of likelihood of confusion. See Jordache Enters.,
Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir. 1987); Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. T-Shirt Gallery, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1468, 1478-79 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Tetley, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 785, 791
(E.D.N.Y. 1983). Some courts have failed to appreciate this distinction between
intent to use and intent to confuse. See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1038 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Wendy's Int'l,
Inc. v. Big Bite, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 816, 822 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 207 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 852, 857 (N.D.
Ill. 1980). The distinction becomes especially significant in trademark infringe-
ment suits against parodists because the trademark parodist clearly intends to
use the plaintiff's mark, but usually does not intend to cause confusion concern-
ing source, origin, sponsorship, or affiliation. See, e.g.,Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1486;
Tetley, 556 F. Supp. at 791.
54. This factor must also be kept in proper perspective. As the legal stan-
dard is whether there was a likelihood of confusion, the plaintiff is not required
to prove actual confusion in order to prevail on an infringement claim. See supra
notes 41-42 and accompanying text. The existence of actual confusion, how-
ever, is obviously probative of whether a likelihood of confusion was created,
11
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degree of care consumers are likely to exercise in deciding
whether to purchase goods or services provided by the plaintiff
and defendant. 55 It is not necessary that all of the factors point
toward the same conclusion. When the factors do not unani-
mously suggest a particular conclusion, the court must identify
those factors that weigh most heavily in light of all the relevant
circumstances, and must determine whether those factors point
toward a likelihood of confusion. 56
2. Trademark Parody Cases and Likelihood of Confusion Issue
The likelihood of confusion issue is central to a trademark
infringement claim regardless of whether the defendant's use of
the plaintiff's mark was in the context of a parody. The cases in
which the alleged infringement amounted to a parody are of par-
ticular interest, however, because they have led to seemingly ir-
reconcilable results on arguably similar facts.5 7 Concededly, the
likelihood of confusion determination is largely fact-specific.
Consequently, one might sometimes expect divergent results in
cases involving arguably similar but somewhat different facts.
One might also assume, however, that the context in which the
defendant used the plaintiff's mark should normally prevent a
finding of likelihood of confusion, so long as the public would
reasonably identify the defendant's use as a parody. In other
words, the nature of parody, which involves the taking of "shots"
at a recognized original, ordinarily would seem likely to cause the
public to realize that the plaintiff was not the source of the par-
and is probably the most telling evidence of such a likelihood. Conversely, some
courts reason that the absence of evidence of actual confusion points toward a
finding of no likelihood of confusion. T-Shirt Gallery, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. at 1478;
Tetley, 556 F. Supp. at 791.
55. The degree of care contemplated by this factor depends on the sort of
goods or services involved and on the sophistication of the consumers who de-
sire such goods or services. See Mutual of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 401 (purchaser of
relatively inexpensive item such as t-shirt may not be likely to use high degree of
care to ascertain actual source of product). In applying this factor, some courts
have been more than willing to assume that much of the buying public is gullible
and easily duped. See Wendy's, 576 F. Supp. at 822-24; Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini
Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1190-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
56. See Mutual of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 399, 400 (court found trademark in-
fringement although no evidence of fourth factor of intent to pass off parodied
goods as those of trademark owner); Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1527 ("Not all
these [factors] are always relevant or equally emphasized in each case.").
57. Compare Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Florists Ass'n, 603 F. Supp. 35 (N.D.
Ohio 1984) (florists' use of "This Bud's for You" not infringement because par-
ody too obvious to create confusion) with Chemical Corp. of America v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962) (insecticide manufacturer's
substitution of "Bugs" for "Bud" in slogan likely to cause confusion).
[Vol. 36: p. I
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ody, that the plaintiff did not sponsor or endorse the defendant's
use of his trademark, and that the plaintiff and the defendant were
not affiliated in business.58 This assumption is sometimes, but
clearly not always, borne out in the trademark parody cases.
Tetley, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 59 provides a useful illus-
tration of the expected operation of the assumption that a trade-
mark parody would not ordinarily create confusion. In Tetley, the
court denied Tetley's request for injunctive relief against parodies
of its trademarks for "Tetley Tea" and the "Tiny Little Tea Leaf
Tea" slogan. 60 A Topps sticker, designed for children and sold
across the country, had used the name "Petley" on a picture of a
product box that depicted a dog scratching fleas. 6 1 The words
"40 Flea Bags" and "Tiny Little Dog Fleas" also appeared on the
picture of the box.62 In concluding that there was no likelihood
of confusion concerning source, sponsorship, endorsement, or af-
filiation, the court stressed the "heavy handedness" of the de-
fendant's parody. 63 The public's probable recognition of the
sticker as a parody would lead to a related recognition that the
plaintiff trademark owner was not responsible for the sticker. As
the court recognized in Tetley, the fact that the parody causes con-
sumers to think of the original does not by itself mean that con-
sumers are likely to be confused concerning source, sponsorship,
and the like.6 4
The obviousness of the defendant's parody has constituted a
58. The reasoning here is that the public generally would not expect the
plaintiff to poke fun at its own valued trademark or to make it the object of the
humorous or sometimes caustic commentary found in parodies. When consum-
ers see such a use of the plaintiff's trademark, they probably would recognize
the use for what it is: a use by a party other than the plaintiff and without the
permission of the plaintiff.
59. 556 F. Supp. 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
60. Id. at 786-87.
61. Id. at 787.
62. Id. The words "Orange Pekingese Fleas" also appeared on the sticker
as an obvious takeoff on the "Orange Pekoe Tea" language that appeared on the
plaintiff's packages of tea. Id. at 790. The sticker was part of the Wacky Packs
series, in which Topps parodied numerous well-known products and trade-
marks. See id. at 787.
63. Id. at 792. As further support for its conclusion that there was no likeli-
hood of confusion, the court emphasized that the plaintiff's and defendant's
products were vastly different and were sold to different sorts of consumers in
different markets. Id. at 790-91. The court also noted that the absence of any
evidence of actual confusion would seem to cut against a finding of likelihood of
confusion. Id. at 792, 794.
64. See id. at 790, 792. Indeed, a parody cannot be effective unless it causes
the reader or hearer to think of the original being parodied. See Note, Trademark
Parody: A Fair Use and First Amendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV. 1079, 1079 (1986).
13
Langvardt: Protected Marks and Protected Speech: Establishing the First Amen
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
14 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36: p. 1
major factor in judicial findings of no likelihood of confusion in
both commercial and non-commercial settings. In the commer-
cial setting, for example, a defendant's use of the name
"Lardashe" on its large-size designer jeans was held not to cause
a likelihood of confusion, and thus did not infringe the plaintiff's
familiar "Jordache" trademark. 65 "Miami Mice" t-shirts parody-
ing "Miami Vice" television show trademarks66 and the previ-
ously-discussed parody of the "This bud's for you" slogan by a
florists' association were also held not to cause a likelihood of
confusion. 67
In the non-commercial cases, obvious parodies are used as
vehicles for the expression of viewpoints or commentary of an ed-
itorial nature rather than to sell a product or service.68 , For in-
65. See, e.g., Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48, 55
(D.N.M. 1985), aff'd, 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987). This case provides an
excellent illustration of the notion that a business competitor-both parties sold
designer jeans-may deliberately use a similar or even identical version of an-
other competitor's trademark and not be liable for trademark infringement if the
use does not create a likelihood of confusion. This is true even when the use
involves taking a slightly off-color "jab," as the "Lardashe" name seems to do, at
the other party or its trademark. Whether the defendant may be liable to the
trademark owner on another legal theory in this sort of instance will be explored
later. See infra notes 166-67, 186-211 and accompanying text.
66. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. T-Shirt Gallery, Ltd., 634 F. Supp.
1468, 1477-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Casey & Casey,
Inc., 622 F. Supp. 201, 204-05 (S.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd without opinion, 792 F.2d
1125 (11th Cir. 1986).
67. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Florists Ass'n, 603 F. Supp. 35, 37 (N.D. Ohio
1984). For discussion of the case, see supra note 47 and accompanying text. For
other cases in which the plaintiff's infringement claim failed because no likeli-
hood of confusion was created by the defendant's parody in a commercial con-
text, see Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 746 F.2d 112 (2d Cir.
1984) (Nintendo's "Donkey Kong" did not infringe Universal Studios' "King
Kong" trademark); Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.
1981) (use by Sears of name "Bagzilla" for garbage. bags did not infringe plain-
tiff's "Godzilla" trademark); Dr. Pepper Co. v. Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., 517 F.
Supp. 1202 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (restaurant chain's commercials parodying Dr.
Pepper's "Be a Pepper" advertisements not trademark infringement, but copy-
right infringement found); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows,
Inc. v. Chandris America Lines, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (cruise
ship company's use of "The Greatest Show on Earth Isn't" slogan did not in-
fringe plaintiff's "The Greatest Show on Earth" trademark).
68. A substantial argument may be made that uses of this nature are outside
the legitimate reach of trademark rights doctrines because those doctrines
should operate only when commercial uses are involved. See San Francisco Arts
& Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 560-73 (1987)
(Brennan,J., dissenting); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 933-
35 (D.D.C. 1985); Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Comm.,
489 F, Supp. 1112, 1120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). As will be seen, a noncommercial
use of a trademark triggers a stronger first amendment-based defense than does
a commercial use thereof. See infra notes 409-11, 448-90 and accompanying text.
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stance, in Reddy Communications, Inc. v. Environmental Action
Foundation, Inc.,69 defendant Environmental Action Foundation,
Inc. (EAF) was a nonprofit corporation whose purpose was to
provide information about environmental issues. In various pam-
phlets and books, EAF used caricatures of the plaintiff's trade-
mark, the Reddy Kilowatt character, to express adverse comments
about the electric utility industry. These uses of the caricatures
were clearly contrary to the purposes underlying the plaintiff's
longstanding use of the Reddy Kilowatt trademark in utility com-
panies' advertisements and promotional materials. 70 Neverthe-
less, the parody was obvious, not only because EAF's versions of
Reddy Kilowatt were caricatures, but also because of the unmis-
takably negative commentary in which the caricatures played a
role.7' The court concluded that there was no trademark in-
fringement because reasonable readers of the EAF literature
would be unlikely to believe that the plaintiff and the utility com-
panies with which the plaintiff was allied-the very objects of
EAF's criticism-produced, sponsored, or endorsed the EAF
materials. 72
Similarly, in Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Com-
mittee, 73 STOP, a nonprofit organization, used USOC's trade-
marks on a poster that protested a plan to turn the Olympic
Village at Lake Placid into a federal prison at the conclusion of
the 1980 Winter Olympics. Three trademarks were used: the
word "Olympic" was part of the "Stop the Olympic Prison" head-
ing at the top of the poster; the familiar interlocking Olympic
rings were superimposed on a drawing of vertical steel-gray bars;
and the Olympic torch was depicted as being thrust through the
rings and bars by a silhouetted forearm.74 STOP's clearly non-
69. 477 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1979).
70. Id. at 942, 945. The plaintiff trademark owner was in the business of
providing advertising and public relations services to utility companies. Id. at
939.
71. Id. at 948.
72. Id. Perhaps the most interesting and telling caricature used by EAF de-
picts Reddy Kilowatt sticking out his tongue at the reader. Presumably, this was
intended to convey EAF's view of utility companies' attitudes toward the public.
See id. at 949. The court was kind enough to favor readers of the opinion with a
reproduction of the caricature. See id.
73. 489 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The organization known as Stop
the Olympic Prison will be referred to in subsequent discussion as "STOP" and
the United States Olympic Committee will be referred to as "USOC."
74. Id. at 1114-15, 1127.
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commercial use 75 was not technically a parody because it was not
even arguably humorous, but it did involve adverse commentary
sufficiently similar to a parody to warrant discussion here. The
court rejected USOC's claim of trademark infringement 76 be-
cause the necessary likelihood of confusion was not established. 77
In view of the context and content of STOP's poster, reasonable
persons who viewed the poster would not be inclined to believe
that USOC produced, sponsored, or endorsed it.78
In still other cases, the defendant's parody may have strad-
dled the commercial/noncommercial line but was nonetheless so
obvious that there was no likelihood of confusion. For example,
in Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Productions, Inc.,79 Pillsbury lost a
trademark infringement claim against the publisher of an adult
magazine that had depicted a likeness of Pillsbury's trademarked
"Poppin' Fresh" character engaging in various sexual activities. 80
Because the parody appeared in the context of an adult magazine
and contained material that was hardly consistent with anything
75. Although STOP sold some of the posters, it did so to solicit contribu-
tions for its cause. It gave away most of the posters without charge. Id. at 1115.
76. USOC raised other claims besides trademark infringement. One was a
claim that STOP's poster violated section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act of
1978, 36 U.S.C. § 380, which purports to grant USOC exclusive rights to the use
of the word "Olympic" and the Olympic symbol of five interlocking rings. The
court also rejected this claim, interpreting the statute as pertaining only to com-
mercial uses. Stop the Olympic Prison, 489 F. Supp. at 1118-21. The court hinted
that the statute might implicitly contain a likelihood of confusion requirement.
See id. at 1119-20. In a later decision dealing with another party's unconsented
use of "Olympic," the United States Supreme Court concluded that the Amateur
Sports Act of 1978 pertains predominantly to commercial uses but does not im-
plicitly require USOC to prove likelihood of confusion in order to enforce its
statutory exclusive rights against another party. See San Francisco Arts & Athlet-
ics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535, 539-41 (1987).
For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 382, 393-98 and accompanying text.
77. Stop the Olympic Prison, 489 F. Supp. at 1123.
78. Id. In addition to containing material that reasonable persons would be
unlikely to attribute to USOC, the poster stated that the STOP organization had
produced it. Id.
79. 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
80. Id. at 125-26, 133-34. This use by the defendant had both commercial
and noncommercial attributes. The publisher expected to make a profit from
the sale of the magazine, but that of course is also true of magazines commonly
perceived as more "legitimate" than the one at issue in the case. The sense of
relevant Supreme Court decisions is that a commercial profit motive is not by
itself sufficient to make the speech of a magazine commercial rather than non-
commercial. See infra notes 257-60 and accompanying text. The primary impor-
tance of the commercial/noncommercial distinction is that it dictates the level of
first amendment protection speech receives. See infra notes 249-52, 261-94 and
accompanying text. For purposes of later analysis, a use such as that in Pillsbury
would be classified as noncommercial despite its partially commercial nature.
See infra notes 409-11, 424 and accompanying text.
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Pillsbury would ever authorize, the court found that even the
most gullible reader would not regard the parody as the work of
Pillsbury.8' A similar approach was recently taken in Cliffs Notes,
Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc. 82 In Cliffs Notes,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
jected an argument that the defendant's Spy Notes, parodies of
the familiar Cliffs Notes summaries of well-known works of litera-
ture, were confusingly similar to Cliffs Notes.83 The court con-
cluded that the obviousness of the parodies84 would likely
prevent any public confusion as to whether the publisher of Cliffs
Notes also published or sponsored Spy Notes.8 5 Various other
decisions involving parodies that were either noncommercial or
close to the commercial/noncommercial line have held that the
defendant's use of the plaintiff's trademark did not create a likeli-
hood of confusion.8 6
81. Pillsbury, 215 U.S.P.Q (BNA) at 133-34. It should be noted, however,
that Pillsbury prevailed on an alternative claim for violation of a state anti-dilu-
tion statute. Id. at 135. For a discussion of this aspect of the case, see infra notes
168-69 and accompanying text.
82. 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989).
83. Id. at 495-97. The Second Circuit reversed the district court's issuance
of a preliminary injunction against the publisher of Spy Notes. Id. at 497. Tech-
nically, the case was brought on the theory that Spy Notes violated § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982) (amended 1988), by employing a cover,
name and format confusingly similar to Cliffs Notes and thereby implicitly mak-
ing the false representation that the publisher of Cliffs Notes also produced Spy
Notes. Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 718
F. Supp. 1159, 1160 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989). Lanham Act
cases fitting such a fact pattern are effectively the same as trademark infringe-
ment claims; therefore likelihood of confusion is a required element. See infra
notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
84. The parodies involved in the case are noteworthy because of their
"double parody" nature. Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 492. They were not only paro-
dies of the Cliffs Notes' approach to summarizing works of literature, but also
parodies of recent "cool, ironic, sophisticated, urbane" novels. Id. It appears
that the takeoffs on Cliffs Notes were little more than humor directed at Cliffs
Notes, whereas the "jabs" taken at the spy novels and their authors were evi-
dently intended to be not only amusing but also critical of the supposed quality
of the novels. Id.
85. Id. at 495-97. The Second Circuit also placed heavy emphasis on first
amendment concerns. It classified the parodies as "artistic expression" entitled
to considerable constitutional protection despite the profit motive of the pub-
lisher of Spy Notes. See id. at 493-94, 497. For a discussion of those aspects of
the case, see infra notes 364-73 and accompanying text.
86. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978)
(lower court incorrectly granted summary judgment on Disney's claim that its
"Silly Symphonies" trademark was infringed by defendant's use of "Silly Sympa-
thies" in adult comic books), cert. denied sub nom. O'Neill v. Walt Disney Prods.,
439 U.S. 1132 (1979); General Mills, Inc. v. Henry Regnery Co., 421 F. Supp.
359 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (denying request for preliminary injunction against pub-
lisher of cookbook entitled "Betty Cooker's Crock Book for Drunks" for alleged
17
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Not all of the parody cases litigated on a trademark infringe-
ment theory are won on the defendant's argument that the obvi-
ousness of the parody prevented the necessary likelihood of
confusion. In fact, trademark owners have won a high percentage
of the infringement claims against parodists.8 7 Some of the cases
infringement of "Betty Crocker" trademark); Girl Scouts of United States v. Per-
sonality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (defendant's "Be
Prepared" poster showing pregnant teenager in Girl Scout uniform held not to
infringe Girl Scouts' trademarks).
In a recent noncommercial use case the court's decision on the likelihood of
confusion issue would have been interesting if the case had not been settled a
few months after it was filed. See Wall St. J., Mar. 8, 1990, at B8, col. 5 (eastern
ed.). Miller Brewing Co. filed suit against Doctors Ought to Care (DOC), "a
[non-profit] coalition of health professionals . . . that is helping to educate the
public, especially young people, about the major preventable causes of poor
health and high medical costs." DOC News and Views, Winter 1990, at 2, col. 1
(masthead). DOC places "particular emphasis on counteracting the promotion
of tobacco and alcohol," and regards alcohol and tobacco use as "killer habits."
Id. Miller filed suit alleging that DOC's parodies of the "Miller Lite" trademark
and the "We're having a party" slogan that Miller had used in advertisements
for Miller-sponsored parties and concerts constituted infringement. DOC, Miller
Lite in Bill of Rights Brew-ha-ha, DOC News and Views, supra, at 1, col. 1. DOC's
parodies appeared on t-shirts sold by DOC to raise money for the Texas Special
Olympics. The t-shirts were sold outside the Houston Astrodome, where the
first of the Miller parties and concerts took place. One side of the shirts referred
to "Killer Lite" beer and added the statement, "We're pushing a drug." The
other side of the shirts parodied the "We're having a party" slogan with the
words "We're grabbing a potty" and a depiction of a person vomiting into a
toilet. Id.; Green, Miller Doesn't See Humor in T-Shirts Mocking "Lite " Ads, Wall St.
J., Oct. 13, 1989, at B3, col. 5 (eastern ed.). The shirts also bore a list of alcohol-
related diseases. DOC, Miller Lite in Bill of Rights Brew-ha-ha, supra, at 1, col. 1.
Miller alleged trademark infringement as well as a variety of other legal theories,
including trademark dilution, unfair competition, copyright infringement, and
interference with contractual relations. Id. at 3; Green, supra.
It is difficult to believe that Miller could have succeeded on the trademark
infringement claim if the case had gone to trial. The context and content of
DOC's parodies would seem to make it nearly impossible for Miller to prove the
necessary likelihood of confusion. Other theories raised by Miller would not
have required proof of likelihood of confusion, however. For a discussion of
dilution theory and Miller's dilution claim, see infra notes 139-83 (discussion of
dilution theory), 484-85 (discussion of Miller's dilution claim) and accompany-
ing text. Had the case gone to trial, the defendant's first amendment interests
would have become especially important in the resolution of Miller's dilution
claim. See Green, supra; DOC, Miller Lite in Bill of Rights Brew-ha-ha, supra, at 3.
The case was settled, however, with neither party conceding that the other's po-
sition was valid. Wall St. J., Mar. 8, 1990, supra.
87. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987)
(use of "Mutant of Omaha" on t-shirts sold by supposed anti-nuclear weapons
activist infringed plaintiff's "Mutual of Omaha" trademark), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
933 (1988); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (use of cheerleading uniform similar to plaintiff's in
pornographic movie violated plaintiff's trademark rights); Chemical Corp. of
America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962) (floor wax-insec-
ticide manufacturer's use of "where there's life ... there's bugs" in advertise-
ments infringed upon Busch's "where there's life ... there's Bud" slogan), cert.
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decided in favor of the trademark owners have involved parodies
that might seem obvious but were nonetheless shown by compe-
tent evidence to create a likelihood of confusion. For example,
fast food giant McDonald's Corp. prevailed on separate infringe-
ment claims against parties that employed the names
"McBagel's" for a bakery and restaurant88 and "McSleep" for a
proposed chain of motels.8 9 In each case, consumer survey evi-
denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963); Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 698 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C.
1988) (Disney's copyrights and trademark rights violated by defendant's use of
versions of Mickey Mouse and Minnie Mouse characters on t-shirts and sweat-
shirts), aff'd in pertinent part, rev'd in part, 897 F.2d 565 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Quality
Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198 (D. Md. 1988) (use of
"McSleep" as name of motel chain infringed McDonald's Corp. marks); Grey v.
Campbell Soup Co., 650 F. Supp. 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (use of "Dogiva" and
"Cativa" for gourmet pet biscuits infringed "Godiva" trademark used by Camp-
bell for chocolates and other candy), aff'd, 830 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1987); McDon-
ald's Corp. v. McBagel's, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (use of
"McBagel's" for bakery and restaurant infringed McDonald's Corp. marks);
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp.
1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (defendant's "Garbage Pail Kids" stickers violated plain-
tiff's trademark rights and copyright protection concerning "Cabbage Patch
Kids" dolls); Crazy Eddie, Inc. v. Lois Pitts Gershon, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 537
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (temporary restraining order granted to owner of "Crazy Ed-
die" trademark against competitor's "Confessions of Crazy Eddie" commercial);
DC Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga.
1984) (owner of trademarks and copyrights in Superman and Wonder Woman
characters entitled to injunction against defendant's use of "Super Stud" and
"Wonder Wench" characters in singing telegram business); Wendy's Int'l, Inc.
v. Big Bite, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (advertisement using girl
who stated "ain't no reason to go any place but Big Bite" infringed Wendy's
trademarked "Little Wendy" character and "ain't no reason to go any place
else" slogan); Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 7 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 1862 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (adult magazine's satirical depiction of
Tarzan and Jane characters infringed plaintiff's trademark rights in those char-
acters); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 207 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 852 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (defendant's use of "Jaws" as name of garbage
disposals preliminarily enjoined at request of movie studio); General Elec. Co. v.
Alumpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1036 (D. Mass. 1979) (t-shirts bearing
"Genital Electric" inscription held to infringe General Electric trademarks);
General Foods Corp. v. Mellis, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (pre-
liminary injunction awarded against defendants' song "I'm the Pop Rock King"
held to infringe "Pop Rocks" trademark used by plaintiff as name of candy);
Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (use of
"Gucchi Goo" on diaper bag infringed "Gucci" trademark); Interbank Card
Ass'n v. Simms, 431 F. Supp. 131 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (preliminary injunction
awarded against defendant's use of religious cards and stickers referring to
"charge" and trademarked rings of plaintiff charge card association); Edgar Rice
Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Theatres, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 159 (C.D. Cal. 1976)
(references to Tarzan and Jane characters in title and story line of X-rated movie
infringed plaintiff's trademark rights and copyright protection in those charac-
ters); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
("Enjoy Cocaine" poster infringed Coca-Cola Co.'s trademarks).
88. McBagel's, 649 F. Supp. at 1282.
89. Quality Inns, 695 F. Supp. at 221-23. McDonald's has adopted an ag-
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dence demonstrated that any parodying of the McDonald's
name 90 was not so obvious as to prevent a likelihood of confusion
among consumers. The surveys demonstrated a rather high level
of actual confusion among consumers, many of whom believed
that McDonald's was involved in some respect in the McSleep and
gressive enforcement policy concerning its various "Mc"-prefixed trademarks.
It has threatened or instituted litigation against various alleged infringers. Mc-
Donald's Plays Name Game Hardball, Bloomington (Ind.) Herald-Telephone, June
15, 1988, at B7, col. 1 (Scripps Howard News Service article that first appeared
in San Francisco Examiner). The court's opinion in the McBagels case lists more
than 30 food-related trademark registrations that belong to McDonald's and in-
volve use of the "Mac" or the "Mc" prefix. McBagel's, 649 F. Supp. at 1270 n.2.
McDonald's also claims several other "Mc"-prefixed marks for uses that are not
limited to the fast food context. See Quality Inns, 695 F. Supp. at 203 (noting such
examples as "McKids" for children's clothing and "McJobs" for job programs).
Although the Quality Inns case was believed to be the first judicial decision find-
ing infringement of a McDonald's mark outside the food setting, McDonald's
has favorably settled many such claims over the years. Koenig, McDonald's Victory
Turns Out Lights for 'McSleep Inn, 'Wall St. J., Sept. 19, 1988, at 42, col. 3 (eastern
ed.).
90. The commercial setting has spawned numerous business names that ap-
pear to be parodies of the McDonald's name. These include McDonuts (for
baked goods), McMaid (for a maid service), McFranchise (for management con-
sulting services), McPrint (for printing services), McQuik (for oil change
franchises), and McTravel (for a travel agency). Quality Inns, 695 F. Supp. at 213.
Recently, two familiar fast food chains, Kentucky Fried Chicken and Pizza Hut,
have parodied the Ronald McDonald character and other McDonald's trade-
marks in advertisements. See McCarthy, Kentucky Fried Chicken Draws Squawks from
CBS with Ads Ribbing McDonald's, Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1990, at B6, col. 1 (eastern
ed.). Gibson, Two Giants Give Each Other the Works as They Fight to Slice up Pizza
Market, Wall. St. J., Sept. 15, 1989, at BI, col. 4 (eastern ed.). It does not ap-
pear, however, that McDonald's has taken legal action against either firm.
In addition, the familiarity of the McDonald's name and image has led to
journalistic uses of the "Mc" prefix as a means of indicating thrift, speed and
convenience. For example, the Quality Inns court noted that journalists have
coined the terms McMedicine (for inexpensive medical care facilities), McLaw
(for legal services franchises), McFuneral (for funeral service franchises),
McPaper (for the newspaper USA Today) and McGod (for religion as practiced
by television evangelists). Quality Inns, 695 F. Supp. at 215. The court referred
to its written decision as a McPinion after observing that a newspaper account of
the case had mentioned the McCourt. Id. Nevertheless, the court rejected the
argument of Quality Inns that the "Mc" prefix had become a generic, and hence
unprotectable by McDonald's, way of expressing notions of speed, convenience,
and the like. Id. at 216.
Another example of a parody of McDonald's trademarks in a noncommer-
cial setting was a syndicated political cartoon that depicted a likeness of then-
President Reagan posting the number 10 next to the words "million unem-
ployed" on a "McRonald's" sign which included the familiar golden arches.
McBagel's, 649 F. Supp. at 1272. It would seem difficult for McDonald's to suc-
cessfully attack such uses on an infringement basis, primarily because their non-
commercial nature would probably cut against a finding of likelihood of
confusion. As will be seen, however, not all trademark rights theories require
proof of likelihood of confusion. See infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of why these noncommercial uses should have substantial first
amendment protection, see infra notes 469-90 and accompanying text.
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McBagel's ventures. 91
Survey evidence showing actual confusion also played a key
role in Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak.9 2 The court held
that Mutual of Omaha's trademark was infringed by the defend-
ant's use of "Mutant of Omaha" on t-shirts and other items. The
court concluded that the defendant's parody of the Mutual of
Omaha mark93 would not be readily apparent to consumers, and
could thus cause confusion as to source, sponsorship, or
endorsement. 9 4
In other cases, however, it seems that the court's distaste for
the defendant's parody has caused the court to summarily con-
clude that there was a likelihood of confusion without engaging in
meaningful analysis of the issue.9 5 For instance, in one of the
91. In each of the cases, surveys given considerable weight by the court
indicated that more than 30% of those surveyed were actually confused. Quality
Inns, 695 F. Supp. at 208-09, 218-19; McBagel's, 649 F. Supp. at 1277-78. Evi-
dence of actual confusion, of course, is frequently considered the best evidence
of likelihood of confusion. See supra note 42.
92. 648 F. Supp. 905 (D. Neb. 1986), aff'd, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988). The percentage of survey participants who
were actually confused was approximately 10%. Id. at 911. This is considerably
less than the 30% figures seen in the surveys in Quality Inns and McBagel's. See
supra note 91. The likelihood of confusion issue was therefore a closer call in
Mutual of Omaha. Although it affirmed the district court's decision in Mutual of
Omaha, the Eighth Circuit observed that it might have reached a different conclu-
sion if the likelihood of confusion issue were before it on de novo review. Mu-
tual of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 398-99. Because such review was not called for,
however, the Eighth Circuit found the record sufficient to support the district
court's finding of likelihood of confusion. Id.
93. Besides using the "Mutant of Omaha" phrase, the t-shirts sold by the
defendant showed an Indian head logo arguably similar to the one used by the
plaintiff insurance company. Mutual of Omaha, 648 F. Supp. at 907. The t-shirts
also contained the language "Nuclear Holocaust Insurance" and "When the
world's in ashes we'll have you covered." Id. The defendant later began selling
merchandise that bore the "Mutant of Omaha's Mutant Kingdom" inscription as
a takeoff on the plaintiff insurance company's longstanding sponsorship of the
"Wild Kingdom" television program. Id. According to the defendant, the t-
shirts and other merchandise constituted expression of his opposition to nuclear
weapons. Id. at 911. Both the district court and the Eighth Circuit rejected the
first amendment argument made by the defendant. Mutual of Omaha, 836 F.2d at
402-03; Mutual of Omaha, 648 F. Supp. at 907. For a discussion of this aspect of
the case, see infra notes 312-14 and accompanying text.
94. Mutual of Omaha, 648 F. Supp. at 910. The district court distinguished
Tetley, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), by
observing that the parody of the Mutual of Omaha trademark was not "so obvi-
ous and heavy handed" as the parody in Tetley. Mutual of Omaha, 648 F. Supp. at
910. For a discussion of Tetley, see supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d
433 (5th Cir. 1962) (floor wax-insecticide manufacturer's use of "where there's
life . . . there's bugs" slogan held to infringe Busch's "where there's life ...
there's Bud" slogan), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963); Original Appalachian
Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986)
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early trademark parody cases, Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc. ,96
the court granted Coca-Cola a preliminary injunction against the
producer of a poster entitled "Enjoy Cocaine." 97 The words ap-
peared in the familiar cursive script used by Coca-Cola for its
brand name. 98 The court's opinion reflects a preoccupation with
the objectionable nature and subject matter of the defendant's
poster. One gets the impression that the court was eager to en-
join what it considered a distasteful poster,99 even though careful
analysis of the likelihood of confusion question might have re-
vealed a roadblock to the desired result.100
(defendant's "Garbage Pail Kids" stickers held to infringe trademarks and copy-
rights of plaintiff in connection with "Cabbage Patch Kids" dolls); Edgar Rice
Burroughs, Inc. v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1862
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (use of Tarzan andJane characters in satirical depiction in adult
magazine held to violate plaintiff's trademark rights in those characters).
96. 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
97. Id. at 1193.
98. Id. at 1186. In addition to ruling for the plaintiff on the infringement
claim, the court grounded its decision on the alternative theories raised by the
plaintiff. See id. at 1190-91. Only the infringement claim is being considered in
this portion of the article.
Coca-Cola Co.'s concern about being linked with cocaine in any way-even
an apparently implausible way-is reflected in its recent suit against a manufac-
turer of powdered candy that was sold in a small bottle. Coca-Cola claimed that
the bottle resembled the trademarked Coca-Cola bottle, that the powdered
candy inside the bottle could be mistaken for cocaine, and that consumers could
therefore believe that Coca-Cola Co. is a participant in or endorser of the co-
caine trade. See Coke Sues Candy Firm, Alleging Product Links Soft Drink to Cocaine,
Wall St. J., Aug. 11, 1989, at B3, col. 6 (eastern ed.). Although the court in
Coca-Cola's suit concerning the "Enjoy Cocaine" poster noted that there is no
shortage of gullible, easily confused consumers, see Coca-Cola, 346 F. Supp. at
1190, it is difficult to imagine even the most hopelessly naive consumer believing
that cocaine was the product being sold in the small bottles appearing on the
shelves of a legitimate business establishment.
99. The court noted the familiarity of the Coca-Cola trademarks and disap-
provingly commented on the defendant's "predatory intent." Coca-Cola, 346 F.
Supp. at 1187. In addition, the court expressed concern about protecting the
business reputation of the plaintiff and about the "tragic drug problem" in the
United States as a result of the use of "noxious substance[s]" such as cocaine.
Id. at 1189. The gist of the court's statements is that Coca-Cola Co. was being
unfairly put-upon by an irresponsible free-rider, and that such actions should
not be countenanced. See id. at 1188-90.
100. The court did cite, almost in passing, affidavits that contained evi-
dence to support a finding of likelihood of confusion. See id. at 1189 n.9. None-
theless, the court seemed disinclined to explore the substantiality of that
evidence and failed to engage in meaningful discussion of factors ordinarily con-
sidered in likelihood of confusion analysis. See id. at 1188-89. For a discussion
of the types of factors ordinarily considered, see supra notes 48-56 and accompa-
nying text. It is perhaps only a slight overstatement to say that the court was
effectively employing a standard under which a likelihood of confusion would be
found if there was any supporting evidence, no matter how insubstantial.
Whether Coca-Cola could have prevailed at trial-where the affidavits it em-
ployed in seeking the preliminary injunction would not have been admissible-is
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Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd. 101 is
perhaps an even stronger example of a court's giving short shrift
to the likelihood of confusion issue and finding trademark in-
fringement primarily on the basis of objectionable speech or ac-
tions by the defendant. 0 2 The plaintiff claimed trademark rights
in the physical appearance of its cheerleaders' uniform. 0 3 It ob-
jected to the use of a likeness of the uniform in the sexually-ex-
plicit movie "Debbie Does Dallas." The conclusion of the movie
featured a cheerleader who engaged in various sexual exploits
while clad in parts of the uniform. In affirming the trial court's
finding of trademark infringement, 04 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit disapprovingly referred to the
content of the film as "gross and revolting" and "depraved."'10 5
Neither the Second Circuit nor the district court in Dallas
Cowboys conducted an insightful analysis of the likelihood of con-
fusion issue. The district court simply concluded that likelihood
of confusion could be inferred from the moviemaker's apparent
intent to capitalize on the popularity of the Dallas Cowboys
an interesting question that remains unanswered because the issuance of the
preliminary injunction effectively ended the litigation. For another parody case
in which the court issued a preliminary injunction after applying a very low
threshold in determining likelihood of confusion, see Wendy's International,
Inc. v. Big Bite, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 816, 823-24 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
101. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979). Technically, the case was brought under
§ 4 3(a) of the federal Lanham Act. For a discussion of the similarity between
Lanham Act and trademark infringement claims, see infra notes 116-21 and ac-
companying text.
102. Dallas Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 204-05.
103. Id. at 203.
104. Id. at 206-07. The court rejected the defendant's first amendment ar-
guments. Id. at 206. For a discussion of that aspect of the decision, see infra
notes 302-10 and accompanying text.
The victorious plaintiff in Dallas Cowboys also found appellate success in an-
other parody-based case. In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard
Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979), the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that the defendant
Scoreboard had infringed the plaintiff's copyrighted poster of the Cowboys
cheerleaders in their uniforms. Id. at 1188-89. Scoreboard's infringement con-
sisted of a poster that strongly resembled the plaintiff's except that the ex-Cow-
boys cheerleaders shown in the poster were partially out of their Cowboys-like
uniforms. Id. at 1186-88. Although the Fifth Circuit decided the case on copy-
right infringement grounds, the district, court had also based its judgment for
the plaintiff on trademark infringement and unfair competition grounds. Id. at
1186, 1188 n.l.
105. Dallas Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 202, 205. The court noted, however, that
the question of whether the movie was obscene was not before the court. Id. at
206 n.10.
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Cheerleaders. 10 6 The drawing of such an inference was errone-
ous, however, because the intent to use a recognized trademark is
not necessarily the same as an intent to confuse the public.'0 7 An
inference of likelihood of confusion should only be drawn from
the latter sort of intent. 0 8
The Second Circuit also seemed to misapply this basic con-
cept. It noted that the uniform shown in the movie "unquestiona-
bly brings to mind the Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders. Indeed, it is
hard to believe that anyone who had seen defendants' sexually
depraved film could ever thereafter disassociate it from plaintiff's
cheerleaders. This association results in confusion ... ."109 The
Second Circuit failed to appreciate the difference between a de-
fendant's use that merely calls to mind the original trademark and
a use that calls to mind the original in such a way that there is a
likelihood of confusion concerning source, sponsorship, or en-
dorsement. The former and the latter are different sorts of
uses. "10 Indeed, in Dallas Cowboys, the objectionable way in which
the trademark was used-the primary object of the court's con-
cern and the major reason it found a likelihood of confusion-
should have led the court to conclude that there was no likelihood
of confusion. The nature of the movie was such that the public
would not be inclined to believe the trademark owner had any
involvement with it.
106. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F. Supp.
366, 376-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aft'd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
107. The defendant in Dallas Cowboys claimed that the movie "Debbie Does
Dallas" was intended as a parody of or satire on cheerleaders. Id. at 375. The
trial court disagreed, saying that the movie was neither humorous nor a vehicle
for meaningful commentary. See id. at 376. The Second Circuit also said it was
neither a parody nor a satire. Dallas Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 206. Even if the movie
was not a true parody, the lawsuit presented the same basic issues seen in trade-
mark parody cases.
Assuming, however, that "Debbie Does Dallas" was at least in part a parody,
the parody itself has now been parodied in a commercial setting. Newspaper
accounts report the existence of a Fort Collins, Colorado establishment known
as "Debbie Duz Donuts," which employs topless waitresses and sells donuts,
coffee and adult videos. Lincoln (Ne.) Journal-Star, Aug. 20, 1989, at 2A, col. 2.
108. For discussion of the significant difference between intent to use and
intent to confuse, see supra note 53 and accompanying text. The parodist wants
the public to recognize the original being parodied, but does not generally in-
tend for the public to become confused concerning source, sponsorship, or en-
dorsement. See id. For another parody case in which the court failed to
appreciate the difference between intent to use and intent to confuse, see Origi-
nal Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031,
1038 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
109. Dallas Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 205.
110. For a discussion of these different sorts of uses, see supra notes 58-86
and accompanying text.
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In addition to its role as an essential element of trademark
infringement, the likelihood of confusion element has special sig-
nificance in the infringement cases that involve parodies. 1 ' As
will be explained later, when the likelihood of confusion require-
ment is properly applied, it serves as a check on liability and usu-
111. Although the focus of this article is on trademark parody, parodies of
copyrighted works also have given rise to a considerable amount of litigation.
See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986) (copyright on song "When
Sunny Gets Blue" not infringed by parody titled "When Sunny Sniffs Glue");
MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981) (copyright on song "Boggie
Woogie Bugle Boy of Company B" infringed by parody titled "Cunnilingus
Champion of Company C"); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d
Cir. 1964) (Mad Magazine parodies did not infringe copyrights on Irving Berlin
Songs), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964); Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th
Cir. 1956) (comedian Jack Benny held liable for parody of play "Gas Light"),
aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v.
Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (per curiam); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (no copyright infringement
when television program "Saturday Night Live" included song "I Love Sodom,"
which parodied copyrighted song "I Love New York"), aff'd per curiam, 623 F.2d
252 (2d Cir. 1980); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137
F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (television skit "From Here to Obscurity" did not
infringe copyright on movie "From Here to Eternity").
Unlike trademark infringement, copyright infringement may occur even
though the defendant's use did not cause likelihood of confusion concerning
source, endorsement, affiliation and the like. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1988); 1 J.
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6:4. Copyright law, however, has long recognized
the "fair use" defense, first as a judicially created doctrine and more recently by
virtue of a provision in the Copyright Act of 1976. See Berlin, 329 F.2d at 543-45
(discussing fair use defense); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (fair use defense). The fair use
defense frequently, though not always, protects the parodists from liability to
the copyright owner. See, e.g., Fisher, 794 F.2d 432 (parodist protected from lia-
bility by fair use defense); Berlin, 329 F.2d 541 (same); Elsmere Music, 482 F.
Supp. 741 (same); Columbia Pictures, 137 F. Supp. 348 (same). But see MCA, 677
F.2d 180 (parodies at issue not fair use); Benny, 239 F.2d 532 (same).
Some litigation over parodies involves claims by plaintiffs that both copy-
right and trademark rights were violated. See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 434 (copyright
and disparagement claims); Warner Bros. Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos.,
720 F.2d 231, 238 (2d Cir. 1983) (copyrights and trademarks associated with
Superman character not infringed by television program "The Greatest Ameri-
can Hero"); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc., v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600
F.2d 1184, 1186 (5th Cir. 1979) (trial court found probable infringement of
copyrighted poster of cheerleaders and probable unfair competition); Walt Dis-
ney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 752 n.2 (9th Cir. 1978) (summary judg-
ment for plaintiffs affirmed on copyright infringement claim concerning use of
copyrighted characters in adult "counter-culture" comic books, but reversed on
trademark infringement claims concerning uses of plaintiffs' titles), cert. denied sub
nom. O'Neill v. Walt Disney Prods., 439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
For useful discussion of copyright parody cases, the fair use doctrine and
first amendment interests in the copyright context, see generally Clemmons, Au-
thor v. Parodist: Striking a Compromise, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 3 (1985); Denicola, Copy-
right and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67
CALIF. L. REv. 283 (1979); Dorsen, supra note 5; Goetsch, Parody as Free Speech-
The Replacement of the Fair Use Doctrine by First Amendment Protection, 3 W. NEw ENG.
L. REV. 39 (1980); Note, supra note 64, at 1079.
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ally keeps the infringement theory from posing serious first
amendment difficulties."12
C. Section 43(a) of Lanham Act of 1946 and Trademark Law
Revision Act of 1988
Federal law sets forth not only the basis for infringement
claims concerning registered marks, 1 3 but also provides another
theory often relied upon by plaintiffs in trademark-related litiga-
tion. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act of 1946, as recently
amended by the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 (TLRA),
creates a civil right of action in favor of persons likely to be
harmed by another party's use, in connection with the providing
of goods or services, of false or misleading designations of origin,
or other false or misleading representations.' 14 This section may
be invoked regardless of whether the plaintiff has a federally reg-
istered trademark.'1 5 In many respects, section 43(a) is a federal
unfair competition provision whose broad language may be read
to cover a wide range of behaviors considered competitive torts
under the common law. 16
In some section 43(a) cases, the allegedly false or misleading
representation usually is an implication that the plaintiff sponsors
or endorses, or is affiliated or associated with the defendant or
the defendant's business activities. 117 Such a representation ar-
guably arises from the defendant's use of a mark confusingly simi-
112. See Denicola, supra note 27, at 159, 165-66. For a discussion of the
proper application of the likelihood of confusion requirement, see infra notes
450-52, 475-80 and accompanying text. A persistent problem, however, is that
the likelihood of confusion element is not always properly applied. See supra
notes 95-112 and accompanying text.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1988).
114. Id. § 1125(a). The standard interpretation of section 43(a) has been
that only business plaintiffs are entitled to bring suit under the statute. Consum-
ers are not regarded as permissible section 43(a) plaintiffs. Best, Monetary Dam-
ages for False Advertising, 49 U. Prr. L. REV. 1, 2 n.1 (1987).
115. Best, supra note 114, at 4 n.7, 5 n.14; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(1988) (nothing in § 43(a) language indicating that federally registered trade-
mark is necessary for plaintiff to properly bring suit thereunder).
116. See Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Should Be the Reach of
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. REV. 671, 671-72, 680-81 (1984).
For examples of the various contexts in which section 43(a) may be employed,
see id.; Langvardt, Free Speech Versus Economic Harm: Accommodating Defamation,
Commercial Speech, and Unfair Competition Considerations in the Law of Injurious False-
hood, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 903, 949-50 & n.269 (1989).
117. See Best, supra note 114, at 4 n.7, 5 n. 14. For cases illustrating the use
of section 43(a) in the context of alleged infringement of unregistered marks,
see infra note 120 and accompanying text.
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lar to the plaintiff's." 8 Thus, section 43(a) claims of this sort are
essentially the same as trademark infringement actions." 19 This is
true regardless of whether the section 43(a) claim pertains to a
parody of the plaintiff's mark 20 or to another allegedly infringing
sort of use. Accordingly, the dual elements of substantial similar-
ity and likelihood of confusion, which are required in common
law infringement claims and in claims for infringement of feder-
ally registered marks, are also required in section 43(a) suits of
the infringement variety.' 2'
In addition to its use as an infringement theory in trademark
parody cases, the recently amended version of section 43(a) may
also be used by trademark parody plaintiffs as a federal vehicle for
what is effectively an injurious falsehood claim.' 22 The tort of in-
jurious falsehood addresses a defendant's disparagement or cast-
ing of aspersions on a plaintiff's goods, property, services, or
business.' 23 The amended version of section 43(a) authorizes
118. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1000 (2d Cir. 1989).
119. As noted earlier, trademark infringement claims under federal law or
common law involve essentially the same claim: that the defendant's use of the
plaintiff's mark, or of something substantially similar thereto, would likely cause
the public to become confused concerning such matters as source, origin, en-
dorsement, or business affiliation. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
120. A number of the parody cases cited or discussed previously involved a
§ 43(a) claim as an alternative theory of recovery. See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v.
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989);
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1984); Toho
Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981); Dallas Cowboy
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Florists Ass'n, 603 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Dr.
Pepper Co. v. Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1202 (N.D. Tex. 1981);
Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Reddy Communications, Inc. v. Environmental Action Found.,
477 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1979); Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F.
Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Girl Scouts of United States v. Personality Posters
Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp.' 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
121. The Trademark Law Revision Act's recent amendment of § 43(a) ex-
pressly requires proof of likelihood of confusion for § 43(a) claims of this sort.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). The likelihood of confusion determination in
these cases involves application of essentially the same factors employed in
other infringement suits and discussed previously herein. See, e.g., Reddy Commu-
nications, 477 F. Supp. at 946-47. For a discussion of these factors, see supra
notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
122. See Kobak & Fleck, Commercial Defamation Claim Added to Revised Lanham
Act, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 30, 1989, at 33, col. 1. The new § 43(a) has added this addi-
tional basis of liability without eliminating any sorts of claims actionable under
the former Lanham Act version. See id.
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A (1977) [hereinafer RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND)]. This tort is sometimes referred to as disparagement because
that is the name of its most frequently encountered form. Injurious falsehood
has sometimes been an alternative theory in trademark parody litigation.
27
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civil suits for a defendant's false or misleading representation
which, "in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents
the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or
her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities." 24
The quoted language should allow a suit based on the defend-
ant's representation concerning the plaintiff's goods, services, or
business, because the plaintiff would be "another person" within
the meaning of the statute. Such a conclusion is consistent with
the apparent intent underlying the TLRA's amendment of section
43(a): to alter the prevailing judicial interpretation that section
43(a) reached only the defendant's representations concerning his
own goods or services.' 2 5
Therefore, certain disparagement and other injurious false-
hood claims that formerly would have been actionable only under
the common law may now be pursued under the new section
43(a).1 26 Bringing these claims under section 43(a) may be ad-
vantageous to plaintiffs because section 43(a)'s language does
not impose the stern proof requirements normally encountered
by plaintiffs in injurious falsehood cases. 127 Finally, the TLRA
124. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988) (emphasis added). Specific language of
the sort quoted in the text accompanying this footnote did not appear in the
Lanham Act's version of § 43(a) prior to its amendment by the Trademark Law
Revision Act of 1988. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982) (amended 1988).
125. S. REP. No. 100-515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5577, 5603; Kobak & Fleck, supra note 122, at
33; Lavelle, What's in a Name? New Law Explains, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 6, 1989, at 1, col.
1. Former § 43(a)'s general prohibition of false descriptions or representations
in connection with goods or services, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982) (amended
1988), was regarded as covering the defendant's false or misleading representa-
tions concerning the nature, quality, or characteristics of his own goods or serv-
ices. The consistent judicial interpretation of former § 43(a), however, was that
the statutory language did not reach the defendant's false or misleading repre-
sentations concerning the plaintiffs goods, services, or business. See, e.g., Ber-
nard Food Indus., Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279, 1283-84 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970); see also S. REP. No. 100-515, supra (noting this
judicial interpretation of § 43(a)). Thus, claims for what would have been dis-
paragement or other forms of injurious falsehood under the common law were
not regarded as actionable under the pre-TLRA version of § 43(a), because such
claims necessarily involved the defendant's statements about the plaintiff's
products, services, or business. See Bernard Food, 415 F.2d at 1283-84.
126. See S. REP. No. 100-515, supra note 125; Kobak & Fleck, supra note
122, at 33-35.
127. For discussion of proof of fault requirements in injurious falsehood
law, see infra note 209 and accompanying text. Section 43(a) does not contain
any requirement that the plaintiff prove the defendant's actual or constructive
knowledge of the falsity of the representation concerning which suit was
brought. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). Such requirements are imposed for
first amendment reasons in defamation law and in injurious falsehood law. See
infra notes 203, 209 and accompanying text. If plaintiffs begin employing the
new § 43(a) as a means for bringing claims that formerly would have been ac-
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version of section 43(a) requires that the false or misleading rep-
resentation must have been made "in commercial advertising or
promotion."' 128 All disparagement or other injurious falsehood
claims occurring outside the advertising or promotion setting
should remain actionable only under the common law and not
under section 43(a). 129
Because the amended version of section 43(a) is so new, it
remains to be seen to what extent plaintiffs will rely on it as a
federal vehicle for injurious falsehood claims. It is clear, how-
ever, that if trademark parody plaintiffs attempt to use the statute
as a basis for a disparagement claim, they must be able to estab-
lish that any falsehoods asserted by the defendant concerning the
plaintiffs' trademarks necessarily were falsehoods concerning
their "goods, services, or commercial activities." 30
D. Dilution
As demonstrated earlier, neither federal law nor the common
law provides a trademark owner with complete protection be-
cause unconsented use of a mark will not entitle its owner to relief
unless the use created a likelihood of confusion.' 3' The likeli-
hood of confusion requirement thus creates a gap in the protec-
tion a trademark owner receives.
Approximately one-half of the states have attempted to close
this gap, at least partially, by enacting what are known as anti-
dilution statutes.132 These statutes set forth the dilution doctrine,
tionable on injurious falsehood or even defamation grounds, courts will have to
determine whether the fault requirements of defamation and injurious falsehood
may be evaded by styling the case as a § 43(a) claim. The same considerations
that prompted the development of fault requirements in defamation and injuri-
ous falsehood law would seem to apply to those § 43(a) claims that are essen-
tially the same as defamation or injurious falsehood claims. Langvardt, supra
note 116, at 950-51 & nn.272-74.
128. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(2) (1988).
129. For instance, if a manufacturer of a product sues a magazine because it
allegedly stated a falsehood in the course of a review of the effectiveness of the
plaintiff's product, the claim may well be actionable on common law injurious
falsehood grounds but should not be actionable under the new § 43(a). This is
because the magazine's statement would not have been in the context of "com-
mercial advertising or promotion."
130. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(2) (1988). In the Trademark Law Revision Act
of 1988, Congress rejected calls to enact a separate "trademark disparagement"
section. See Lavelle, supra note 125, at 50. Even without such a separate section,
however, some instances of trademark disparagement arguably would be action-
able under the amended § 43(a). See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 40-41, 46 and accompanying text.
132. See Shire, supra note 37, at 273 n.2.
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which does not require the trademark owner to prove likelihood
of confusion. 33 Unequivocally geared toward furthering trade-
mark owners' economic interests in preserving the value of their
marks, the dilution doctrine recognizes that the owners' interests
may be endangered by other parties' uses of the marks even when
those uses are not likely to create consumer confusion. Anti-dilu-
tion statutes therefore allow mark owners to obtain relief against
parties whose actions violated neither federal law nor the com-
mon law. 134
Dilution claims based on these statutes have become popular
among plaintiffs in trademark rights litigation regardless of
whether a parody is involved.' 35 Most anti-dilution statutes are
identical to or patterned after the Model State Trademark Bill,' 3 6
which provides:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution
of the distinctive quality of a mark registered under this
Act, or a mark valid at common law, or a trade name
valid at common law, shall be a ground for injunctive re-
lief notwithstanding the absence of competition between
the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source
of goods or services.137
As indicated by the quoted language, the owner is entitled to in-
junctive relief for unconsented use of his trademark if he can
show either dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark or likeli-
hood of injury to business reputation. 38
133. Note, supra note 64, at 1087; see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330
(West 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451(b) (1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 140, para.
22 (1988); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 368-d (McKinney 1984). For additional discus-
sion of the differences between the infringement and dilution theories, see
Shire, supra note 37. When Congress recently revised the Lanham Act in 1988,
it rejected a strong lobbying effort in favor of a proposed federal anti-dilution
provision. Lavelle, supra note 125, at 50.
134. See 2J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:13(A); Shire, supra note 37, at
275.
135. Shire, supra note 37, at 274; Note, supra note 64, at 1088. This popu-
larity among trademark owner-plaintiffs is understandable, given the dilution
doctrine's lack of the troublesome likelihood of confusion requirement.
136. 2J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:13(B).
137. MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL § 12 (United States Trademark Ass'n
1964), reprinted in 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 22:4.
138. For a thorough discussion of these two theories, see Denicola, supra
note 27, at 187-90; Note, supra note 64, at 1088-90.
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1. Dilution by Loss of Distinctiveness of Mark
The first theory for relief, from which the dilution doctrine
derives its name, requires the trademark owner to demonstrate
that the third party's use would be likely to dilute the distinctive
quality of the owner's mark.'3 9 This theory is based on the con-
cern that a gradual "whittling away" of a mark's usefulness and
value may result from the public's being exposed to uses of the
mark, or substantially similar versions thereof that were not in-
tended by the mark's owner.' 40 Even if the public realizes that
the party making the use is not connected with the mark's owner,
or that the respective uses of the mark's owner and the other
party pertain to dissimilar products or services, a loss of useful-
ness or value may occur. 14 1 The mark's distinctiveness will be lost
because the mark will no longer exclusively identify the mark
owner as the source of certain goods or services. Instead, the
mark will also come to identify the other party as a provider of
certain goods or services. When that occurs, the usefulness and
economic value of the mark to its original owner will be severely
diminished or even destroyed.' 42
For example, the distinctive quality of the "Polaroid" mark,
used for many years by Polaroid Corp. in connection with its cam-
eras and related products, was held to be in danger of being di-
luted by another firm's subsequent use of "Polaraid" as the name
of its heating and refrigeration business.' 43 This dilution oc-
curred regardless of whether consumers were likely to believe
that the nationally-known producer of cameras had begun provid-
ing refrigeration services.144 Even though the public could likely
recognize that the camera manufacturer and the refrigeration
company were separate entities, the court found that the unique-
ness of the "Polaroid" mark was likely to be lessened. 45 If the
public were to continue being exposed to the refrigeration com-
pany's use of "Polaraid," the camera manufacturer's legitimate
139. See MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL, supra note 137, § 12. This sort of
dilution claim was envisioned by Frank Schechter, who is generally regarded as
the originator of the dilution theory. See Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trade-
mark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927).
140. Schechter, supra note 139, at 825.
141. Note, supra note 64, at 1086 n.37, 1089.
142. See Schechter, supra note 139, at 825; 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1,
§ 24:13(A).
143. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830, 836 (7th Cir. 1963).
144. Id. at 836-37.
145. There was evidence of actual confusion in Polaroid, but in a dilution
claim, neither actual nor likely confusion is a requirement. See id.
31
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uses of "Polaroid" would trigger associations, in the public's col-
lective mind, not only with cameras but also with the defendant's
refrigeration services.' 46 Thus, "[t]he mental image would be
blurred,"1 47 even though most consumers would not be confused
concerning what each company provided.
Dilution claims based on the loss of a mark's distinctive qual-
ity depend heavily on the mental associations made by consumers
when they see a mark in use. 148 The mental associations relevant
to dilution are subtly yet significantly different from those rele-
vant in trademark infringement cases.' 49 In infringement cases,
the impression resulting from the defendant's unconsented use of
the plaintiff's mark must trigger a likelihood of public confusion
concerning whether the plaintiff is providing the defendant's
goods or services or is in some sense connected with the defend-
ant.' 50 The success of a dilution claim, however, depends upon a
defendant's use that calls to mind both the defendant and the
plaintiff without producing a mental association so strong as to
cause a probability of confusion over source.' 5 1
The subtle distinction between the consumer associations
relevant to dilution and those relevant to infringement cases
makes the dilution theory conceptually difficult. There is no
question, however, thAt by eliminating the need for the likelihood
of confusion element required in trademark infringement law, the
dilution doctrine "lays a heavy hand upon one who adopts the
trade name or mark of another."' 152 In trademark parody cases,
plaintiffs have sometimes relied on this first type of dilution
146. See id.
147. Exxon Corp. v. Exxene Corp., 696 F.2d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 1982) (de-
scription of Polaroid case).
148. See id.; 2J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:13(A).
149. 2J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:13(B).
150. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
151. See 2J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:13(A). After the defendant has
made such a use, the plaintiff's mark would be diluted because the plaintiff's
legitimate uses of the mark would then cause the public to think not only of the
plaintiff but also of the defendant's goods or services. See, e.g., Polaroid, 319 F.2d
at 836. This would be so even though the public would not be confused con-
cerning what each party was producing or providing. Of course, if the defend-
ant's use does produce a likelihood of confusion, the dilution claim is
superfluous because the plaintiff would have a meritorious infringement claim.
2 J. MCCARTHY, supra § 24:13(A).
152. Polaroid, 319 F.2d at 836. Concern about this "heavy hand" has led
some courts to be reluctant to enforce anti-dilution statutes or to read a likeli-
hood of confusion requirement into them. In recent years, however, the dilu-
tion doctrine has become a powerful force in trademark rights litigation. See
Denicola, supra note 27, at 184-85; 2J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:13(B)-(D).
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claim-dilution by loss of distinctiveness-as a basis for relief
against parodists. The results in these cases have been mixed,
and judicial analysis of the presence or absence of dilution has
been generally superficial.' 53
Although generally not enunciated by the courts, two consid-
erations help explain the decisions on parody-based dilution
claims. First, dilution by loss of distinctiveness is more likely to
be found if the defendant's use was in a trademark-like sense (as
in the name of the defendant's product, service, or business)
rather than in the nature of commentary. Second, if the defend-
ant's use occurred only once, it is less likely to give rise to a suc-
cessful loss of distinctiveness claim than if the use has been
repeated numerous times or would be so repeated unless en-
joined.' 54 A one-time use is much less likely to effect the underly-
ing concern of this sort of dilution claim-the "whittling away" of
the distinctiveness of the trademark. 155
In McDonald's Corp. v. McBagel's, Inc.,i56 for example, both
considerations weighed in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant's
use of "McBagel's" as the name of a bakery and restaurant in-
volved the name of the plaintiff's product and would presumably
have continued indefinitely if not enjoined.' 57 Concluding that a
loss of the distinctiveness of McDonald's "Mc"-prefixed trade-
marks would be likely if the McBagel's name remained in use by
the defendant, the court granted injunctive relief to McDon-
153. Parody-based dilution claims are usually raised as an alternative theory
of recovery. Part of the explanation for the minimal judicial analysis of these
dilution claims is that other theories of recovery-most notably trademark in-
fringement-usually receive greater attention in the written opinions. Indeed,
the resolution of the dilution claim may sometimes appear to be little more than
an afterthought, with the result on the dilution claim usually tracking the out-
come of the infringement claim despite the absence of the likelihood of confu-
sion element in a dilution claim. For representative cases illustrating the
foregoing assertions, see infra notes 159-60, 163 and accompanying text. But see
Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 134-35 (N.D.
Ga. 1981) (although absence of likelihood of confusion compelled conclusion
that parody was not trademark infringement, parody tended to dilute distinctive-
ness of Pillsbury's trademark and was thus enjoined).
154. For decisions illustrating these two factors, see infra notes 156-63 and
accompanying text.
155. For discussion of this underlying concern, see supra note 140 and ac-
companying text.
156. 649 F. Supp. 1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
157. Id. at 1271, 1278.
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ald's.15 8 Conversely, in L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc. ,159
the two considerations weighed in the defendant's favor. The
First Circuit refused to recognize L.L. Bean's dilution claim con-
cerning an adult magazine's parody of the L.L. Bean name and
catalog. 160 The defendant's use was not in a trademark-like
158. Id. at 1280-81. McDonald's also prevailed on a trademark infringe-
ment theory. For a discussion of the infringement aspect of the case, see supra
notes 88-91, and accompanying text.
Numerous other factually similar cases have been decided the same way. See
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson
Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480, 482-83 (7th Cir. 1988) (car dealer's sign on show-
room roof reading "The Greatest Used Car Show on Earth" held likely to dilute
distinctiveness of "The Greatest Show on Earth" slogan of circus); Grey v.
Campbell Soup Co., 650 F. Supp. 1166, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (defendant's use
of "Dogiva" and "Cativa" as names of gourmet pet biscuits would whittle away
at distinctiveness of plaintiff's "Godiva" trademark), aff'd without opinion, 830
F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1987); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 207 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 852, 858-59 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (distinctiveness of movie
studio's "Jaws" trademark would be damaged by defendant's use of same name
for garbage disposals). But see Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828
F.2d 1482, 1489-91 (10th Cir. 1987) (no loss of distinctiveness of plaintiff
Jordache's trademark because public identification ofJordache name with plain-
tiff would not be eroded by defendant's parody version "Lardashe"); Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1984) (defend-
ant's use of name "Donkey Kong" for video game would not have blurring effect
on plaintiff's "King Kong" mark); Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d
788, 793 (9th Cir. 1981) (use of "Bagzilla" as name of garbage bag would not
dilute distinctive quality of plaintiff's "Godzilla" trademark).
159. 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013
(1987).
160. Id. at 27, 30-33. L.L. Bean's suit was based on a High Society magazine
feature titled "L.L. Beam's Back-to-School Sex Catalog." Id. at 27 (emphasis
supplied). Besides using a name similar to the L.L. Bean trademark, the "cata-
log" parodied the style normally used in the plaintiff mail order company's cata-
logs. Id. The First Circuit was actually ruling on the question whether the
defendant's parody constituted dilution by tarnishment. For a discussion of di-
lution by tarnishment, see infra notes 166-77 and accompanying text. Neverthe-
less, the court's opinion contains discussion of dilution claims involving loss of
distinctiveness. See L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 30. It is clear that the First Circuit,
which concluded that there was no tarnishment and hence no dilution of that
sort, also would have rejected any claim of dilution by loss of distinctiveness. See
id. at 30-33. L.L. Bean, one of the few trademark parody cases in which the court
has devoted serious discussion to first amendment issues, will be examined
again in later sections dealing with dilution by tarnishment and first amendment
considerations. See infra notes 174-77, 321-37 and accompanying text.
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sense,' 6 ' and was presumably a one-time occurrence. 62 Other
decisions involving comparable uses by defendants are generally
consistent with L.L. Bean. 163
2. Loss of Business Reputation Associated with Mark
Under most anti-dilution statutes, the owner can also bring a
successful dilution claim by demonstrating that the defendant's
use of the mark is likely to damage the previously developed busi-
ness reputation associated with the mark.' 64 This alternative is
broad enough to include two differing dilution actions. The first
is a claim of probable damage to a trademark's business reputa-
tion as a result of the defendant's use of the mark, or a substan-
tially similar version, in connection with goods that are inferior in
161. The court concluded that anti-dilution statutes were designed to apply
to certain commercial uses of trademarks. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 29-33. It ap-
peared to restrict the commercial use classification to instances where the de-
fendant uses the plaintiff's mark in a trademark-like sense, such as by adopting
the mark as the name of a product, service, or business. See id. at 29, 31-33. The
parody at issue in the case was classified by the L.L. Bean court as "editorial or
artistic," and hence noncommercial. Id. at 32. For a discussion of the impor-
tance of the commercial/noncommercial distinction to first amendment con-
cerns in trademark parody cases, see infra notes 407-90 and accompanying text.
162. The parody in L.L. Bean should be considered a one-time use even
though there would have been a large number of copies of the magazine in
which the parody appeared. The defendant's parody was an isolated instance in
one issue of the magazine. That single parody presumably would fade from
public attention after a reasonable time, unlike the parody used day after day as
the name of a product, service, or business to which the public is consistently
exposed.
163. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. T-Shirt Gallery, Ltd., 634 F. Supp.
1468, 1479-80 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (defendant's t-shirt picturing "Miami Mice"
poked fun at plaintiff's "Miami Vice" trademark but was unlikely to dilute its
distinctiveness); Tetley, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 785, 794
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (defendant's parody of Tetley trademarks held not to dilute dis-
tinctiveness of trademarks where parody was part of defendant's Wacky Packs
stickers which poked fun at various companies' well-known products and trade-
marks); Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp.
1112, 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (protest-oriented poster that employed version of
plaintiff's protected trademark constituted commentary and would not dilute
distinctiveness of trademarks); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Chandris America Lines, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 707, 712-13 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (cruise line's one-time use in advertisement of words "The Greatest Show
on Earth Isn't" would not dilute distinctiveness of familiar slogan of circus). But
see Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
205 n.8 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding, without discussion, that defendant's use of
plaintiff's trademark in sexually explicit movie violated anti-dilution statute);
Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 124, 135 (N.D. Ga.
1981) (summarily holding that use of Pillsbury trademarks in parody by adult
magazine likely to dilute distinctive quality of trademarks).
164. For a discussion and examples of anti-dilution statutes, see supra notes
132-38 and accompanying text.
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quality to, or less prestigious than, the trademark owner's goods.
The plaintiff's argument is that the mark's reputation and value
are likely to be diminished because the public will assume that the
lack of quality or lack of prestige reflected by the defendant's
goods will also be present in the plaintiff's unrelated goods.' 65
The second sort of dilution claim pursued under the loss of
business reputation is seen more frequently. The claim is based
on another's use of the mark in a context the mark owner consid-
ers unwholesome. Such a use arguably casts a negative light on
the mark, reducing its reputation and standing in the eyes of con-
sumers as a wholesome identifier of the mark owner's products or
services. This sort of claim is sometimes referred to as dilution by
"tarnishment" because it deals with a mark whose previously un-
sullied public image has been tarnished by the defendant's offen-
sive actions. 166
Most of the dilution by tarnishment cases involve parodies.
Although the trademark parody cases applying anti-dilution stat-
utes do not establish ground rules for determining what is an un-
wholesome context, they tend to indicate that parodies with
sexual overtones or dealing with illegal drug use are likely to tar-
nish the reputation of a plaintiff's mark. ' 67 In Pillsbury Co. v. Milky
Way Productions, Inc.,168 the court concluded that a sexually-ori-
ented parody was an unwholesome context and allowed the plain-
tiff to prevail on a dilution by tarnishment theory even though the
absence of a likelihood of confusion caused the plaintiff to lose its
165. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:13(E). This sort of claim is occa-
sionally seen in the trademark parody context. See, e.g., Jordache Enters., Inc. v.
Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (10th Cir. 1987) (Jordache loses dilu-
tion claim because any lack of prestige associated with defendant's Lardashe
jeans unlikely to affect prestige ofJordache jeans); Grey v. Campbell Soup Co.,
650 F. Supp. 1166, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 1986) ("Godiva" trademark on premium-
quality food products for human consumption diluted because of lower prestige
of animal foods for which defendant used the names "Dogiva" and "Cativa");
Gucci, 446 F. Supp. at 840 n.6 (defendant's use of "Gucchi Goo" on inexpensive
diaper bag would detract from prestige and high-fashion image of Gucci name).
166. See Denicola, supra note 27, at 185, 189-90; Dorsen, supra note 5, at
941-44.
167. See Dallas Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 202, 205 & n.8 (plaintiff's trademark
used in sexually explicit movie); Pillsbury, 215 U.S.P.Q at 125-26, 135 (plaintiff's
trademarks used in adult magazine); Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. High Soc'y
Magazine, Inc., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1862, 1863-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (plain-
tiff's trademarks used in adult magazine). But see L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 27, 29-
32 (rejecting notion that finding of trademark tarnishment may be based on sin-
gle use in unwholesome context; dilution claims inappropriate when asserted
against parody that is editorial in nature rather than commercial).
168. 215 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 124 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
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trademark infringement claim. 169 In Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising,
Inc. ,170 the court relied on dilution by tarnishment as an alterna-
tive basis for its issuance of a preliminary injunction against the
defendant's "Enjoy Cocaine" poster.' 7 1 Although one court con-
cluded that the Garbage Pail Kids stickers' parody of the Cabbage
Patch Kids was unwholesome,' 72 most courts have been hesitant
to find unwholesome contexts when neither sexual content nor
references to illegal drug use can be found in the defendant's
parody. 173
169. Id. at 134-35. For a discussion of the trademark infringement aspect
of Pillsbury, see supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. The court seemed to
take it as a "given" that the appearance of the trademark parody in an adult
magazine would have a tendency to damage the reputation associated with the
Pillsbury trademarks. See Pillsbury, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 135. The same sort of
reaction was obtained from the courts in the Dallas Cowboys and Edgar Rice Bur-
roughs cases. One might argue that those who actually saw the parodies in these
cases-readers of adult magazines or viewers of adult movies-probably would
be the consumers least likely to have a resulting lower opinion of the plaintiffs
and their trademarks. Hence, the argument goes, there was neither actual nor
probable dilution by tarnishment. If such an argument was made in Pillsbury,
Dallas Cowboys, or Edgar Rice Burroughs, the courts obviously did not give it
credence.
170. 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1189-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
171. Id. 1191-92. In ruling for the plaintiff on the dilution claim, the court
observed that "[t]o associate such a noxious substance as cocaine with plaintiff's
wholesome beverage as symbolized by its 'Coca-Cola' trademark and format
would clearly have a tendency to impugn that product and injure plaintiff's busi-
ness reputation, as plaintiff contends." Id. at 1189; see also General Foods Corp.
v. Mellis, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 261, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (commenting on un-
wholesome nature of drug references in defendant's song which used plaintiff's
trademark). For a discussion of the court's conclusion that the poster also in-
fringed Coca-Cola's trademarks, see supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
172. See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,
642 F. Supp. 1031, 1039-40 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (dilution by tarnishment). In Topps
Chewing Gum, the court's distaste for the Garbage Pail Kids stickers, a popular
item designed for and sold to children, is reflected in its statement that the stick-
ers "derisively depict dolls with features similar to Cabbage Patch Kids dolls in
rude, violent and frequently noxious settings." Id. at 1032. The court's objec-
tion to the content of the stickers also goes a long way toward explaining the
ease with which it found likelihood of confusion on the plaintiff's alternative
claim for trademark infringement. See id. at 1039.
173. SeeJordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1490-91
(10th Cir. 1987) (no unwholesome context and hence no tarnishment of
Jordache mark when defendant used "Lardashe" as name of its large-size de-
signer jeans); Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir.
1981) (use of "Bagzilla" as name of garbage bags did not tarnish "Godzilla"
mark because mark not linked with something unsavory); Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. T-Shirt Gallery, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1468, 1479-80 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(connotations suggested by "Miami Mice" t-shirts did not tarnish "Miami Vice"
trademark); Tetley, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 785, 794
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (dilution by tarnishment not likely where defendant's "Petley
Flea Bags" stickers poked fun at Tetley trademarks).
Girl Scouts of United States v. Personality Posters Manufacturing Co., 304
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In the L.L. Bean case, the First Circuit departed from the
prior trend of finding dilution by tarnishment almost as a matter
of course when the plaintiff's trademark was used in a parody
having sexual overtones. The court refused to grant relief to the
trademark owner despite the appearance of the defendant's par-
ody in an adult magazine.' 74 In so ruling, the court rejected the
view that a finding of tarnishment may be based on the defend-
ant's single unauthorized use of the plaintiff's trademark in an
arguably unwholesome setting.' 75 It asserted that the dilution by
tarnishment theory should be restricted in application to clearly
commercial contexts where the defendant uses the plaintiff's
trademark in connection with goods that are inferior to, or other-
wise incompatible with, the plaintiff's goods or business. 176 The
court called the defendant's parody "editorial or artistic" and
held that as a noncommercial parody it was not subject to injunc-
tion under the anti-dilution statute. 177
The foregoing cases leave considerable uncertainty as to
what is an unwholesome context and whether it is appropriate to
apply dilution by tarnishment to noncommercial parodies. 7 Be-
cause dilution by tarnishment claims necessarily require courts to
make judgments on what is offensive, unwholesome, or tar-
nishing, trademark parody cases pursued on dilution grounds im-
plicate important first amendment concerns. These first
amendment issues are often ignored entirely by courts or, if not
F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), is also noteworthy because the court refused to
entertain the Girl Scouts' dilution claim even though the defendant's "Be Pre-
pared" poster dealt, in some sense, with the subject of sex. Id. at 1233-34. The
court found that notwithstanding the poster's depiction of a smiling, pregnant
"Girl Scout," the poster was unlikely to tarnish the reputation of the Girl Scouts
organization or its symbols. See id. at 1231, 1234-36.
174. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 27, 30-34. For an earlier discussion of this case,
see supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
175. Id. at 30-33.
176. Id. In other words, the L.L. Bean court effectively would limit dilution
by tarnishment to tarnishment caused by the inferior nature of the defendant's
goods, and would prohibit the use of the unwholesome context route. The
court also noted the first amendment difficulties inherent in determining what is
offensive or unwholesome. Id. at 34. For a discussion of tarnishment caused by
the inferior nature of the defendant's products, see supra notes 164-65 and ac-
companying text. The court also noted the first amendment difficulties inherent
in determining what is offensive or unwholesome. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 34.
177. Id. at 33-34. First amendment considerations provided the main rea-
son for the limits placed by the court on the application of the anti-dilution stat-
ute. See id. at 29-34. For a discussion of L.L. Bean's focus on the first
amendment, see infra notes 321-37 and accompanying text.
178. See L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 29-34.
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ignored, are dealt with unsatisfactorily. 179
No discussion of the dilution doctrine would be complete
without mention of a phenomenon dubbed "pseudo-dilution." 18 0
This phenomenon is the tendency of some courts to grant a
trademark owner relief on dilution-like grounds when the dilution
theory has not been raised by the plaintiff or is not even available
under applicable law. ' 8 ' Pseudo-dilution is sometimes seen in
cases where the court regards the defendant's actions as particu-
larly objectionable. 182 When courts resort to pseudo-dilution,
they do not openly acknowledge having done so. Instead, they
inappropriately employ dilution-oriented language to bolster a
finding of infringement or conclude that infringement was estab-
lished even though the decision reveals an underlying dilution ba-
sis.183 Plaintiffs who either failed to bring a dilution claim or were
not entitled to do so under applicable law obviously are happy to
acquiesce in a court's use of pseudo-dilution.
Whether consisting of its statutory forms or of the unofficial
variety just described, the dilution doctrine has joined the in-
fringement theory as a major player in the trademark rights arena.
When the case involves a parody, trademark owners have not al-
ways been content to restrict themselves to claims of infringement
or dilution. The following subsection examines the alternative
causes of action sometimes employed in these cases.
179. For a discussion of these first amendment issues, see infra notes 295-
314 and accompanying text.
180. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:15; see Denicola, supra note 27, at
190.
181. See 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:15; Denicola, supra note 27, at
190. For examples of courts resorting to pseudo-dilution, see infra notes 182-83
and accompanying text. It must be remembered that because neither the federal
trademark statute nor the common law recognizes the dilution doctrine, the di-
lution theory is available only when there is an applicable state anti-dilution stat-
ute. 1 J. GILSON, supra note 35, § 7.04, at 7-33. Not all states have such statutes.
See id. at 7-34. Therefore, dilution claims cannot always be raised in trademark
rights litigation.
182. See, e.g., Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d
433 (5th Cir. 1962) (producer of floor wax-insecticide deliberately altered plain-
tiff's "Where there's life . . . there's Bud" slogan by substituting "bugs" for
"Bud"), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963); General Foods Corp. v. Mellis, 203
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (defendant used plaintiff's trademark in
song with drug-oriented content); Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Thea-
tres, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 159 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (defendant used plaintiff's
Tarzan and Jane characters in title and storyline of X-rated movie).
183. See Chemical Corp., 306 F.2d at 435-38; General Foods, 203 U.S.P.Q
(BNA) at 263; Interbank Card Ass'n v. Simms, 431 F. Supp. 131, 134-35
(M.D.N.C. 1977); Manns Theatres, 195 U.S.P.Q (BNA) at 161-62; see also 2J. Mc-
CARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:15 (noting this tendency of courts); Denicola, supra
note 27. at 186 (same).
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E. Other Theories Used by Plaintiffs in Trademark Parody Cases
In apparent attempts to cover all the possible bases, trade-
mark parody plaintiffs have raised common law tort claims as al-
ternative theories of recovery. These claims include passing off,
misappropriation, defamation and disparagement.
1. Passing Off and Misappropriation
A passing off claim involves the allegation that the defendant
competed unfairly by engaging in a scheme to have his goods or
services "pass" in the marketplace as those of the plaintiff.'8 4 An
alternative claim for passing off normally adds little to a trade-
mark infringement case, because passing off involves the same
sort of likelihood of confusion element essential to a finding of
infringement. 185
Other times, the plaintiff's unfair competition claim alleges
that the defendant engaged in misappropriation. The misappro-
priation doctrine has had a checkered history.' 8 6 It has been suc-
cessfully employed in a variety of nontrademark contexts where
the gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint is that the defendant
184. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
185. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 440 (9th Cir. 1986); Warner Bros. v.
American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 247 (2d Cir. 1983); Reddy Commu-
nications, Inc. v. Environmental Action Found., 477 F. Supp. 936, 948 (D.D.C.
1979).
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and Trademark Law Revision Act, which
can cover passing off cases, also requires proof of likelihood of confusion. 15
U.S.C. § 1125 (1988); see, e.g., Warner Bros., 720 F.2d at 247. A passing off claim
is likely to fail in a parody setting because the parodist generally does not at-
tempt to pass off the parody as the original. Instead, the parodist wants the
public to recognize that he is at once drawing upon the original and doing some-
thing different-engaging in humor or commentary. See, e.g., Fisher, 794 F.2d at
440 (defendant's song "When Sonny Sniffs Glue" parodied plaintiff's "When
Sunny Gets Blue," but defendant not attempting to pass off parody as
plaintiff's).
186. See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215
(1918) (leading case in early development of misappropriation). The Interna-
tional News Court used the misappropriation doctrine as the basis for allowing
Associated Press (AP) to prevail in an unfair competition claim against Interna-
tional News Service (INS) for its practice of copying news after it appeared in
stories in AP-subscribing newspapers on the East Coast. Id. at 232. INS would
alter the form of the stories and send them by telegraph to its subscribers on the
west coast. See id. at 236-40. AP was allowed to prevail because a contrary result
would allow INS to "reap where it had not sown," in that AP had gone to the
time, trouble, and expense of assembling an effective news-gathering operation,
and INS took advantage of the results of that operation. Id. at 239-40. Since
International News, the misappropriation doctrine has been criticized as likely to
endanger the proper intellectual property balance developed by federal law. See
Denicola, supra note 27, at 172-73, 179 n.101. For a complete discussion of the
history and development of the misappropriation tort, see id. at 171-81.
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seized for his own benefit something of value that the plaintiff had
built up through expenditures of time, money, and effort. 187 The
underlying rationale of this nebulous tort is to prevent defend-
ants from "reap[ing] ... the harvest of those who have sown."1 88
The application of the misappropriation doctrine to the
trademark rights setting is subject to question. A trademark may
properly be characterized as an item of value developed through
its owner's expenditures of time, money and effort. 189 As such,
trademark owners' claims could be actionable under the misap-
propriation rubric.190 It must be remembered, however, that the
misappropriation doctrine, which developed as part of the com-
mon law outside the trademark setting, contains no likelihood of
confusion requirement in the usual trademark law sense.' 9 1
Therefore, to recognize misappropriation as a separate common
law basis for trademark-related litigation would be to alter sub-
stantially the common law's longstanding formulation of trade-
mark rights. 192
When faced with a trademark owner's misappropriation
claim, courts generally seem inclined to avoid extended analysis
of whether the doctrine fits in the trademark setting. Some courts
187. See Denicola, supra note 27, at 173-74.
188. International News, 248 U.S. at 239-40.
189. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:10.
190. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 207
U.S.P.Q (BNA) 852 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (misappropriation of well-known "Jaws"
trademark). In this case, the court expressly relied on the misappropriation doc-
trine as a basis for enjoining the defendant's use of "Jaws" as the name of a
garbage disposal. Id. at 857-58.
191. See Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 794 (9th Cir.
1981) (noting that misappropriation theory does not require likelihood of confu-
sion, but refusing to apply misappropriation theory to trademark rights); Univer-
sal City Studios, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 858 (misappropriation claim does not
require proof of likelihood of confusion). The common law's protection of
trademarks has traditionally required likelihood of confusion as an element of
the trademark owner's claim. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
192. See Toho, 645 F.2d at 794; cf Eagle's Eye, Inc. v. Ambler Fashion Shop
Inc., 627 F. Supp. 856, 860-61 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (court expressed concern in
trademark parody case about use of misappropriation doctrine to skirt likelihood
of confusion requirement under trademark infringement theory); see also Den-
icola, supra note 27, at 176-77, 178-81 (noting objections to recognition of mis-
appropriation theory in trademark rights setting).
Application of the misappropriation tort has generally been reserved for
situations in which there is not another applicable body of law to govern the
case, but unfair competition considerations make its use a necessity. See, e.g.,
International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); United States
Golf Ass'n v. Saint Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028, 1034-35 (3d
Cir. 1984). In the trademark rights context, however, there are numerous legal
theories on which trademark owners may rely.
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have summarily disregarded the misappropriation claim, assert-
ing that trademark law simply does not recognize such a claim.1 93
Other courts have indicated that there is no need to consider the
plaintiff's misappropriation claim, because such a claim would
not provide the plaintiff with any advantages beyond those avail-
able under conventional trademark law.19 4 In preferring to avoid
careful analysis of whether the misappropriation theory may be
used to enforce trademark rights, courts have perpetuated uncer-
tainty concerning such claims.
Notwithstanding this apparent judicial reluctance to decide
whether the misappropriation doctrine should be granted official
recognition in the trademark setting, misappropriation influences
have significantly infiltrated trademark law. Sometimes this infil-
tration is subtle. Although a misappropriation claim is not neces-
sarily brought, some courts apply what amounts to a
misappropriation analysis as a justification for a finding of trade-
mark infringement.' 95 Other times, the misappropriation in-
193. See, e.g., Toho, 645 F.2d at 794; cf Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622
F. Supp. 931, 933-36 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding that owner of "Star Wars" trade-
mark not entitled to prevail on misappropriation grounds against public interest
groups that referred to "star wars" in political advertisements opposing Reagan
Administration's strategic defense initiative).
A further cause for uncertainty in the application of the misappropriation
theory is that some misappropriation claims are preempted by § 301 of the
Copyright Act of 1976. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). That section provides that a
state law-based cause of action is preempted by federal copyright law if (1) the
party bringing the state law claim asserts rights in or as to a work that comes
within the subject matter of the Copyright Act (i.e., a work fixed in a tangible
medium), and (2) the rights asserted in the work under state law are equivalent
to the rights guaranteed by the Copyright Act. Id.
An exploration of the intricacies and application of § 301 is beyond the
scope of this article. For present purposes, it should suffice to say that if a plain-
tiff alleges both trademark and copyright infringement by the parodist-allega-
tions that may be raised, for instance, where a plaintiff's fictional character or
song is parodied-an alternative claim for misappropriation is likely to be pre-
empted. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 440 (9th Cir. 1986) (misappropriation
claim preempted); Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d
231, 247 (2d Cir. 1983) (same); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. T-Shirt Gallery,
Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1468, 1474-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (same). For further discus-
sion of preemption, see Denicola, supra note 27, at 172-73, 179 n.101.
194. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q (BNA),
124, 135 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (rejecting what amounted to misappropriation claim).
A court that takes this approach has missed a crucial point: full recognition of
the misappropriation doctrine in the trademark context would provide the trade-
mark owner a distinct advantage over what he has under the federal trademark
statute or the common law, because the misappropriation theory would allow
relief without proof of likelihood of confusion.
195. See, e.g., Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Em-
blem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004. 1011 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975)
(misappropriation-like rationale applied in allowing injunctive relief against de-
[Vol. 36: p. I
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fluence is more obvious, and the court may even cite
misappropriation precedents as a basis for granting the plaintiff
relief on conventional trademark grounds. 96 Regardless of
whether misappropriation claims are formally recognized or even
pleaded by plaintiffs, the apparent receptivity of courts to misap-
propriation-oriented arguments assures the misappropriation
doctrine a continued, albeit unofficial, role in trademark law.' 97
2. Defamation and Disparagement
Plaintiffs in trademark parody cases occasionally plead an al-
ternative claim of defamation. There seems little reason to
bother doing so, however, given the other theories potentially
available and the meager prospects of success on a defamation
claim. Defamation suits are based on actual or presumed harm to
the reputation of a person, whether natural or corporate. 198 This
requirement of harm to reputation makes it difficult for the trade-
mark owner to prevail in a parody-based defamation action.
When a defamation claim is brought by a corporation or
other business entity (the sort of plaintiff often seen in trademark
parody litigation), a critical question is whether the defendant's
statements would have a tendency to harm the plaintiff's overall
business reputation for integrity, competence and solvency.' 99
Arguable harm to property such as a trademark or to other eco-
fendant's sale of patches employing hockey teams' trademarks); Chemical Corp.
of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433, 435, 437-38 (5th Cir. 1962)
(use of misappropriation-like rationale in finding trademark infringement); Dal-
las Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F. Supp. 366, 372,
374, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aft'd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (court employs
misappropriation language and concepts in finding sexually explicit movie in-
fringed plaintiff's trademark).
196. See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir.
1981) (citing International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239
(1918)).
197. As with dilution, the absence of the likelihood of confusion element
gives the misappropriation doctrine the potential to suppress an undue amount
of speech if it is applied to the trademark parody setting. This suppression
serves as another reason not to recognize misappropriation in the trademark
rights setting. See infra note 454 and accompanying text.
198. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 123, §§ 558-559, 621-622.
Although defamation claims were first recognized only in favor of natural per-
sons, it is now commonly accepted that corporations are permissible plaintiffs in
defamation cases because they have business reputations to protect. See; W.
KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § I 11, at 779 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), supra, § 561 & comment b.
199. See RESTATEMENT (Second), supra note 123, § 561(a) & comment b;
Langvardt, A Principled Approach to Compensatory Damages in Corporate Defamation
Cases, 27 AM. Bus. L.J. 491, 496 (1990).
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nomic interests of the plaintiff does not become relevant in a def-
amation case unless the requisite tendency to harm the plaintiff's
reputation is shown.200 It stretches plausibility almost to the
breaking point to assert that a business plaintiff's overall reputa-
tion is harmed by a parody of its trademark-even a parody that is
arguably in bad taste. As a result, trademark parody-based defa-
mation claims tend to falter on the basic harm to reputation ele-
ment, 20 1 even before the potentially more difficult questions of
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 123, §§ 558, 561. A decrease in
the value of the trademark itself does not mean that the plaintiff's reputation is
harmed. Courts generally are hesitant to assume that a statement which is harm-
ful to the plaintiff's economic interest (and hence may give rise to an injurious
falsehood claim) necessarily harms the plaintiff's overall reputation. PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 198, at 965. For discussion of injurious falsehood claims, see
infra notes 204-11 and accompanying text.
201. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 440 (9th Cir. 1986); Stop the
Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112, 1124-26
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Girl Scouts of United States v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co.,
304 F. Supp. 1228, 1234, 1235-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). But see Coca-Cola v. Gemini
Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
In Fisher, the plaintiffs' song "When Sunny Gets Blue" had been parodied
by the defendant in a song called "When Sonny Sniffs Glue." Fisher, 794 F.2d at
434. The court easily disposed of the plaintiffs' defamation claim, stating that
the parody "cannot reasonably be understood in a defamatory sense by those
who hear it." Id. at 440. In other words, the court concluded that there was no
possibility of harm to the plaintiffs' reputation. See id. In Stop the Olympic Prison,
the court treated the Olympic Committee's disparagement claim as a defamation
claim because it alleged harm to the Olympic Committee's reputation as a result
of the STOP organization's protest-oriented poster. Stop the Olympic Prison, 489
F. Supp. at 1123-24. The court concluded that there was no reasonable pros-
pect of such reputational harm, see id. at 1126, and insufficient evidence that
STOP had even communicated a falsehood concerning the Olympic Committee.
Id. at 1125.
In the Girl Scouts case, the court found no basis for concluding that the de-
fendant's "Be Prepared" poster had either actually or probably harmed the rep-
utation of the Girl Scouts organization. Girl Scouts, 304 F. Supp. at 1234-35.
The court concluded with this observation:
Those who may be amused at the poster presumably never viewed
the reputation of the plaintiff as being inviolable. Those who are indig-
nant obviously continue to respect it. Perhaps it is because the reputa-
tion of the plaintiff is so secure against the wry assault of the defendant
that no such damage [to reputation] has been demonstrated.
Id. at 1235-36.
The Coca-Cola case, however, provides conflicting indications as to whether
the court was recognizing Coca-Cola's defamation claim as an alternative basis
for the granting of a preliminary injunction against the producer of the "Enjoy
Coca-ine" poster. Defamation was among the plaintiff's various claims,
although the plaintiff apparently focused more heavily on its trademark infringe-
ment and dilution claims. See id. at 1190-93. Likewise, the court's major con-
cern was with the latter claims. See Coca-Cola, 346 F. Supp. at 1186-93.
Nonetheless, the court spoke of harm to the plaintiff's overall reputation and
thus appeared to be sustaining the defamation claim as well as the infringement
and dilution claims. See id. at 1188-89, 1191.
Later in the opinion, however, the Coca-Cola court seemed to indicate that it
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falsity2 0 2 and constitutional fault 20 3 are encountered.
The tort of disparagement is potentially better suited to the
trademark parody setting. It is classified under the broader head-
ing of injurious falsehood, which concerns itself with false state-
was not ruling on the defamation claim. See id. at 1192-93. It stressed that the
trademark infringement and dilution theories were the heart of the plaintiff's
case. See id. In avoiding careful consideration of the defamation claim, the court
seemingly wished to avoid tackling the difficult issue of whether the requisite
degree of fault had been displayed by the defendant. See id. To complicate mat-
ters further, the court again referred to possible harm to the plaintiff's reputa-
tion near the end of the opinion. Id. at 1193. To the extent that the confusing
Coca-Cola decision may be read as recognizing a defamation claim under the cir-
cumstances of the case, the decision does not have great precedential value be-
cause the court glossed over important questions of falsity and fault. For
discussion of the falsity element of a defamation claim, see infra note 202. For
discussion of fault requirements in defamation cases, see infra note 203.
202. A basic requirement of a meritorious defamation claim is that the de-
fendant made a statement that was both defamatory (in the sense of having a
tendency to harm the plaintiff's reputation) and false. RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
supra note 123, § 558. This falsity requirement necessarily means that the state-
ment must expressly or impliedly set forth a statement that is of supposed
"fact," but is actually false. Even if a statement is cast in opinion form, it is
actionable if it implies "facts" that are not true. Milkovich v. LorainJournal Co.,
110 S. Ct. 2695, 2705-07 (1990). The typical trademark parody case, if pursued
on defamation grounds, is likely to fail because the reasonable reader or listener
probably will not perceive any statements in the parody as serious statements of
"fact." See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 440; Girl Scouts, 304 F. Supp. at 1235-36.
203. For first amendment reasons, the Supreme Court has required public
official and public figure plaintiffs to prove a fault requirement known as "actual
malice" in order to prevail in a defamation suit. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
Actual malice is defined by the Court as meaning that the defendant made a
false statement with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for its
truth or falsity. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. The existence of actual
malice must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. See Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-86. A
private figure plaintiff, on the other hand, is not expected to prove actual inalice
but must prove at least negligence on the part of the defendant in failing to take
the steps a reasonable person would have taken to ascertain the truth before
making the statement. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346-48. When the statement giving
rise to the suit was of public concern, the private figure plaintiff's damages are
restricted to actual proven injury if she proves only the minimum fault require-
ment of negligence. Presumed and punitive damages are not allowable in such a
scenario unless the plaintiff proves actual malice. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 751 (1985); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50.
The foregoing rules are complex and require difficult factual and legal de-
terminations. Detailed consideration of them is beyond the scope of this article
because defamation claims are of only marginal significance in the trademark
parody setting. As previously noted, defamation claims based on trademark par-
odies usually fail on another basis before these difficult constitutional questions
are encountered. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text. For more de-
tailed discussion of the constitutional aspects of defamation law, see Langvardt,
Media Defendants, Public Concerns, and Public Plaintifs: Toward Fashioning Order from
Confusion in Defamation Law, 49 U. Prrr. L. REV. 91 (1987).
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ments that cause harm to the plaintiff's economic interests but do
not go so far as to harm the plaintiff's reputation. 20 4 The name
"disparagement" tends to be used when the injurious falsehood
case arises in a business context.20 5 A disparagement claim is
more plausible in the trademark parody setting than a defamation
claim, because a trademark provides the sort of economic interest
that may be adversely affected for purposes of a disparagement
claim.20 6 It is possible that the defendant's parody could diminish
the value of the plaintiff's trademark, especially where the par-
ody's context is arguably distasteful.20 7
The preceding discussion of harm to the value of a trademark
should sound familiar, because similar notions are relevant to di-
lution claims. Indeed, trademark disparagement and trademark
dilution, especially that of the tarnishment variety, bear strong
conceptual resemblances to each other.208 Nevertheless, there
are differences in elements of proof that make disparagement
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 123, § 623A.
205. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 198, § 128, at 964-65.
206. E.g., Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905 (D. Neb.
1986), aff'd, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988); Lu-
casfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931 (D.D.C. 1985). In Mutual of
Omaha, the trial court recognized that a trademark may be disparaged, but re-
jected Mutual of Omaha's disparagement claim because the defendant's "Mu-
tant of Omaha" t-shirts did not create an unsavory association with the
plaintiff's trademarks. Mutual of Omaha, 648 F. Supp. at 912. As noted earlier,
however, the trial court and the Eighth Circuit held in the plaintiff's favor on its
trademark infringement claim. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. In
Lucasfilm, the court also recognized that a trademark constitutes the sort of eco-
nomic interest that, if harmed, may give rise to a disparagement claim. Lucasfilm,
622 F. Supp. at 933. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim, however, because
the defendant's "star wars" television spots were political commentary that did
not disparage the plaintiff's "Star Wars" trademark. See id. at 935.
207. See Eagle's Eye, Inc. v. Ambler Fashion Shop, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 856,
862-64 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (plaintiff's allegations of disparagement in trademark
parody setting held sufficient to withstand Rule 12(b)(6) motion for dismissal);
Coca-Cola v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1190-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
("Enjoy Cocaine" poster parodying Coca-Cola trademark also disparaged it);
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Chandris America
Lines, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 707, 712-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (recognizing possibility of
disparagement, but declining to find that plaintiff's trademark had been dispar-
aged); cf Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Florists Ass'n, 603 F. Supp. 35, 40 (N.D. Ohio
1984) (no disparagement because florists association's use of parody was in con-
text of "promotion of something ... wholesome, delectable, and appetizing").
Compare id. with Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d
433, 435-38 (5th Cir. 1962) (apparent reliance on disparagement notions in
granting Busch relief against floor wax-insecticide manufacturer's "where
there's life ... there's bugs" parody).
208. For discussion of the dilution doctrine's focus on likely harm to marks
as the result of unconsented uses in unwholesome contexts, see supra notes 167-
79 and accompanying text.
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more difficult to prove and hence less desirable to trademark par-
ody plaintiffs. 20 9 In view of its stern proof requirements, it is
likely that disparagement will maintain a secondary position be-
hind infringement and dilution claims210 in trademark parody
litigation. 21'
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT SPECTRUM
By its nature, parody involves expression of some sort. It is
therefore potentially entitled to first amendment protection
against undue governmental interference. Although some courts
apparently prefer to avoid the first amendment thicket whenever
possible in trademark parody litigation,212 the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of expression cannot readily be dismissed
as irrelevant to such cases. In order to determine the extent and
nature of the first amendment's proper role in trademark parody
cases-an inquiry the U.S. Supreme Court has not directly under-
taken-one must begin by examining relevant first amendment
doctrines. 213
209. One element of disparagement is that the defendant made a false
statement, either express or implied. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 123,
§ 623A comment g. In the trademark parody setting, the plaintiff may be hard-
pressed to establish this element for the same reason noted earlier concerning
defamation claims based on parodies. See supra note 202. No showing of falsity
is required in a dilution case, however. Further, to succeed on a disparagement
claim, the plaintiff must prove actual harm to his economic interests. RESTATE-
MENT, supra, §§ 623A, 633, 651. In a dilution claim, likelihood of harm is suffi-
cient. See MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL, supra note 137. Disparagement claims
generally necessitate proof of some sort of wrongful intent or fault, either as a
common law or constitutional matter. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 198,
§ 128, at 968-70. In some states, the fault requirements for disparagement re-
semble those of defamation law. See supra note 203. In other states, the fault
requirement is that the defendant made the false statement with ill will toward
the plaintiff or because of spiteful motives. Langvardt, supra note 116, at 916-17.
Dilution claims have not traditionally included such fault requirements,
although first amendment considerations should not be ignored when the dilu-
tion theory is used to attack trademark parodies. See infra notes 453-66, 481-90
and accompanying text.
210. Where there is an applicable anti-dilution statute, a separate claim for
disparagement is largely superfluous unless the plaintiff wishes to seek money
damages, which are available in disparagement claims but not in dilution claims.
Anti-dilution statutes typically allow only injunctive relief. See MODEL STATE
TRADEMARK BILL, supra note 137.
211. Some disparagement claims may now be actionable under § 43(a) of
the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). For a
discussion of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, see supra notes 122-29
and accompanying text.
212. For a discussion of this avoidance by courts, see infra notes 295-97 and
accompanying text.
213. Although the Court has not decided a trademark parody case, certain
of its decisions are nonetheless highly relevant to the trademark parody context.
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The first amendment flatly states that there shall be "no law"
restricting freedom of speech or press.2 14 Nevertheless, the gov-
ernment's need to function effectively has led to the consistent
judicial determination that the first amendment prohibits only
government action that unduly restricts freedom of expression. 2t 5
Incidental government restrictions on expression therefore do
not violate the first amendment. 21 6 Courts balance two compet-
ing interests in deciding whether government action unduly re-
stricts freedom of speech: the speaker's first amendment interest
and the government's interest in regulating the affected expres-
sion.217 Different sorts of speech may carry different degrees of
constitutional protection. 218 The degree of protection, if any,
given to speech and the corresponding strength of the speaker's
first amendment interest depend upon where the speech falls on
the first amendment spectrum.219
A. Full First Amendment Protection for Political Speech and
Noncommercial Equivalents
Supreme Court decisions establish that even though the first
amendment spectrum is broad enough to include various types of
speech, not all speech is protected. 220 Obscene expression, for
example, receives no first amendment protection. 22' The same is
For a discussion of these decisions, see infra notes 387-404 and accompanying
text.
214. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
215. The first amendment literally refers to actions by the federal govern-
ment that interfere with free expression. Id. The first amendment's guarantees
are regarded as incorporated within the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). By virtue of this process
of incorporation, the guarantees set forth in the first amendment restrict actions
by the federal, state and local governments insofar as they unduly interfere with
free expression. For purposes of convenience and clarity, this article will refer
to the "first amendment" even in instances where a reference to the fourteenth
amendment would be technically proper.
216. For discussion of the circumstances under which the government may
regulate or restrict certain forms of expression without violating the first amend-
ment, see infra notes 244-47, 262-68 and accompanying text.
217. For a discussion of courts' balancing of these competing interests, see
infra notes 238-47, 263-94 and accompanying text.
218. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
758-60 (1985) (indicating that not all speech is of equal value for first amend-
ment purposes).
219. See id.
220. See id. A familiar first amendment notion is that the freedom of speech
and press clauses contemplate a marketplace of ideas in which viewpoints and
information pertaining to various subjects are traded freely. See Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
221. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (mailing of unsolicited sex-
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true of speech that is both designed to incite or likely to incite
imminent lawless activity. 222 At the opposite end of the spectrum
is political speech. Although the full range of the political speech
classification is uncertain, it may safely be said that it includes
statements and certain expressive actions regarding the workings
of government, major social and public policy issues and persons
connected with such matters. 223 Political speech is given full first
amendment protection 224 because such expression is considered
central to the meaning of the first amendment. 22 5
Other types of expression are also entitled to first amend-
ment protection.2 26 As the Supreme Court has observed, "[O]ur
cases have never suggested that expression about philosophical,
social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters-to take a
nonexhaustive list of labels-is not entitled to full First Amend-
ment protection." 227 The Court has also emphasized that expres-
sion on matters of "public concern" rests comfortably under the
first amendment umbrella. 228
Thus, the novelist, composer, essayist, or commentator is en-
titled to rely on the freedom of speech or press clauses regardless
of whether her work is of a political nature.229 This necessarily
ually explicit material not protected by first amendment). Indecent expression,
however, is generally protected. See Sable Communications Inc. v. FCC, 109 S.
Ct. 2829, 2836 (1989) (sale of dial-a-porn messages to adults cannot be criminal-
ized because indecent).
222. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
223. See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2539-40 (1989) (flag burning
may be expressive action protected by first amendment); Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (first amendment requires that public figures and
public officials prove "actual malice" on behalf of publisher to recover for tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 784-86 (1978) (first amendment protects speech made by corporate repre-
sentatives on behalf of corporation criticizing proposed legislation); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-71 (1964) (first amendment protects
criticisms of public officials where no actual malice involved).
224. See, e.g., Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2542-43. For a discussion of the "full"
first amendment protection given to political speech, see infra notes 242-44 and
accompanying text.
225. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2542-43; Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988)
(content-based restriction on picketing in front of foreign embassy violative of
first amendment).
226. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557-
58 (1975) (theatrical production); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
339-40 (1974) (issues of public concern); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413, 417 (1966) (works of literature).
227. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977).
228. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
758-60 (1985).
229. See Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (parody con-
cerning public figure); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (magazine article
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means that the satirist or parodist carries a substantial constitu-
tional entitlement to engage in humorous or caustic commentary
without the chilling prospect that legal liability will be readily im-
posed upon her because of what she has stated. 230 The party who
has served as the subject of the satire or parody may find the par-
ody offensive, but offensiveness, without more, cannot serve as a
constitutional basis for imposing liability on the satirist or paro-
dist.23 ' The Supreme Court recently made this proposition abun-
dantly clear in Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell.2 3 2 Even though
Falwell did not involve trademark rights, it is relevant to the issues
dealt with in this article because it involved an attempt to impose
liability for the harm allegedly caused by a parodist's expression
of ideas.2 33
In Falwell, the Court struck down, as violative of the first
amendment, an award of compensatory and punitive damages to
the Reverend Jerry Falwell. 23 4 Falwell had brought a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress against Hustler maga-
zine and its publisher, Larry Flynt, because of a Hustler advertising
parody that portrayed Falwell in an unwholesome and unflatter-
ing light. 23 5 The Court reasoned that the offensive character of
speech-even when it is calculated to offend, as satire or parody
often is-does not strip the speech of the constitutional protec-
tion it would otherwise carry. 236 Therefore, the Court imposed
stern first amendment requirements on public plaintiffs who seek
to hold parodists liable for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 23 7
The Supreme Court again underscored the substantial pro-
about play); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (movie). For
additional cases, see supra note 223 and accompanying text.
230. See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 50-56. For a discussion of the lesser protection
given to commercial speech, and thus a satire or parody that is commercial in
nature, see infra notes 261-94 and accompanying text.
231. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971); Street v. New York,
394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969).
232. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
233. See id. at 48-49.
234. Id. at 57.
235. Id. at 48-49. Although Falwell lost his defamation claim because thejury concluded that a reasonable person would not interpret any statements
about him in the parody as actual facts, Falwell prevailed in the lower courts on
the theory that the Hustler parody constituted intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Id.
236. Id. at 50, 52-53.
237. See id. at 56-57. The Court required Falwell, a public figure plaintiff,
to prove the "actual malice" requirement of a defamation case before prevailing
on his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
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tection given potentially offensive political speech and its
equivalents in Texas v. Johnson,238 the notorious flag-burning deci-
sion. In Johnson, the Court held that a protestor who burned the
American flag could not be convicted of a criminal offense for
violating a Texas statute.23 9 The Court classified the burning of
the flag as expressive conduct entitled to first amendment protec-
tion, and concluded that the criminal prosecution amounted to an
unconstitutional attempt to punish the protestor because of the
content of his political expression. 240 The Court emphasized that
"[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amend-
ment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable. " 2 4 '
Because the criminal prosecution in Johnson was regarded by
the Court as an attempt to restrict the content of political expres-
sion, the Court applied "the most exacting scrutiny" to the gov-
ernment action. 242 In other words, the Court ruled that the
appropriate test to be applied was the one amounting tofull first
amendment protection. 243 Under this test, in order for the gov-
ernment to justify a content-based restriction on political speech,
it must demonstrate that the restriction was necessary to fulfill a
compelling government interest.244
In applying this demanding test, theJohnson Court examined
the interests asserted by the state in support of the prosecution of
the defendant. According to the Court, the first asserted inter-
est-that of preventing breaches of the peace which could result
from offensive acts such as flag-burning-was not implicated on
the facts of the case.245 The Court further concluded that even
though Texas had a "legitimate" interest in preserving the flag as
a symbol of nationhood and national unity, there was no likeli-
hood that the defendant's politically motivated burning of the flag
238. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
239. Id. at 2548.
240. Id. at 2536, 2640-47.
241. Id. at 2544.
242. Id. at 2543 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)). Had
the Court determined that the Texas statute was merely a time, place and man-
ner restriction rather than a restriction on the content of speech, or that the
defendant's conduct was not expressive, a far less rigorous test would have been
applied. See id. at 2538.
243. See id. at 2543.
244. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318, 321 (1988).
245. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2541. According to the Court, there was no
showing that a disturbance of the peace had occurred or threatened to occur as a
result of the defendant's burning of the flag. Id.
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would dilute the flag's symbolic strength in the eyes of the pub-
lic.246 The Court therefore held that the prosecution of the de-
fendant was not necessary to preserve the flag as a symbol of
national unity. 247 Accordingly, the prosecution of the defendant
did not withstand first amendment scrutiny.
Johnson illustrates the difficult burden of justification placed
on the government when affected expression is entitled to full
first amendment protection. Not all constitutionally shielded
speech receives such extensive protection, however. Current con-
stitutional doctrine mandates a distinction between noncommer-
cial speech, which is potentially entitled to full protection, and
commercial speech, which receives some, though not full, protec-
tion. The following paragraphs examine the constitutional signif-
icance of the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech-a distinction critical to the determination of the proper
role of the first amendment in trademark parody cases. 248
B. Lesser (and Lessening) Protection for Commercial Speech
The distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech is a mainstay of first amendment jurisprudence. Speech
classified as commercial was long regarded as being outside the
scope of the freedom of speech and press clauses. 249 That view
was repudiated in 1976. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. ,250 the Supreme Court brought
commercial speech under the first amendment umbrella but de-
clined to give it the full protection accorded political speech and
its equivalents. 25' The commercial/noncommercial distinction
thus assumed its present role. Instead of determining whether the
246. Id. at 2542, 2544-46, 2547. According to the Court, "[N]obody can
suppose that this one gesture of an unknown man will change our Nation's atti-
tude towards its flag." Id. at 2547.
247. See id. at 2546 ("It is not the State's ends, but its means, to which we
object.").
248. For discussion of the role this distinction must play in order to prop-
erly accommodate first amendment interests in trademark parody cases, see infra
notes 385-490 and accompanying text.
249. See, e.g., Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942) (noting
that "the Constitution imposes no ... restraint on government as respects
purely commercial advertising").
250. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
251. Id. at 771-72 n.24. Although explicit recognition of first amendment
protection of commercial speech did not come until Virginia Board of Pharmacy,
two earlier decisions had strongly hinted that such a conclusion was imminent.
See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818-22 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973).
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subject speech fell within the first amendment, the distinction
now establishes the degree of constitutional protection for the sub-
ject speech. 252 The less-than-full protection given commercial
speech will be explored in more depth shortly. First, however, it
is useful to consider what is and is not commercial speech.
"Commercial speech" is usually defined by the Supreme
Court as expression that does "no more than propose a commer-
cial transaction." 253 Advertising intended to promote the sale of
a product or service is a typical example of commercial speech.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's major decisions involving commer-
cial speech have been advertising cases. 254 Sometimes, however,
the Court has broadened the definition of commercial speech to
include expression that is solely in the economic interest of the
speaker and his audience. 255 This latter definition may allow the
commercial speech label to be assigned to certain speech that
does more than merely propose a commercial transaction. 256 The
Court has not offered definitive guidance along these lines,
however.
Notwithstanding the lack of clarity concerning the full reach
of the commercial speech classification, it may safely be said that a
speaker's expectation of profit from his statements does not by
itself make the expression commercial speech. Both older and re-
cent Supreme Court decisions emphasize that the mere existence
of a profit motive for speech does not reduce the degree of consti-
tutional protection to which the expression is entitled.2 57 If
252. Compare Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748 (limited first amendment
protection for commercial speech) with Valentine, 316 U.S. 52 (no first amend-
ment protection for commercial speech).
253. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983);
Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762.
254. See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986);
Bolger, 463 U.S. 60; Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557 (1980); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748.
255. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
256. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68 (finding commercial speech present even
though advertisements at issue' contained some speech that did not propose
commercial transaction); see also Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979)
(trade name that does not by itself seem to propose commercial transaction but
does seem solely in economic interest of speaker and audience held commercial
speech).
257. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct.
2678, 2685 (1989); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S.
750, 756 n.5 (1988); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Re-
lations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973);Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
501-02 (1952). The Falwell case is also consistent with this proposition, given
the full first amendment protection extended to Hustler's parody despite the ob-
vious fact that the magazine was sold to make a profit. For a discussion of the
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speech is to be classified as partially protected commercial speech
or as wholly unprotected expression, factors other than the eco-
nomic motivation of the speaker must justify the classification.2 58
This approach to the economic gain issue is constitutionally com-
pelled. Without it, the first amendment guarantees of freedom of
speech and press would be little more than "empty vessels" 259
providing insufficient protection for the organized press, book
publishers and other similarly situated parties whose expression
has profitmaking aspects.2 60
Assuming, however, that speech restricted by government ac-
tion is properly classified as commercial, a court charged with de-
termining the validity of the government action must make
suitable allowances for the partially-protected status of commer-
cial expression. Doing so may be challenging, because the
Supreme Court's notion of what constitutes an intermediate de-
gree of first amendment protection has not remained constant.
The following discussion focuses on the development and current
status of first amendment protection for commercial speech.
The holding in Virginia Board of Pharmacy that commercial
speech merits constitutional status was justified primarily by the
Supreme Court's recognition of the public interest in the free
flow of commercial information. 261 The Court made it clear that
any constitutional protection extended to commercial speech was
Falwell case, see supra notes 232-37 and accompanying text. Speech which in-
volves a profit motive is not necessarily solely in the economic interest of the
speaker and his audience. Instead, the speech at issue in the above cited cases
(speech in newspapers, movies, and the like) communicates ideas that have so-
cial significance going well beyond the mere economic interests of the
speaker/writer and listener/reader.
258. Although the Supreme Court has been less than clear concerning what
other factors besides the mere existence of a profit motive are necessary in order
for speech to be considered commercial speech, the closer the speech comes to
the sale of goods or services-as opposed to the context of the "sale" of ideas,
as in a newspaper, book, or movie-the more likely it is that the speech will be
considered commercial speech. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-68 (speech that con-
tains some noncommercial aspects but is primarily advertising of commercially
sold product should be treated as commercial speech for first amendment
purposes).
259. Harte-Hanks Communications, 109 S. Ct. at 2685 ("If a profit motive
could somehow strip communications of the otherwise available constitutional
protection, our cases . . .would be little more than empty vessels.").
260. Id.; see Falwell, 485 U.S. at 53-55 (discussing value of, and first amend-
ment protection given to, various forms of parody and satire that obviously have
some attached profit motive).
261. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763. The Virginia Board of Pharmacy
Court struck down a state regulation that effectively prohibited pharmacists
from advertising the prices they would charge for prescription drugs. Id. at 749-
50, 752.
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conditioned on the expression's being truthful and about a lawful
activity.2 62 Except for specifying these conditions, however, Vir-
ginia Board of Pharmacy left undermined the specific means of im-
plementing commercial speech's partial first amendment
protection. That task was undertaken in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.263 The Central Hudson
Court developed a four-part test for determining the constitu-
tionality of government action that restricts commercial
speech. 264
The first element of the Central Hudson test asks whether the
affected commercial speech pertains to a lawful activity and is
nonmisleading.2 65 If this question is answered negatively, there is
no need to apply the remaining elements of the test because the
government action will not violate the first amendment.266 If the
question posed in the first element of the Central Hudson test is
answered affirmatively, the affected commercial speech is entitled
to first amendment protection. Nevertheless, the government ac-
tion may be upheld if it clears the hurdles posed by the remaining
three elements of the four-part test. 26 7 Central Hudson established
the remaining elements as: (1) whether the government had a
"substantial" underlying interest to further in taking the action;
(2) whether the government action directly advanced the underly-
ing interest; and (3) whether the government action was no more
extensive than necessary to serve that interest.268
262. Id. at 770-72. In the realm of noncommercial speech, however, false
statements and statements about unlawful matters are treated much differently.
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-73 (1964) (falsity of
speech does not necessarily cause loss of first amendment protection); Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (speech about unlawful activity pro-
tected by first amendment unless speech is both directed to incite and likely to
incite imminent lawless activity).
263. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
264. This test was designed to give substance to the partial first amendment
protection contemplated by Virginia Board of Pharmacy. See 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
265. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
266. Id. The "negative" answer contemplated in the text would mean that
the commercial speech either was about an unlawful activity or was misleading.
267. Id.
268. Id. In Board of Trustees of the State University of N.Y. v. Fox, 109 S.
Ct. 3028 (1989), however, the Supreme Court lessened the rigor of the fourth
element of the Central Hudson test. The Court discarded Central Hudson's "no
more extensive than necessary" inquiry, substituting an inquiry as to whether
the government action was "narrowly tailored" to serve the underlying interest.
Fox, 109 S. Ct. at 3035. For present purposes, however, it is sufficient to say that
affirmative answers to each of the questions posed in the last three elements of
the four-part test would enable the government action to withstand the first
amendment challenge, whereas a negative answer to any of the three questions
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The partial first amendment protection crafted in Virginia
Board of Pharmacy and Central Hudson contemplated that even
truthful commercial speech about lawful activities could constitu-
tionally be subjected to government regulation under appropriate
circumstances. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's decisions
prior to 1986 reflected an inclination to view skeptically govern-
ment attempts to restrict commercial speech that was neither false
nor promoted illegal activities. 269 For instance, in Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Products Corp. ,270 the Court struck down as unconstitutional a
federal statute that prohibited unsolicited mailings of contra-
ceptive advertisements.2 7 ' The affected advertisements were pre-
sumably truthful, and the sale of contraceptives was
unquestionably a lawful activity. Thus, the commercial speech at
issue 272 merited first amendment protection under the first ele-
ment of the Central Hudson test. According to the Court, the gov-
ernment was unable to override this protection because an
insufficient nexus between the statute and the government's un-
derlying interests caused the statute to fail the final two elements
of the four-part test. 273
would make the action unconstitutional. For a further discussion of Fox, see infra
notes 282-94 and accompanying text.
269. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637-38
(1985); Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68-75; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564; Bates v. State
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 363-64 (1977); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at
749, 750-52, 773. In all of these cases, the Court struck down restrictions on
nonmisleading speech about lawful activities.
270. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
271. Id. at 75.
272. Bolger is significant for another reason that is well-suited to the pur-
poses of this article. A threshold issue in the case was whether the contraceptive
advertisements constituted commercial speech or, instead, more strongly pro-
tected political speech. See id. at 65. The noncommercial aspects of the adver-
tisements consisted of statements concerning the usefulness of contraceptive
devices in preventing pregnancy and minimizing the risk of transmission of ve-
nereal disease. Id. at 67-68. The Court noted, however, that the speaker's eco-
nomic motivation is also an important consideration in determining whether
expression is commercial speech. Id. at 67. This statement by the Court must
not be taken too far out of its context: the advertisements at issue in the case
pertained predominantly to the sale of a commercial product. The Bolger Court
concluded that if expression seems predominantly commercial, despite having
some noncommercial, political aspects, it should be classified as commercial and
thus entitled to only partial first amendment protection. Id. at 66-68. The
Court's approach to making commercial/noncommercial distinctions can be
useful in the trademark parody setting. See infra notes 407-12 and accompanying
text.
273. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 71-75. Recognizing that the government had a sub-
stantial interest in aiding parents in deciding when and whether to discuss mat-
ters pertaining to contraception with their children, the Court nonetheless
concluded that the statute's sweeping ban on unsolicited advertisements was un-
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The first decade of decisions after Virginia Board of Pharmacy
collectively established the high-water mark for first amendment
protection of commercial speech. A 1986 decision, Posadas de
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. ,274 began an apparent lessening
of the protection accorded commercial speech. In Posadas, the
Court rejected a first amendment challenge to a Puerto Rico reg-
ulation that prohibited advertisements promoting casino gam-
bling if the advertisements were directed at residents or citizens
of Puerto Rico. 275 Casino gambling was legal in Puerto Rico.
276
Posadas thus stands in marked contrast to the Court's previous de-
cisions which disapproved of government regulation of accurate
speech concerning lawful commercial activities.
In upholding the advertising ban, the majority opinion by
Justice Rehnquist professed allegiance to Central Hudson's four-
part test. 277 The Court, however, altered the previous application
of the third and fourth elements of the test. Instead of con-
ducting a careful analysis of the relationship between the advertis-
ing ban and the government's underlying interest in protecting
residents from the harmful effects of casino gambling, the Court
seemed to defer to the legislature's judgment about whether the
regulation directly advanced the government interest through a
means no more extensive than necessary. 278 Observing that the
Puerto Rico legislature would not have enacted the advertising
ban if it did not believe that the restriction would be an appropri-
ate means of advancing the government interest, the majority in-
dicated that judicial interference with this "reasonable" judgment
by the legislature would be inappropriate.2 79
With its deferential approach, Posadas effectively weakened
the Central Hudson test while purporting to adhere to it. More
government regulations of commercial speech may logically be
expected to pass constitutional muster under Posadas's deferential
approach to the last two elements of the Central Hudson test than
under prior judicial analysis. 280 Even though Posadas did not spe-
constitutional. The statute did little to further the state's interest and was far
too broad in its application. See id.
274. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
275. Id. at 330-31, 344.
276. Id. at 331.
277. Id. at 340.
278. See id. at 341-44. See Lively, The Supreme Court and Commercial Speech:
New Words with an Old Message, 72 MINN. L. REV. 289, 292, 301 (1987) (noting
deferential approach taken by Posadas Court).
279. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341-44.
280. Compare Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341-44 with Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638;
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cifically designate the extent to which first amendment protection
for commercial speech was being lessened, the decision nonethe-
less signalled that a lessening of protection was underway. 28'
This signal took a more concrete form three years later in Board of
Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox.28 2
In Fox, the Court focused on the final element of Central Hud-
son's four-part test for determining whether government action
that restricts commercial speech violates the first amendment.
283
As formulated in Central Hudson, the final element inquired
whether the government action was no more extensive than nec-
essary to serve the underlying government interest.284 Some of
the Court's previous commercial speech decisions seemed to indi-
cate that this element effectively required a "least restrictive
means" analysis.28 5 Writing for the Fox majority, Justice Scalia
stated that no such analysis was contemplated or required by Cen-
tral Hudson.286 The majority reasoned that the references in prior
decisions to a least restrictive means approach were dicta because
the Court had never actually established that a government re-
striction on commercial speech must be absolutely the narrowest
Bolger, 463 U.S. at 69; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564; Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy,
425 U.S. at 773.
281. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341-44. In addition to altering the Court's
approach to the final two elements of the Central Hudson test, Posadas suggested
an alternative means of analysis with potentially grave consequences for com-
mercial speech. After concluding that the restriction on advertising at issue
passed the four-part test and therefore was constitutional, the majority asserted
that because Puerto Rico would have had the power to ban casino gambling, it
should logically have the power to take the less intrusive step of allowing casino
gambling while prohibiting certain advertising of it. Id. at 345-47. If this dictum
is seized upon in future cases, it could become a broad-ranging doctrine that
would justify many restrictions on commercial speech, because there are few
underlying activities that the government could not constitutionally prohibit. See
Lively, supra note 278, at 300. The dissenters in Posadas accused Justice Rehn-
quist of having the analysis backwards. They regarded the advertising ban as the
more drastic action, in terms of constitutionally protected freedoms, than a ban
on the underlying activity of gambling because gambling is unlikely to enjoy
constitutional protection. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 354 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
It remains to be seen to what extent the Posadas dictum will be relied on in future
commercial speech decisions.
282. 109 S. Ct. 3028 (1989).
283. Id. at 3032-35. Fox dealt with a state university's regulation that re-
stricted private parties from holding "Tupperware parties" in students' dormi-
tory rooms. Id. at 3030. The student plaintiffs alleged that the regulation
unconstitutionally deprived them of their rights to receive commercial speech.
Id.
284. For a discussion of this element of the Central Hudson test, see supra
note 268 and accompanying text.
285. Fox, 109 S. Ct. at 3032-35.
286. Id. at 3033.
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means of furthering the underlying government interest.287
In rejecting the least-restrictive means analysis, the Fox Court
held that the final element of the four-part test merely requires
that when the government regulates commercial speech, its
means must be "narrowly tailored to achieve [its] desired objec-
tive." 28 8 Justice Scalia observed that the Constitution mandated
a "reasonable" fit, "not necessarily [a] perfect" fit, between the
regulation and the underlying government interest. 28 9 After
Fox's reformulation of the Central Hudson test, a regulation that is
more extensive than necessary to serve an underlying govern-
ment interest may now pass first amendment muster. Under Fox's
"narrowly tailored" approach, a restriction that sweeps more
broadly than the narrowest possible regulation may still be "rea-
sonably" suited to the advancement of the government
interest.290
Fox's definite lessening of the protection afforded by the
commercial speech test signifies that government restrictions on
commercial speech will be less likely to be struck down on first
amendment grounds than they would have been under Central
Hudson. Although the recent interpretation of the commercial
speech test translates into a lessening of the first amendment pro-
tection afforded commercial speech, the Fox Court failed to ac-
knowledge that it was effecting such a shift. Instead, the Court
purported merely to clarify the degree of scrutiny given to gov-
ernment action that limits commercial speech.29 1 Furthermore,
the Court expressly denied that Fox amounted to an adoption of a
lenient "rational basis" test for determining the constitutionality
of restrictions on commercial speech. 29 2
287. Id. at 3034-35.
288. Id. at 3035. The Fox trial court had ruled for the university, but the
court of appeals reversed and remanded because the trial court had not consid-
ered whether the university regulation was the least restrictive means by which
the university could further its substantial interests in preserving an educational
environment and in minimizing the risk that students would be taken advantage
of by unscrupulous merchants. Fox v. Board of Trustees, 841 F.2d 1207, 1213-
14 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 3028 (1989). The Supreme Court reversed
and remanded because the court of appeals had erroneously required a "least
restrictive means" analysis. Fox, 109 S. Ct. at 3037-38.
289. Id. at 3035.
290. See id. at 3033-35.
291. See id. at 3034-35. In Posadas, the Court adopted a similar approach:
effectively altering the Central Hudson test while purporting to adhere to it. For a
discussion of Posadas, see supra notes 274-81 and accompanying text.
292. Fox, 109 S. Ct. at 3035. The rational basis test is often used to deter-
mine whether the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has
been violated by an economic regulation that did not affect a suspect class or the
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Although Fox should not be regarded as having eliminated
first amendment protection for commercial speech, it is fairly
read as having lowered commercial speech protection to a rung
that is still "intermediate," yet farther removed from the highest
rung of the first amendment ladder of protection. The highest
rung, of course, is reserved for political speech and its noncom-
mercial equivalents. 293 Fox thus signals a widening of the gulf be-
tween the respective levels of first amendment protection for
noncommercial and commercial speech. 29 4
IV. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS IN
TRADEMARK PARODY CASES
The relevance of first amendment considerations in trade-
mark parody cases has not always been recognized by courts.
Although some of the more recent decisions reflect attempts to
deal seriously with parodists' constitutional arguments, most
courts deciding trademark parody cases have either ignored the
possible first amendment issues or dealt with them in an abbrevi-
ated, unprincipled fashion. As a prelude to section V's proposals
concerning a proper accommodation of first amendment interests
in trademark parody cases, this section of the article reviews how
courts have dealt with freedom of expression interests in these
cases.
There is no question that litigation over trademark rights is
much simpler for courts to resolve if the first amendment thicket
is avoided. Of course, it is not unreasonable for a court to avoid
exercise of a fundamental right. Under this test, an economic regulation will be
sustained if it is reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose. The
regulation will normally be upheld when this test applies because the govern-
ment can establish "reasonable relation" with ease. SeeJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 530 (3d ed. 1986). Despite the Court's disa-
vowal of the rational basis test in Fox, the Court's focus on a "reasonable" fit
between the regulation and the underlying government interest seems akin to
adopting a rational basis type of review. See Fox, 109 S. Ct. at 3035. It should
also be noted that the Fox Court spoke approvingly of the deferential approach
taken in Posadas. See id at 3034. For a discussion of the deferential approach
used in Posadas, see supra note 281 and accompanying text.
293. For a discussion of the degree of constitutional protection afforded
political and noncommercial speech, see supra notes 238-47 and accompanying
text.
294. In Fox, Justice Scalia stated that the decision actually strengthened
"the essential protections of the First Amendment" by confirming that a mean-
ingful distinction was kept between fully protected noncommercial speech and
less-valued commercial speech. See Fox, 109 S. Ct. at 3035. The Court's recent
ringing endorsements of noncommercial (as opposed to commercial) speech
highlight this distinction. See Texas v.Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989); Hustler
Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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this thicket by finding a defendant not liable on other "nonconsti-
tutional" grounds.2 95 Where the defendant would otherwise be
liable under a substantive theory of trademark rights, however,
the possible first amendment aspects of the case should not be
dismissed as irrelevant or unnecessary to the decision. Some
courts have simply omitted discussion of freedom of expression
issues when ruling in favor of the trademark owner.2 96 In other
trademark parody cases in which the trademark owner prevailed,
courts have grudgingly acknowledged that the parodist made a
first amendment argument but have rejected it with virtually no
analysis or explanation. 297
A. The "Adequate Alternative Avenues of Communication" Approach
Other courts have rejected the parodists' first amendment ar-
gument because of an erroneous application of the Supreme
Court's decision in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner.2 98 This decision should
not be considered controlling in the trademark parody setting.
Lloyd presented the question of whether the first amendment was
violated when persons were prevented from distributing handbills
concerning the military draft and the Vietnam War at a privately
295. See, e.g., Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482,
1490 n.7 (10th Cir. 1987) (first amendment issue noted in footnote but not dealt
with because defendant found not liable for infringement or dilution); Toho Co.
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981); Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. T-Shirt Gallery, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Tetley, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
296. See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1988); Original Appa-
lachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D.
Ga. 1986); Wendy's Int'l, Inc. v. Big Bite, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Ohio
1983); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124 (N.D.
Ga. 1981); Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 7 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1862 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); General Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., 205
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1036 (D. Mass. 1979); Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co.,
446 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Thea-
tres, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 159 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
Some of these courts' failures to address the constitutional issue were harm-
less error. In view of the nature of the defendant's use, the first amendment
would not have saved the defendant from liability. In other decisions, however,
the failure to consider the first amendment issue resulted in defendant being
held liable when constitutional considerations should have dictated a finding of
no liability. Section V of this article will set forth criteria for determining when
the first amendment should protect the parodist from liability.
297. See, e.g., General Foods Corp. v. Mellis, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 261, 263-
64 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183,
1192-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); cf. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Miller, 211
U.S.P.Q (BNA) 816, 820 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (affirming denial of registration of
"mark" that was parody of previously registered mark).
298. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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owned shopping center.29 9 The Supreme Court concluded that
there was no first amendment violation because there was no gov-
ernment action, only the action of a private property owner exer-
cising property rights. 300 The Court also noted that the would-be
distributors of handbills had various "adequate alternative ave-
nues of communication" because they could have distributed
their materials at other locations. 30 1
In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,302
the defendants argued that the first amendment should protect
them from liability for their use of a likeness of the plaintiff's
cheerleading uniform in their sexually explicit movie.30 3 The Sec-
ond Circuit, relying on Lloyd, rejected the first amendment argu-
ment. The court noted that the plaintiff's trademark was "in the
nature of a property right" and therefore need not "yield to the
exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances where
adequate alternative avenues of communication exist." 30 4 The
court pointed out that if the defendant's movie was a commentary
on sexuality in athletics, there were numerous ways in which the
defendant could have made the comment without employing the
plaintiff's trademark. 30 5
The reliance in Dallas Cowboys on Lloyd involved an erroneous
legal analysis that linked two considerably different forms of
property: real estate and trademarks. Besides the obvious differ-
ence that real estate is tangible property while a trademark is in-
tangible, the two forms of property function quite differently.
Real estate is a location at which speech may or may not take
place. A trademark, on the other hand, is hardly a location. It is a
299. Id. at 552, 556.
300. Id. at 567-68, 570.
301. Id. at 564-67. Significantly, the Court observed that the content of the
handbills did not pertain to the shopping center owner or to the purposes for
which the shopping center was built or was being used. Therefore, it was not
essential that the would-be speakers gain access to the privately owned shopping
center. They could have distributed their materials at numerous public places.
Id. at 564.
302. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
303. Id. at 205-06.
304. Id. at 206 (quoting Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 567). The court also concluded
that the issuance of an injunction against the defendants' movie would not con-
stitute government action but would instead be only an outgrowth of the trade-
mark owner's legitimate efforts to enforce its property rights. Id. The
conclusion that there would be no government action in such an instance was
erroneous. See infra notes 374-84 and accompanying text.
305. Dallas Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 206. According to the court, however, the
movie had "a barely discernible message." Id. The court was not presented
with the question of whether the movie was obscene. Id.
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potential subject of speech or is otherwise incorporated into the
content of speech. The trademark parodist pokes fun at a trade-
mark or engages in commentary concerning the trademark, its
owner, or some aspect of life. 30 6 It overextends the trademark
owner's rights and devalues the parodist's interests in freedom of
expression to conclude that the trademark owner's property
rights in the mark necessarily must prevail over another party's
ability to make an expressive use of the mark.30 7 A proper accom-
modation of these two competing interests is essential. 308
Whatever a proper accommodation of these competing inter-
ests may be, it is not effected by blindly applying the ill-fitting
Lloyd approach to the trademark rights setting. It is one thing to
recognize, as Lloyd did, that the real estate owner has a right to
restrict the location of another party's speech by saying that the
expression cannot take place on the real estate owner's private
property. It is quite another to assert, as in Dallas Cowboys, that
the trademark owner may automatically exclude her trademark
from the list of permissible subjects about which another may
speak.309 The latter approach is constitutionally infirm because it
becomes a judicially sanctioned content regulation, rather than a
restriction on where speech may take place.310
The questionable first amendment framework adopted in
Dallas Cowboys has been erroneously adopted in other trademark
parody cases. 311 For instance, in Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v.
306. Thus, the trademark is still a vital part of the parody's content even
when the parody is primarily a vehicle for commentary on something other than
the trademark or its owner, rather than an irreverent "jab" at the trademark or
its owner. See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing
Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989) (parody employing likeness of Cliffs
Notes cover and style of writing was adverse commentary on novels being "sum-
marized" in parody rather than adverse commentary on Cliffs Notes).
307. See Denicola, supra note 27, at 206; Note, supra note 64, at 1110-12.
308. For a discussion of this article's proposed accommodation, see infra
notes 448-90 and accompanying text.
309. See Denicola, supra note 27, at 196-97, 206; Note, supra note 64, at
1111-12; see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998-99 (2d Cir. 1989) (voic-
ing disapproval of applying Lloyd approach to literary expression); L.L. Bean,
Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir.) (expressing disagree-
ment with applying Lloyd approch in trademark parody setting), appeal dismissed,
cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987).
310. For a discussion of how judicial enforcement of private trademark
rights is government action for purposes of first amendment issues, see infra
notes 374-84 and accompanying text.
311. A federal district court decision that preceded Dallas Cowboys took the
same approach to first amendment issues. See Interbank Card Ass'n v. Simms,
431 F. Supp. 131 (M.D.N.C. 1977). Largely by virtue of its attention-getting
facts, however, Dallas Cowboys acquired more notoriety. In Interbank, the court
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Novak, 312 the Eighth Circuit affirmed the issuance of a permanent
injunction in favor of Mutual of Omaha against an anti-nuclear
weapons activist who sold t-shirts and other items on which "Mu-
tant of Omaha" was printed.313 The court, citing Dallas Cowboys,
rejected the defendant's first amendment argument because there
were "adequate alternative avenues of communication" available
to the defendant.31 4
granted the owners of the "Master Charge" name and the trademarked Master
Charge interlocking circle design a preliminary injunction against defendants
who had distributed numerous likenesses of Master Charge cards with religious
messages on them. Id. at 132-33. The court, citing Lloyd, rejected the defend-
ants' first amendment argument and concluded that the defendants had various
adequate alternatives by which to communicate their messages other than
through the use of plaintiff's trademarks. Id. at 133-34. The court also con-
cluded that judicial enforcement of the plaintiff's trademark rights was not gov-
ernment action implicating first amendment concerns. For a discussion of why
this conclusion was erroneous, see infra notes 374-84 and accompanying text.
The facts of Interbank suggest some interesting issues. The defendants' first
amendment argument seemingly would have been grounded not only on the
freedom of speech clause, which is commonly invoked by defendants in parody
cases, but also on the freedom of religion component of the first amendment.
With its misplaced reliance on Lloyd, however, the Interbank court avoided ad-
dressing these issues in any depth.
312. 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988).
313. Id. at 398, 402-03.
314. Id. at 402. In fairness to the Eighth Circuit, the court did not embrace
the Dallas Cowboys approach to its fullest extent. Implicit in the court's opinion is
a concession thatjudicial enforcement of trademark rights is government action,
although there was not, in the court's view, impermissible government action in
the facts of the case. See id. at 402-03. The Dallas Cowboys court found no such
government action. See supra note 304 and accompanying text. The Mutual of
Omaha Court also appeared to recognize that there may be limits to the applica-
tion of the Dallas Cowboys approach. It emphasized that the injunction at issue
only barred the defendant from "commercial" use of Mutual of Omaha trade-
marks-the type of use the court concluded was involved in the case despite the
defendant's argument that he was communicating a noncommercial, protected
message. Mutual of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 402 & n.8, 403 n.9. The court observed
that the injunction, and presumably Mutual of Omaha's trademark rights, would
not bar the defendant from using his Mutant of Omaha designs in "an editorial
parody in a book, magazine, or film." Id. at 402. Finally, the court attempted to
show that its decision was not inconsistent with L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publish-
ers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1 st Cir. 1987), one of the leading trademark parody deci-
sions dealing with first amendment issues. The Mutual of Omaha court labeled
the parody involved in L.L. Bean as editorial or artistic and noncommercial, but
stressed that the "Mutant of Omaha" parody was both commercial and likely to
cause confusion. Mutual of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 403 n.9. Interestingly enough,
the L.L. Bean court, referring to the preliminary injunction hearing in Mutual of
Omaha, seemed to reject the notion that the parody in Mutual of Omaha was
purely commercial. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 32 n.4. Rather, it referred to Mutual
of Omaha as a case involving a parody whose primary purpose was the communi-
cation of a message. Id. For a discussion of the first amendment aspects of L.L.
Bean, see infra notes 321-37 and accompanying text.
Under this article's proposed first amendment framework, the result in Mu-
tual of Omaha was correct-even though the first amendment model adopted in
[Vol. 36: p. I
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B. First Amendment Considerations as an
Additional Rationale
Other courts have shown more of a willingness to recognize
that freedom of expression considerations play a serious role in
trademark parody cases. For instance, in Girl Scouts of the United
States v. Personality Posters Manufacturing Co. ,35 the court noted that
enjoining the defendant's "Be Prepared" poster of a pregnant
"Girl Scout" could run afoul of the substantial first amendment
protection given to those exercising the "right of satirical expres-
sion." 3 16 Similarly, in University of Notre Dame v. Twentieth Century-
Fox Film Corp. ,317 the court refused to enjoin a satirical movie that
contained a scene in which a team represented to be Notre Dame
lost a "wild burlesque of a football game" to a Middle Eastern
country's team. 318 The court noted the first amendment protec-
tion given to books, motion pictures and the like, and emphasized
that whether the movie at issue was "good burlesque or bad, pen-
etrating satire or blundering buffoonery, is not for us to decide.
It is fundamental that courts may not muffle expression by pass-
ing judgment on its skill or clumsiness, its sensitivity or coarse-
ness; nor on whether it pains or pleases." 31 9
In both Notre Dame and Girl Scouts, as well as in other cases
examined previously, the courts first concluded that the defend-
ant would not be liable on the substantive trademark rights theory
at issue, and then cited first amendment concerns as a further rea-
son for denying relief to the trademark owner. 320 Therefore, be-
the decision was flawed-if the defendant's parody was both commercial and
likely to cause confusion. For this article's proposed first amendment frame-
work, see infra notes 448-90 and accompanying text. For the related discussion
of making commercial/noncommercial distinctions in trademark parody cases,
see infra notes 407-47 and accompanying text.
315. 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
316. Id. at 1235.
317. 22 A.D.2d 452, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301, aff'd mem., 15 N.Y.2d 940, 207
N.E.2d 508, 259 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1965).
318. Id. at 454,458, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 304, 307. The movie, "John Goldfarb,
Please Come Home," was described by the court as a "broad farce" that dealt
with government, religion, and football in a satirical fashion. Id. at 453, 256
N.Y.S.2d at 303. Notre Dame's suit was based on a New York statute that al-
lowed nonprofit corporations to restrain the use of their name for advertising
purposes or for purposes of trade. Id. at 455-56, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 305. The case
was therefore a trademark parody case. The court concluded that the movie was
not the sort of commercial use contemplated by the statute, and that, in any
event, the movie was constitutionally protected expression. Id. at 456-58, 256
N.Y.S.2d at 305-07.
319. Id. at 457, 458, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 306, 307.
320. In Girl Scouts, for example, the court had already rejected the plaintiff's
several claims before making its first amendment observations which it conceded
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cause the first amendment issue was not crucial to the outcome,
these decisions did not contain enunciations of principled mecha-
nisms for addressing the first amendment aspects of trademark
parody cases.
C. The First Amendment as Determinative of the Outcome
Unlike the cases just described, recent decisions of the First
and Second Circuits have made first amendment limitations on
trademark rights the centerpiece of consideration. These deci-
sions have provided more insight than any of their predecessors
into the appropriate accommodation of freedom of expression
considerations in trademark parody cases.
In L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc. ,321 the First Circuit
overturned an injunction granted against the publisher of High
Society magazine following the adult magazine's parody of the L.L.
Bean name and catalog style.3 22 The trial court had held that the
parody violated Maine's anti-dilution statute 23 The First Circuit
rejected the argument accepted by various other courts that dilu-
tion by tarnishment could occur on the basis of a trademark's ap-
pearing on only one occasion in an arguably unwholesome
were unnecessary to the decision in favor of the defendant. See Girl Scouts, 304 F.
Supp. at 1235. In the University of Notre Dame case, the court acknowledged the
first amendment argument after concluding that the statute on which Notre
Dame based its claim did not cover uses of nonprofit entities' names in movies.
Notre Dame, 22 A.D.2d at 456, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 305.
Other cases include Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931
(D.D.C. 1985), Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Committee,
489 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) and Reddy Communications, Inc. v. Environ-
mental Action Foundation, 477 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1979). The court in Stop
the Olympic Prison rejected the Olympic Committee's various trademark rights
theories on the facts, ostensibly without resorting to a first amendment ration-
ale. See Stop the Olympic Prison, 489 F. Supp. at 1126. Nevertheless, the court
made various observations that had a freedom of expression ring to them. See id.
at 1120-26. In Lucasfilm, the court ruled for the defendant after concluding that
the defendant's use was not the sort prohibited by conventional trademark doc-
trines. See Lucasfilm, 622 F. Supp. at 933-36. The court's opinion has clear con-
stitutional overtones, however. See id. Similarly, in Reddy Communications, the
court found in favor of the defendant parodist on the substantive trademark
rights theories, but made enough references to the defendant's "satirical com-
mentary" to give the decision a freedom of expression flavor. Reddy Communica-
tions, 477 F. Supp. at 943-48.
321. 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013
(1987).
322. Id. at 34.
323. L.L. Bean Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 1531, 1538 (D.
Me. 1986), rev'd, 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013
(1987).
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context. 324 It thus adopted a narrow reading of the typical anti-
dilution statute-a reading that was justified primarily by resort to
the first amendment.
Before discussing the constitutional aspects of the case, the
L.L. Bean court observed that the rights granted to trademark
owners by the substantive theories infringement and dilution are
properly restricted to commercial settings. 325 The decision's rec-
ognition of the need for a commercial/noncommercial distinction
reflects a limitation on trademark rights that is both logical and
consistent with. relevant constitutional considerations. 326 The
court concluded that serious first amendment problems would
arise if anti-dilution statutes were interpreted to allow dilution by
tarnishment claims to be established against noncommercial par-
odists just as easily as against commercial parodists. 327 The first
amendment protects a broad range of statements that may offend
some persons. If anti-dilution statutes created liability for all uses
of a plaintiff's trademark in an unwholesome setting, protected
expression would be at risk. This risk is particularly serious when
the offensive statements are made in noncommercial settings.328
Although the L.L. Bean court did not set forth extensive
guidelines for determining what constitutes a commercial use of a
trademark, the court observed that a defendant who "unauthoriz-
edly merchandis[es] his products with another's trademark" has
engaged in a commercial use. The enjoining of such a use under
an anti-dilution statute would likely be "a legitimate regulation of
324. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 34. For a discussion of the dilution by tarnish-
ment aspect of the court's decision, see supra notes 174-77 and accompanying
text.
325. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 29. The court approvingly cited Lucasfilm, 622
F. Supp. at 933-35 in which the use of the name "star wars" in political adver-
tisements was held to be noncommercial and therefore not violative of Lucas-
film's trademark rights in the name "Star Wars." Id.
326. As indicated in previous discussion, first amendment jurisprudence
has long recognized a commercial/noncommercial distinction. See supra notes
250-52 and accompanying text. The commercial/noncommercial distinction is
critical to the proper accommodation of first amendment interests in trademark
parody cases, as the framework proposed later herein reveals. See infra notes
448-90 and accompanying text.
327. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 30-31.
328. Id. at 30-31, 33-34; cf Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,
51-56 (1988) (recognizing first amendment protection of speech that offends-
and even is calculated to offend-hearers or readers). According to the L.L.
Bean court, the application of the dilution by tarnishment theory should be re-
stricted to clearly commercial settings where the defendant uses the plaintiff's
mark in a trademark-like sense to promote goods or services that are in some
sense inferior to the plaintiff's. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 31-32. The court saw no
such use in the case before it. Id. at 32.
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commercial speech. '3 29 Such a use, however, did not occur in
L.L. Bean. Labeling High Society's parody of the L.L. Bean name
and catalog style "editorial or artistic" in nature, the court deter-
mined that the defendant's use was noncommercial.330 The de-
fendant used the plaintiff's trademarks "solely to identify Bean as
the object of its parody." 33' The court held that to allow the
plaintiff to enjoin such a parody would be to "improperly expand
the scope of the anti-dilution statute far beyond the frontiers of
commerce and deep into the realm of expression. ' 3 3 2 As recog-
nized by the L.L. Bean court, the property rights inuring to trade-
mark owners cannot be enforced to the extent of suppressing all
speech adverse or offensive to the trademark owners.333 The
329. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 32. For a discussion of the approach(es) man-
dated by the Supreme Court for cases involving government restrictions on
commercial speech, see supra notes 263-94 and accompanying text.
330. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 32. The court offered some reasons why the
parody in High Society magazine was not commercial in nature:
The article was labelled as "humor" and "parody" in the magazine's
table of contents section; it took up two pages in a one-hundred-page
issue; neither the article nor appellant's trademark was featured on the
front or back cover of the magazine. [High Society] did not use Bean's
mark to identify or promote goods or services to consumers; it never
intended to market the "products" displayed in the parody.
Id. It should be noted that the obvious wish of High Society's publisher to make a
profit on the magazine was not enough to make the defendant's use commercial
rather than noncommercial. This is consistent with relevant Supreme Court
precedent. See supra notes 257-60 and accompanying text. Although the L.L.
Bean court distinguished Dallas Cowboys as a case involving a commercial use of
another's trademark, it did not explain why the use in Dallas Cowboys, a sexually
explicit movie, was significantly different from the use in L.L. Bean, a sexually
explicit magazine. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 31-32. A possible explanation is that in
Dallas Cowboys, the defendants had falsely advertised that the movie's star had
been a cheerleader for the Dallas Cowboys. Dallas Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 203 &
n.2. The defendants in Dallas Cowboys could therefore be seen as actively "mar-
keting" the movie on the basis of some supposed connection with the plaintiff,
whereas the defendants in L.L. Bean did not undertake actions of that sort. See
L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 32.
331. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 33. The court contrasted such a use with what
the defendant did not do: attempt to "market goods or services" through the
use of L.L. Bean trademarks. Id.
332. Id.
333. See id. at 33-34. The court also noted the latitude historically afforded
parodists and satirists even though their speech may offend those who are the
object of it. Id. at 33. This aspect of the court's reasoning appeared to antici-
pate the Supreme Court reasoning the following year in Falwell. For discussion
of Falwell, see supra notes 232-37 and accompanying text. The L.L. Bean court
concluded that, given the usual tolerance for parody and satire, "[it would be
anomalous to diminish the protection afforded parody solely because a parodist
chooses a famous trade name, rather than a famous personality, author or crea-
tive work, as its object." L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 33 (footnote omitted). In addi-
tion, the court voiced constitutional reservations about calling on courts-as
broad application of the dilution by tarnishment doctrine would seem to call
[Vol. 36: p. I
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court therefore concluded that the anti-dilution statute's reach
was limited by the first amendment.33 4
Another significant aspect of the First Circuit's constitutional
analysis in L.L. Bean is that it repudiated the "adequate alternative
avenues of communication" approach taken by the trial court and
other courts in cases such as Dallas Cowboys. 335 In holding that the
defendant could have conveyed largely the same content without
using the plaintiff's trademarks, the trial court in L.L. Bean disre-
garded the fact that L.L. Bean was a significant object of the par-
ody. The First Circuit's reversal involved a recognition that
granting L.L. Bean relief on the dilution theory would be an im-
permissible content restriction on speech. 33 6 As if to answer
for-to determine whether the parodist's speech is unwholesome, coarse, or of-
fensive. Id. at 33-34. It noted that even though the High Society parody may be
"coarse and vulgar," much speech of that nature is fully protected under the first
amendment unless it is obscene. Id. at 34. The case did not involve any claim
that the parody was obscene. Id. at 34 n.6.
334. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 32-33. In dictum, the court briefly mentioned
that the parody would have received less first amendment protection if it had
caused consumer confusion because "[a] parody which causes confusion in the
marketplace implicates the legitimate commercial and consumer protection
objectives of trademark law." Id. at 32 n.3. Presumably, the court's statement
was referring to the notion of likelihood of confusion in the traditional trade-
mark law sense. For discussion of that concept, see supra notes 37-57 and ac-
companying text. Commercial parodies that create such a likelihood of
confusion should not receive first amendment protection, as the following sec-
tion's proposed framework indicates. See infra notes 448-49 and accompanying
text.
The L.L. Bean court also noted that it had "no occasion to consider the
constitutional limits which might be imposed on the application of anti-dilution
statutes to unauthorized uses of trademarks on products whose principal pur-
pose is to convey a message." L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 32 n.4. The court cited the
"Mutant of Omaha" t-shirts as an example of such a use even though the Mutual
of Omaha court found a purely commercial use in that case. See supra note 314
and accompanying text. For cases where the trademark parody appears on a
product that is intended to communicate a message, the L.L. Bean court asserted
that the appropriate first amendment approach would be to balance "the harm
suffered by the trademark owner against the benefit derived by the parodist and
the public from [such] unauthorized use of [the] trademark .... " L. L. Bean, 811
F.2d at 32 n.4.
335. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 28-34. The trial court's rejection of the defend-
ant's first amendment argument was based on the notion that the defendant
could have chosen means other than using L.L. Bean trademarks to express its
message. The trial court also maintained that its injunction was not an imper-
missible prior restraint because it amounted to only enforcement of the plain-
tiff's property rights. See L.L. Bean, 625 F. Supp. at 1537-38. In disposing of the
first amendment issue in this manner, the trial court essentially tracked the ap-
proach taken in Dallas Cowboys. For discussion of this approach, see supra notes
302-14 and accompanying text.
336. See L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 34. The court acknowledged that the result
it reached differed from that in the Pillsbury case discussed earlier. Id. at 33 n.5.
In Pillsbury, an injunction was granted on a dilution by tarnishment theory
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those who would question whether there was any meaningful con-
tent in the parody at issue in L.L. Bean, the court concluded its
opinion with language that sheds light on the functions of trade-
mark parodies:
The central role which trademarks occupy in public dis-
course (a role eagerly encouraged by trademark owners),
makes them a natural target of parodists. Trademark
parodies, even when offensive, do convey a message.
The message may be simply that business and product
images need not always be taken too seriously; a trade-
mark parody reminds us that we are free to laugh at the
images and associations linked with the mark. The
message also may be a simple form of entertainment
conveyed by juxtaposing the irreverent representation of
the trademark with the idealized image created by the
mark's owner. While such a message lacks explicit polit-
ical content, that is no reason to afford it less protection
under the first amendment. Denying parodists the op-
portunity to poke fun at symbols and names which have
become woven into the fabric of our daily life, would
constitute a serious curtailment of a protected form of
expression. 337
L.L. Bean is not the only recent decision to make freedom of
expression considerations the determining factor in a case involv-
ing a noncommercial use of another's trademark. In two recent
decisions, the Second Circuit applied a first amendment analysis
to resolve cases in which the plaintiffs claimed that an "artistic"
work by the defendants violated the plaintiffs' trademark rights or
other intangible property rights.
against an adult magazine that used the plaintiff's trademarks in a parody. For a
discussion of Pillsbury, see supra notes 79-81, 168-69 and accompanying text.
The L.L. Bean court noted that in Pillsbury, the defendant had not argued that it
had engaged in parody as a defense to the plaintiff's dilution claim. L.L. Bean,
811 F.2d at 33 n.5. The defendants in L.L. Bean, however, did assert the defense
of parody. Therefore, the L.L. Bean court concluded that Pillsbury was not a par-
ody case and neither controlled nor stood for the proposition that a parody may
be enjoined under an anti-dilution statute. Id. Despite the court's attempt to
explain Pillsbury, Pillsbury and L.L. Bean cannot be read as anything but inconsis-
tent. The speech involved in the two cases is too similar, regardless of whether
both, one, or neither case involved a parody. Put simply, from a first amend-
ment perspective, L.L. Bean was right and Pillsbury was probably wrong. The
proposed first amendment framework set forth in section V will make this con-
clusion apparent. See infra notes 481-90 and accompanying text.
337. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 34 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 36: p. I
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The first of these decisions, Rogers v. Grimaldi,33 8 did not in-
volve a trademark parody but is significant in that it recognized
first amendment limitations on the application of section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act, a major legal theory applied in trademark par-
ody cases.33 9 In Rogers, dancer-actress Ginger Rogers alleged that
the defendants' use of the title "Ginger and Fred" for a movie
directed by noted film-maker Federico Fellini violated section
43(a) and her common law right of publicity.3 40 The movie told
the story of two struggling dancers in Italy during the 1940s.
These dancers sometimes imitated the international stars Ginger
Rogers and Fred Astaire and were known to their audience as
"Ginger and Fred." According to Rogers, the title falsely implied
that she endorsed the film in some sense and that the movie was
about her. She further alleged that the public was likely to be
confused by the film's title in violation of section 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act.3 4 1 Her right of publicity claim rested on the notion that
the title impermissibly appropriated her well-known name and
public identity without her consent.3 42
The trial court in Rogers granted summary judgment to the
defendants, concluding that their use of the title was artistic in
nature and thus protected expression falling outside the permissi-
ble scope of the Lanham Act.3 43 The Second Circuit affirmed,
despite its discomfort with the trial court's first amendment ap-
proach of creating a "nearly absolute privilege" for movie titles
that are relevant to the content of the movie.3 44 Reluctant to go
that far, however, the Second Circuit forged a different frame-
work for first amendment considerations applicable to section
43(a) and right of publicity claims concerning titles of artistic
works.
In affirming the grant of summary judgment to the defend-
ants, the court observed that books, movies and the like "are all
338. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
339. For a discussion of § 43(a) and its application in trademark parody
cases, see supra notes 113-30 and accompanying text.
340. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997.
341. Id.
342. The right of publicity doctrine gives public figures, celebrities and en-
tertainers the ability to obtain appropriate legal relief concerning unconsented
uses of their name, likeness, or public identity for commercial purposes. Id. at
1003-04. For useful background on this doctrine, see Zacchini v. Scripps-How-
ard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg
Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979).
343. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aft'd,
875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
344. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996-97.
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indisputably works of artistic expression and deserve protec-
tion."3 45 The court also noted, however, that titles of artistic
works "are of a hybrid nature, combining artistic expression and
commercial promotion," because they are at once intertwined
with the protected work and useful in the marketing of it. 346 In
addition, the Second Circuit observed that artistic works such as
the one at issue in the case are sold in the marketplace along with
purely commercial goods and services and may sometimes create
a risk of consumer confusion. 347 The court conceded that Rogers
had produced some evidence of consumer confusion concerning
whether she had endorsed the movie and whether the movie was
about her. 348
According to the Rogers court, any system recognizing first
amendment protection for artistic works and their-titles must also
make suitable allowance for the rights of consumers not to be
misled when the works are sold in the marketplace.3 49 The court
recognized, however, that the "expressive element" of titles of
artistic works causes such titles to merit "more protection than
the labeling of ordinary commercial products. 350
The Rogers court cautioned that "[b]ecause overextension of
Lanham Act restrictions in the area of titles might intrude on First
Amendment values, we must construe the Act narrowly to avoid
such a conflict." 35' The court rejected the plaintiff's argument
that holding the defendants liable under section 43(a) would not
violate the first amendment because the defendants could have
conveyed the messages of their film in many other ways without
employing the plaintiff's name and without engendering possible
consumer confusion. 352 This argument was based on the "ade-
quate alternative avenues of communication" approach adopted
345. Id. at 997.
346. Id. at 998.
347. Id. at 997.
348. Id. at 997, 1001 & n.8. This evidence came primarily in the form of
survey results. See id.
349. Id.
350. Id. (footnote omitted). In other words, the expressive elements of ti-
tles make them predominantly noncommercial, as compared to the commercial
nature of a trademark-like use. The same sort of analysis may be applied to
parodies that poke fun at a trademark or engage in commentary on it, but do not
employ the trademark for the purpose of identifying the source of goods or serv-
ices. See infra notes 417-24 and accompanying text.
351. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998.
352. Id. at 998-99. The court noted that granting the relief requested by
the plaintiff would be an impermissible restriction on the content of the defend-
ants' speech. Id. at 999.
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by the Second Circuit a decade earlier in the trademark parody
case of Dallas Cowboys.353 In spurning the Dallas Cowboys ap-
proach, the court noted that such an approach made insufficient
allowance for freedom of expression interests.3 54 Instead, the
court concluded that a balancing approach should be adopted,
with section 43(a) "be[ing] construed to apply to artistic works
only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion
outweighs the public interest in free expression. ' 35 5 The Second
Circuit also added substance to this balancing approach:
In the context of allegedly misleading titles using a ce-
lebrity's name, that balance will normally not support
application of [section 43(a)] unless the title has no artis-
tic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it
has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly mis-
leads as to the source or the content of the work.3 56
In applying this standard, the Rogers court concluded that the
title "Ginger and Fred" was artistically relevant and not explicitly
misleading.3 57 Therefore, the court reasoned that the prospect of
353. For discussion of the approach used in Dallas Cowboys, see supra notes
302-14 and accompanying text.
354. The court did not overrule Dallas Cowboys, but attempted to distinguish
it on the basis that the defendants in Dallas Cowboys had explicitly and falsely
advertised a connection between their movie and the plaintiff. Rogers, 875 F.2d
at 999 n.4. For discussion of the false advertising aspect of Dallas Cowboys, see
supra note 330 and accompanying text. The Rogers court noted that "[wie do not
read Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders as generally precluding all consideration of First
Amendment concerns whenever an allegedly infringing author has 'alternative
avenues of communication.' " Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999 n.4. Arguably, the Sec-
ond Circuit may have been restricting the Dallas Cowboys precedent by classifying
it as a case involving a commercial use because the defendants' false advertising
was a blatant attempt to capitalize commercially on a supposed connection with
the plaintiff. So limited, Dallas Cowboys would not be controlling with regard to
an artistic use of the sort found in Rogers. Whatever gloss the Rogers court
wished to place on Dallas Cowboys, the first amendment approach of Dallas Cow-
boys has been restricted to the facts of that case and thus has effectively been
overruled in the Second Circuit. See id. at 998-99 & n.4. It is noted, however,
that the first amendment approach of Dallas Cowboys remains alive in the Eighth
Circuit. See supra notes 312-14 and accompanying text.
355. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
356. Id. (footnote omitted). Even though the court was ruling in the con-
text of a claim under the Lanham Act's pre-1988 version of § 43(a), it is logical
to assume that the Second Circuit would take the same approach to a claim
brought under the present § 43(a), which exists as part of the Trademark Law
Revision Act of 1988 (TLRA). See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). For a discussion
of the TLRA, see supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
357. The title was artistically relevant because it was connected with the
subject matter of the film. See supra notes 340-43 and accompanying text. It was
not explicitly misleading because it only arguably implied some connection be-
tween Rogers and the movie. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999-1001. The court noted
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some public confusion about whether the film was about or en-
dorsed by Rogers was outweighed by the first amendment interest
in free expression.3 58
As for the right of publicity claim asserted by Rogers, the
Second Circuit observed that consideration of first amendment
interests was just as important as in the section 43(a) claim, if not
more so, because the right of publicity cause of action does not
require likelihood of confusion. 359 The court held that in recog-
nition of freedom of expression concerns the right of publicity
claim of a plaintiff would not "bar the use of a celebrity's name in
a movie title unless the title was 'wholly unrelated' to the movie or
was 'simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of
goods or services.' "360
Although Rogers was not a trademark parody case, its first
amendment analysis is highly relevant to the trademark parody
setting for three major reasons. First, as in Rogers, many trade-
mark parodies occur in the context of works that are more "artis-
tic" than they are commercial. 361 Second, section 43(a) is among
the major theories relied upon by plaintiffs in trademark parody
cases because of the breadth of its language prohibiting false or
misleading representations. Many section 43(a) cases, including
the plaintiff's claim in Rogers as well as the typical trademark par-
ody case brought under section 43(a), are subject to a likelihood
of confusion standard for the imposition of liability.362 The sec-
that if the title had been "The True Life Story of Ginger and Fred," the title,
though artistically relevant, might well have been explicitly misleading and
therefore not protected by the first amendment against a § 43(a) claim. Id. at
1000. It also set forth other hypotheticals to illustrate its rule requiring that the
title be both artistically relevant and not explicitly misleading in order to merit
first amendment protection against a § 43(a) claim. See id. at 999-1000. This
was too much for Judge Griesa who concurred only in the result. Although he
agreed that the first amendment protected the defendants from liability, he re-
garded the specific rule adopted by the majority as unworkable and unnecessary
to the resolution of the case. See id. at 1005-07 (Griesa, J., concurring).
358. Id. at 1000-01.
359. Id. at 1004.
360. Id. (quoting Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860,
865 n.6, 603 P.2d 454, 457 n.6, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 355 n.6 (1979) (Bird, C.J.,
concurring), and Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 768, 769, 427
N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (1980)). The defendant's use of the "Ginger and Fred" title
was held permissible because it was related to the movie's subject matter and
was not a disguised commercial advertisement. See id. at 1004-05.
361. For a discussion of artistic parodies, see supra notes 68-85 and infra
notes 439-45 and accompanying text.
362. For a discussion of the likelihood of confusion standard under § 43(a),
see supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text. Rogers indicates that even when a
likelihood of confusion exists, the first amendment may prohibit a conclusion
[Vol. 36: p. I
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tion 43(a) claim of Ginger Rogers that her name was used in a
confusing fashion is quite similar to trademark owners' claims
about the arguably confusing use of their marks in parodies.
Third, the right of publicity claim asserted in Rogers is analogous
to claims often raised by parodists. The right of publicity, which
focuses on the unconsented use of a party's name, likeness, or
image, does not require proof of likelihood of confusion. Neither
does the dilution theory often employed in trademark parody
cases by plaintiffs complaining about unconsented uses of their
trademarks.363
Three months after Rogers v. Grimaldi was decided, the Sec-
ond Circuit recognized the decision's applicability to the trade-
mark parody setting in Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell
Publishing Group, Inc. 364 In Cliffs Notes, the Second Circuit over-
turned a preliminary injunction against the defendant's sale of
Spy Notes, which parodied the cover and style of the familiar
Cliffs Notes summaries of novels.3 65 The Second Circuit dis-
agreed with the trial court's conclusion that the defendant's par-
ody violated section 43(a).3 66 According to the Second Circuit,
the speech at issue in the case was sufficiently similar to that in
Rogers to warrant the application of the Rogers balancing test.
3 67
In "weigh[ing] the public interest in free expression against
the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion," 368 the Cliffs
Notes court asserted that the issue of likelihood of consumer con-
fusion must be given close scrutiny.3 69 Such an approach is sensi-
ble in the context of noncommercial parodies. A cavalier
assumption that likelihood of confusion exists may result in giv-
ing too much weight to the rights of the trademark owner and
insufficient weight to the first amendment rights of the paro-
that the defendant is liable under § 43(a) if the defendant's use was noncommer-
cial in nature. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998-1001. For a discussion that such a
notion should be applicable to the trademark parody setting, see infra notes 474-
80 and accompanying text.
363. For a discussion of the dilution theory, see supra notes 131-34 and
accompanying text.
364. 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989).
365. Id. at 491-93, 497. The Spy Notes also parodied the spy novels sum-
marized in Spy Notes. Id. at 492.
366. Id. at 494-97. The Second Circuit stressed the need to construe sec-
tion 43(a) narrowly to avoid first amendment problems. Id. at 494.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 494-95. The court thus classified the defendant's parodies as
artistic expression. See id.
369. See id. at 495-97.
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dist.3 70 The Second Circuit concluded that the district court had
erred as a matter of law in finding "a strong likelihood of confu-
sion."3 7' Instead, there was at most only a "slight risk of con-
sumer confusion" as a result of the defendant's "literary
parody."3 72 This risk was "outweighed by the public interest in
free expression, especially in a form of expression that must to
some extent resemble the original."3 7 3
V. A PROPER ACCOMMODATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT
INTERESTS IN TRADEMARK PARODY CASES
With the discussion and analysis in earlier sections providing
necessary background and support, this section considers the role
that first amendment considerations should play in trademark par-
ody litigation. It also proposes a framework for accommodating
those considerations in different varieties of trademark parody
cases. The proposed approach sometimes involves restricting the
scope of substantive trademark rights theories in order to mini-
mize their reach into the realm of protected expression. The sug-
gested framework also depends significantly upon a proper
balancing of harm to trademark owners on the one hand and the
strength of first amendment interests of parodists on the other.
A. Judicial Enforcement of Trademark Rights as Government Action
It is fundamental, as has already been noted, that there can
be no first amendment violation unless government action ac-
counts for the alleged restriction on expression.3 74 Some courts
in trademark parody cases have mistakenly concluded that first
amendment arguments raised by defendants should be rejected
because of an absence of government action. Those courts have
reasoned that granting relief to a trademark owner constitutes
merely an enforcement of a private party's property rights rather
than the government action necessary for purposes of first
amendment analysis. 375
This approach to the government action question must be
370. For a discussion of parody cases taking a cavalier approach to the like-
lihood of confusion question, see supra notes 95-112 and accompanying text.
371. Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 497.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
375. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,
604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979); Interbank Card Ass'n v. Simms, 431 F. Supp.
131, 133-34 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
[Vol. 36: p. I
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abandoned in future trademark parody cases because it is not
consistent with Supreme Court precedent in other relevant first
amendment contexts. The Court has made clear that judicial en-
forcement of rights and remedies granted to private parties under
state or federal law may constitute government action for first
amendment purposes if such enforcement would chill interests in
free expression. In the landmark case of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,3 76 the government action invoking the first amendment
was judicial enforcement of state defamation law which granted a
right to relief for reputational harm. 37 7
After New York Times, the numerous Supreme Court deci-
sions setting forth the first amendment aspects of defamation law
have all been grounded on the basic notion that judicial enforce-
ment of state defamation law is sufficient government action to
implicate first amendment concerns. 378 Similarly, the Court re-
cently found government action for first amendment purposes
when a lower court held a magazine liable for the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. 379 The Court has also rec-
ognized that judicial enforcement of the state law-based right of
publicity is government action that may raise first amendment
questions.380
376. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
377. Id. at 265. On the government action question, the Court stated:
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama
courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose
invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and
press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action and
that it is common law only, though supplemented by statute. The test
is not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the
form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.
Id. (citations omitted).
378. See e.g., Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S.
Ct. 2678 (1989); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749 (1985); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
379. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52-57 (1988).
380. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562
(1977). In Zacchini, an entertainer claimed that his right of publicity was violated
when a television station's news report featured a videotape of his "entire act."
Id. at 563-64. The television station asserted that it should be protected from
liability by the freedom of speech and press clauses. Id. at 566-67. Necessarily
implicit in the Court's analysis of the first amendment issue was this "given:"
judicial enforcement of the right of publicity granted under state law is govern-
ment action for purposes of a first amendment defense. Although the Court
rejected the first amendment defense in the factual context of Zacchini, the rejec-
tion was not on the ground of lack of government action. Id. at 574-75, 578-79.
The government action in Zacchini was simply held not to violate the first amend-
ment. Id.
77
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The respective rights claimed by the holder of the right of
publicity, a defamation plaintiff and a trademark owner are quite
similar.38' Therefore, if judicial enforcement of the right of pub-
licity or a rule of defamation law constitutes government action
for first amendment purposes, the same conclusion should be
reached concerning judicial enforcement of trademark rights.
The Supreme Court has recognized that first amendment con-
cerns may be implicated by state and federal statutes dealing with
trademarks or trademark-related matters.382 In light of this rec-
381. See id. at 573 (drawing analogy between right of publicity and forms of
intellectual property). For a discussion of the similarities between the right of
publicity and trademark rights, see supra notes 359-63 and accompanying text.
382. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1979). Although the Court
recognized these first amendment concerns in Friedman, it concluded that a
Texas statute prohibiting optometrists from practicing their profession under a
trade name did not violate the first amendment because the statute was a proper
restriction of potentially misleading commercial speech. Id.; see also San Fran-
cisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. [SFAA] v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522, 535 & n. 12, 536-41 (1987). Although the SFAA Court also recognized that
statutes establishing trademark rights may implicate first amendment concerns,
it concluded that section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U.S.C.
§ 380, did not violate the first amendment in granting the U.S. Olympic Com-
mittee (USOC) an exclusive right to use the name "Olympic." Id. at 526. The
statute did not require USOC to prove likelihood of confusion as a condition of
enforcing its right against an alleged violator. Id. According to the Court, the
exclusive right granted by the statute was enforceable primarily against commer-
cial uses of the Olympic name and against only a small number of arguably non-
commercial uses. Id. at 535-41. The Court upheld an injunction under the
statute against a group (SFAA) that was using the name "Gay Olympic Games"
for an athletic event it sponsored. Id. at 527-28.
Some language in SFAA, if taken out of context, could give the erroneous
impression that the Supreme Court believes that judicial enforcement of trade-
mark rights is not government action for first amendment purposes. When read
in context, however, the language does not create that unfortunate impression.
Besides alleging unsuccessfully that the Amateur Sports Act's grant of an exclu-
sive right to USOC violated the first amendment, SFAA asserted that USOC
discriminatorily enforced its right and therefore violated the equal protection
clause of the fifth amendment. Id. at 542.
The Court rejected the equal protection claim because USOC was not a
government actor and therefore could not have violated the equal protection
clause. Id. at 541-47. In its equal protection analysis the Court observed: "Nor
is the fact that Congress has granted the USOC exclusive use of the word
'Olympic' dispositive. All enforceable rights in trademarks are created by some
governmental act, usually pursuant to a statute or the common law. The actions
of the trademark owners nevertheless remain private." Id. at 544. The "ac-
tions" contemplated by this language pertain only to SFAA's equal protection
claim: USOC's alleged actions in selectively picking and choosing the parties it
intended to sue to enforce its exclusive right. As the Court pointed out, even if
USOC did this, it would not violate the equal protection clause because USOC
was not the government. Id. at 542 n.22. The mere fact that the government
had given USOC an exclusive right did not mean that there was government
action involved in USOC's decisions about when and whether to enforce its
right. In other words, the government was not choosing when and whether to
enforce the exclusive right. USOC, a private party, was making these decisions
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ognition, and the first amendment analyses employed by the
Court in defamation, emotional distress, and right of publicity
cases, it is unreasonable to conclude that judicial enforcement of
trademark rights-whether those rights come from federal law or
from state statutes or common law-would not constitute govern-
ment action.
As discussed above, many of the more recent and better-rea-
soned trademark parody cases have proceeded on the basis that
government action exists, for first amendment purposes, when
courts enforce trademark rights.383 These cases properly focused
on whether the government action at issue violated the first
amendment. Any vestiges of the misguided "no government ac-
tion" rationale of earlier trademark parody cases should not be
perpetuated by courts deciding parody cases in the future.3 84
B. The Need to Distinguish Between Commercial and
Noncommercial Parodies
The treatment given by the Supreme Court to first amend-
ment considerations in other relevant contexts compels a conclu-
sion that a commercial/noncommercial distinction is essential to
a useful first amendment framework in trademark parody litiga-
tion. This subsection examines the reasons for such a distinction
in the trademark parody setting and deals with how the commer-
and taking the "actions" contemplated by the Court's statement that "Et]he ac-
tions of the trademark owners nevertheless remain private .. " Id. at 547. The
Court only meant that USOC, a private party, was making the decisions regard-
ing enforcement of its right. Id. at 544. The SFAA Court did not suggest that
rights granted trademark owners under trademark law, whether by statute or by
common law, are devoid of potentialfirst amendment implications when a court
enforces those rights. Indeed, such a suggestion by the Court would have been
fundamentally at odds with the first amendment discussion earlier in the case,
not to mention with first amendment aspects of previous Supreme Court deci-
sions. See Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
383. See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc., v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing
Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989);Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd.,
828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811
F.2d 26 (1st Cir.), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987). Even in the
Mutual of Omaha decision, where the court adopted an incorrect first amendment
analysis, the court nonetheless implicitly recognized that government action was
present. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402-03 (8th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988).
384. The "adequate alternative avenues of communication" approach to
first amendment considerations employed in the earlier trademark parody cases
should also be spurned. For a discussion of that approach and its deficiencies,
see supra notes 298-314 and accompanying text.
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cial/noncommercial distinction should be made. Later subsec-
tions will propose a framework that addresses and accommodates
the differing first amendment considerations in commercial and
noncommercial parody cases.
1. Reasons for Drawing the Distinction
As earlier discussion revealed, the Supreme Court has long
distinguished between commercial and noncommercial expres-
sion. It initially did so by giving the former no first amendment
protection whatsoever. During the past fifteen years, the Court
has distinguished between the two by giving commercial speech
partial first amendment protection and its noncommercial coun-
terpart full protection.38 5 The distinction between commercial
and noncommercial expression will not disappear from first
amendment jurisprudence for two major reasons. First, the
Supreme Court is not inclined to give commercial speech the full
protection accorded noncommercial expression. Second, even if
the Court continues its apparent course of lessening the partial
protection given to commercial speech38 6 and ultimately goes so
far as to abolish that protection, the commercial/noncommercial
distinction would still exist. If the court were to classify
commercial speech as wholly unprotected, the commer-
cial/noncommercial distinction would again assume its pre-1970s
role of determining whether speech is protected at all. In any
event, therefore, the commercial/noncommercial distinction
would still be a first amendment mainstay. Accordingly, tying the
freedom of expression of trademark parody cases to a distinction
between commercial and noncommercial uses is hardly hitching
one's wagon to a fading star.
Although the Supreme Court has not decided a trademark
parody case, it has decided two significant trademark-oriented
cases and a noteworthy parody case outside of the trademark set-
ting.3 8 7 Read together, these cases further underscore the need
for a commercial/noncommercial distinction in the first amend-
385. For a discussion of the distinction between commercial and noncom-
mercial speech, see supra notes 250-94 and accompanying text.
386. This course was seemingly begun by the Court's decision in Posadas
de P.R. Associates v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986), and continued by its
decision in Board of Trustees of the State University of N.Y. v. Fox, 109 S. Ct.
3028 (1989). For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 274-94 and accom-
panying text.
387. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Friedman v. Rog-
ers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979). For a prior discussion of these cases, see supra notes 232-
37, 382 and accompanying text.
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ment aspects of trademark parody litigation and shed considera-
ble light on how that distinction should be made.
In Friedman v. Rogers,388 the Court rejected a first amendment
challenge to a Texas statute that prohibited optometrists from
practicing their profession under a trade name.3 89 The Court ob-
served that the use of a trade name is a form of commercial
speech. 390 According to the Court, the statute was a legitimate
restriction on potentially misleading commercial speech and
therefore did not violate the first amendment.3 9'
If, as Friedman indicates, using a trade name is a form of com-
mercial speech, the Court presumably would say the same about a
trademark because of the similar functions of trademarks and
trade names. Moreover, if the use of a trademark is a form of
commercial speech, certain trademark parodies must also be com-
mercial speech. In some instances, the parodist employs a ver-
sion of the parodied trademark to identify the parodist's goods or
services. 392 Friedman, as extended in this fashion, would thus
seem to indicate that when the trademark parodist makes a trade-
mark-like use of the imitated trademark, the parodist's expression
is effectively commercial speech that merits partial first amend-
ment protection if it is not misleading, but no protection if it is
misleading.
San Francisco Arts &Athletics, Inc. [SFAA] v. United States Olympic
Committee3 93 bolsters the conclusion that distinctions must be
drawn, for first amendment purposes, between commercial and
noncommercial uses of another party's trademark. In SFAA, the
Supreme Court considered whether section 110 of the Amateur
Sports Act of 1978 violated the first amendment by granting the
Olympic Committee an exclusive right to the use of the
"Olympic" name and by not requiring the Olympic Committee to
prove that an alleged violator's use created a likelihood of confu-
388. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
389. Id. at 15-16.
390. Id. at 11.
391. Id. at 15-16. As noted above, misleading commercial speech receives
no first amendment protection. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976).
392. See, e.g., Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198
(D. Md. 1988) ("McSleep" as name of motel chain); Grey v. Campbell Soup Co.,
650 F. Supp. 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1986) ("Dogiva" as name of dog biscuits), affd,
830 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1987); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 852 (N.D. Ill. 1980) ("jaws" as names of garbage
disposals).
393. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
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sion. 394 The Court concluded that the exclusive right granted by
the statute was basically restricted to policing the marketplace for
commercial uses of the "Olympic" name, and that few noncom-
mercial uses would be prohibited by the statute.395 Therefore,
the Court reasoned, the statute was a permissible regulation of
commercial speech and a tolerable time, place and manner re-
striction on the minimal amount of noncommercial expression
subject to its provisions. 396
Although it focused on the peculiarities of the Amateur
Sports Act's grant of special privileges to the Olympic Commit-
tee, SFAA was essentially a trademark rights case. Echoing a
message from Friedman, the Court noted in SFAA that, if other
parties used the Olympic name in connection with the sale of
goods or services, their uses would amount to commercial
speech.3 97 Much of the Court's discussion of the first amendment
issue in the case focused upon whether other parties' uses of the
Olympic name and symbol would be commercial or noncommer-
cial.39 8 SFAA thus leads to the conclusion that when other parties
use some version of an owner's trademark-whether in a parody
or otherwise-those uses may merit different first amendment
treatment depending on whether they are commercial or
noncommercial.
The Falwell decision also offers insight on the proper han-
dling of trademark parody cases, even though the plaintiff in
Falwell was not asserting trademark rights.3 99 In Falwell, the
Supreme Court struck down an award of damages to Reverend
Jerry Falwell and imposed stern first amendment proof require-
ments on public figure plaintiffs who claim that a defendant's
speech constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress. 400
The decision demonstrates the substantial first amendment lati-
tude given to parodists when their parodies are noncommercial in
nature. Admittedly, the parody in Hustler magazine had a political
connection because of Falwell's role as a political figure in addi-
394. Id. at 528-41; see § 110 of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U.S.C.
§ 380 (1988).
395. 483 U.S. at 539-41.
396. Id. For further discussion of SFAA, see supra note 382 and accompany-
ing text.
397. 483 U.S. at 539-40.
398. See id. at 535-41.
399. See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 51-56.
400. Id. For further discussion of Falwell and its recognition that the offen-
siveness of speech does not deprive the speech of first amendment protection,
see supra notes 232-37 and accompanying text.
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tion to his status as a religious leader. Noncommercial trademark
parodies will not always have that connection. Nonetheless, first
amendment jurisprudence establishes that a wide variety of non-
commercial expression is considered to be the equivalent of polit-
ical speech and therefore entitled to full first amendment
protection.40'
The Court's opinion in Falwell omitted any discussion of a
commercial/noncommercial distinction. Without question, how-
ever, the Court considered the parody at issue to be noncommer-
cial expression. 40 2 The extent of protection given by the Court to
the defendant's speech was clearly the full first amendment pro-
tection accorded noncommercial speech, not the watered-down
variety extended to commercial expression.403 Falwell would thus
seem to stand for the proposition that an arguably offensive par-
ody in a magazine-even a sexually explicit magazine-is likely to
be considered noncommercial expression despite the desire of
the magazine's publisher to profit economically from the sale of
the magazine. Falwell's treatment of noncommercial speech and
the Court's recent commercial speech decisions demonstrate the
widening gulf between the respective levels of first amendment
protection given the two varieties of speech, and the correspond-
ing increase in importance of the commercial/noncommercial
distinction. 404
In some of the more recent parody cases, most notably L.L.
Bean, Clifs Notes and even Mutual of Omaha, courts have recognized
that not all trademark parodies are alike: sometimes parodies are
engaged in for the purpose of marketing a product or service,
whereas other times they are more artistic, literary, or editorial in
nature. These courts seem to have concluded that drawing com-
mercial/noncommercial distinctions among trademark parodies
would be consistent with general first amendment jurisprudence
and sensibly accommodating of the differing natures of paro-
401. Political speech equivalents include speech on social, artistic, philo-
sophical, scientific and ethical matters, as well as statements about miscellaneous
matters of public concern. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231
(1977). See supra notes 223-31 and accompanying text.
402. See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 51.
403. Id. at 56-57. For a discussion of full first amendment protection, see
supra notes 224-25, 243-44 and accompanying text.
404. See Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028
(1989); Posados de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986). These
decisions seem calculated and likely to decrease the already less-than-full first
amendment protection given to commercial speech. For a discussion of these
decisions, see supra notes 274-94 and accompanying text.
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dies.40 5 There are two critical questions: 1) How are courts to
determine whether a parody should be classified as commercial or
noncommercial?; and 2) what should be done with a trademark
parody once it is classified as either commercial or noncommer-
cial? Although these recent decisions have given some helpful
guidance, they have provided only partial answers to the two
questions.406
2. Making the Distinction Between Commercial and Noncommercial
Parodies
In its first amendment decisions, the Supreme Court has pro-
vided three guiding principles that should aid the decisionmaker
in applying the sometimes elusive commercial/noncommercial
distinction to a trademark parody. The first principle suggested
by the Friedman and SFAAI decisions is that when the trademark
parodist has used his version of a trademark to help market a
good or service other than the parody itself, the parody is almost
certainly commercial in nature.40 7 The same would be true if the
parodist used the parody as the name of his business.408 Con-
versely, if the parody was not used in one of these commercial
ways, the parody should usually be considered noncommercial.
For purposes of this principle, a newspaper, magazine, book,
movie, or similar item containing a parody would not be consid-
ered a "good" or "service" even though it is sold in the
marketplace.
The second principle, that speech otherwise appearing to be
noncommercial is not transformed into less protected commercial
speech simply because the speaker has an economic motive, is a
405. For cases expressly or impliedly noting that noncommercial and com-
mercial uses of trademarks should be distinguished, see Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at
495; Mutual of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 402-03; L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 31-32. See also
Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 933-35 (D.D.C. 1985); Stop
the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112, 1120-
21 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Girl Scouts of United States v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co.,
304 F. Supp. 1228, 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); University of Notre Dame v. Twenti-
eth Century-Fox Film Corp., 22 A.D.2d 452, 457, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301, 306-07,
aff'd mem., 15 N.Y.2d 940, 207 N.E.2d 508, 259 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1965).
406. For a discussion of the analyses to be applied to a parody once it is
classified as commercial or noncommercial, see infra notes 448-90 and accompa-
nying text.
407. Such speech effectively would be speech proposing a commercial
transaction and would therefore fit within the definition of commercial speech.
See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
408. See, e.g., Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198
(D. Md. 1988) ("McSleep Inn"); McDonald's Corp. v. McBagel's, Inc., 649 F.
Supp. 1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("McBagel's" restaurant).
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longstanding notion recently reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court.40 9 For purposes of this second principle, a parody appear-
ing in a newspaper, magazine, book, movie, or similar item will
usually be speech that otherwise appears to be noncommercial.
Falwell's implicit, yet obvious, classification of the parody in Hus-
tler magazine as noncommercial reinforces this notion.4 10 Indeed,
if the presence of a profit motive were by itself sufficient to make
speech commercial in nature, there would be little meaningful
first amendment protection for the press, book publishers and
similar parties such as film-makers. 41 Out of necessity, then,
speech of this sort should normally be labeled noncommercial be-
cause its functions of informing, educating and entertaining out-
weigh any profit-motivated characteristics.
Under the third guiding principle, if the trademark parody
possesses both commercial and noncommercial characteristics, it
should be treated as a commercial parody when the commercial
aspects predominate and as a noncommercial parody when the
noncommercial aspects weigh more heavily. This principle com-
ports with the Supreme Court's approach in classifying speech
that seems at once both commercial and noncommercial. 41 2
A few examples drawn from cases discussed earlier in this ar-
ticle will demonstrate the operation of these three principles. As
the examples will reveal, some trademark parodies are relatively
easy to classify as either commercial or noncommercial. Others,
however, fall quite close to the line and are more difficult to
classify.
The parodies of the Anheuser-Busch slogans, "This Bud's
for you" and "where there's life there's Bud," are readily classifia-
ble as commercial parodies under the above principles. In the
cases involving these slogans, the florists' association and floor
wax-insecticide manufacturer used the parodies to market their
409. For a discussion of Supreme Court cases reaffirming this principle, see
supra note 257 and accompanying text.
410. See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 51-56.
411. See Denicola, supra note 27, at 205; cf Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) (speech falling in entertainment
classification entitled to significant first amendment protection).
412. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (ad-
vertisements for contraceptives constituted commercial speech because com-
mercial characteristics predominated over arguably noncommercial discussion
of issues of public concern). For further discussion of this case, see supra notes
270-73 and accompanying text.
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own service or product.4 15 Similarly, the "Lardashe" name as-
signed by a manufacturer to its large-size designer jeans,414 the
"Gucchi Goo" name affixed to diaper bags by their maker and
seller4 15 and the "McSleep" and "McBagel's" trade names41 6
would all be classified as commercial parodies. Although these
parodies may have some entertaining features (depending upon
one's sense of humor), their overwhelmingly commercial charac-
ter compels their classification as commercial under principles
one and three.
What parodies are readily classifiable as noncommercial
under the foregoing principles? The poster in Stop the Olympic
Prison (to the extent that the poster was a parody) would be non-
commercial. 41 7 So would the environmental group's parody of
the Reddy Kilowatt character in its literature criticizing the elec-
tric utility industry,418 and the political advertisements employing
the "star wars" designation to describe the Reagan administra-
tion's strategic defense initiative. 419 All of these parodies were
nonprofit disseminations of viewpoints on matters of public con-
cern. But, as has been shown, the presence of a profit motive is
not necessarily fatal to a parodist's assertion that her parody was
noncommercial. There were also clear noncommercial parodies
involved in University of Notre Dame (satirical movie employing the
Notre Dame name and "football team"), 420 L.L. Bean and Pillsbury
413. For a discussion of cases parodying Anheuser-Busch's slogan, see
supra note 47 and accompanying text.
414. For a discussion of the suit filed byjordache Enterprises, Inc. over the
defendant's use of the "Lardashe" name, see supra note 65 and accompanying
text.
415. See Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
416. For a discussion of these commercial parodies of the McDonald's
name, see supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. The court's discussion in
McBagel's of past uses of McDonald's marks mentioned a use that would clearly
be noncommercial, however: a political cartoon, published during the Reagan
presidency, of a Reagan-like figure who was dressed in a Ronald McDonald-like
clown outfit and was posting the number 10 on the "McRonald's" sign next to
the words "million unemployed." McBagel's, 649 F. Supp. at 1272.
417. For a discussion of Stop the Olympic Prison, see supra notes 73-78 and
accompanying text.
418. For a discussion of Reddy, see supra notes 69-72 and accompanying
text.
419. See Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931 (D.D.C. 1985).
420. For a discussion of Notre Dame, see supra notes 317-19 and accompany-
ing text. Although it is less clearly noncommercial, the movie in Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) could
occupy this classification. One factor in Dallas Cowboys that arguably renders the
use of the plaintiff's trademark commercial, however, is the false advertising as-
pect of the case. For discussion of that aspect of Dallas Cowboys, see supra note
[Vol. 36: p. I
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(parodies in adult magazines), 42 1 Cliffs Notes (parody in a book-like
form) 42 2 and Fisher v. Dees (song that parodied a well-known
song) .423 The defendants in these latter cases all hoped and ex-
pected to profit economically from their parodies, but well-estab-
lished first amendment doctrines dictate that these parodies are
predominantly characterized by their noncommercial functions of
entertaining and providing editorial comment. 424
In other cases, however, line-drawing is more difficult. The t-
shirt, sticker and poster cases are representative of those cases in
which the commercial/noncommercial line is blurred.425 When
the parody is on a shirt, sticker, or poster, the parody (not so much
the object on which it appears) is the item sold. 426 When the par-
ody itself is the item sold, as opposed to being an aid in the mar-
keting of another good or service, the first principle-relating to
whether the parody is used to market a good or service-does not
apply. 427 Yet the producer of a shirt, sticker, or poster should not
automatically be equated with the press, the moviemaker and the
songwriter for purposes of principle number two, which provides
that the mere presence of a profit motive does not necessarily
330 and accompanying text. Even if the movie was predominantly noncommer-
cial, the false advertisements concerning it should have been actionable under
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act since they were explicitly misleading. Cf Rogers v.
Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (artistic work's title may violate
§ 43(a) if title is explicitly misleading).
421. For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 160-62, 174-78 & 321-
37 (L.L. Bean), 81-83 & 168-69 (Pillsbury) and accompanying text. In Pillsbury,
the court seemed to recognize that the parody was noncommercial. See Pillsbuy,
215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 131 (N.D. Ga. 1981). The court effectively treated the
parody as if it were commercial, however, by uncritically granting relief on the
dilution by tarnishment claim. Id. at 135. For a discussion of Pillsbury's failure
to make proper allowance for the noncommercial nature of the parody, see infra
notes 486-90 and accompanying text.
422. For a discussion of Cliffs Notes, see supra notes 82-86, 364-73 and ac-
companying text.
423. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
424. Cf Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 63-68 (1983)
(speech that is predominantly commercial and only secondarily noncommercial
should be classified as commercial). For further discussion of commercial classi-
fications, see supra notes 407-16 and accompanying text.
425. See, e.g., Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. T-Shirt
Gallery, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); University City Studios, Inc. v.
Casey & Casey, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 201 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
426. The shirt of course would have usefulness as an item of clothing re-
gardless of whether the parody appeared on it, but the presence of the parody
on a given shirt is clearly the reason the buyer purchases that shirt. Thus, in
substance, the parody is the item sold even when it is on an item of clothing.
427. For a discussion of the first principle, see supra notes 407-08 and ac-
companying text.
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render speech commercial. Principle number three (the balanc-
ing of commercial versus noncommercial characteristics and
some supplementary considerations) must therefore govern the
classification decision in these close-to-the-line cases. These sup-
plementary considerations are: the sort of "speaker" responsible
for the parody; the apparent motivations underlying the speaker's
use of parody; and the presence and degree of expression of ideas
or viewpoints through the parody.
Of the cases involving parodies on t-shirts or stickers, the
most difficult is Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak.428 There,
the defendant produced and sold "Mutant of Omaha" shirts that
parodied the Mutual of Omaha name and ostensibly offered com-
mentary on issues related to nuclear weapons. The defendant
claimed that the shirts he sold were expressions of his anti-nu-
clear weapons stance.429 His parody went beyond being humor-
ous and seemingly reflected the expression of a viewpoint on an
important public issue. Further, the defendant apparently was
motivated to some extent by a desire to communicate this
viewpoint.
These arguable indicators of noncommercial use in Mutual of
Omaha must be considered, however, alongside other relevant fac-
tors that seem to cut the other way. The defendant did not sell
the shirts as a one-time endeavor. Instead, he sold reasonably
large quantities of them at various locations that were typical out-
lets for miscellaneous goods. He also sold various other items
bearing his Mutant of Omaha designs. 430 The fact that the de-
fendant had several different designs which he used on the shirts
and other items is also significant: it gives the impression that, in
a business sense, he had launched a whole Mutant of Omaha
"line."' 43 ' Consideration of these facts leads to a conclusion that
the parody in Mutual of Omaha was predominantly commercial de-
spite having a significant noncommercial component. Therefore,
428. 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988).
429. Id. at 402.
430. Id. at 398.
431. See id.; see also Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905,
907-08 (D. Neb. 1986) (district court opinion noting that defendant had various
designs). Nothing in the district court or Eighth Circuit opinions indicates that
the defendant was using his profits for the promotion of ideological concerns, as
opposed to pocketing those profits in the usual business sense. In addition,
there was no showing that the defendant had employed his designs in ideologi-
cal pamphlets or similar publications designed to persuade others to adopt his
viewpoint-the sort of thing a person primarily motivated by expressive con-
cerns might do.
[Vol. 36: p. I
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though the call was close, the Mutual of Omaha court was probably
correct in finding a commercial use. 43 2
Other t-shirt and sticker cases have involved parodies that re-
flect some blurring of commercial and noncommercial features,
but are not so problematic as the parody in Mutual of Omaha. For
instance, the "Miami Mice" shirts, which parodied the "Miami
Vice" name and very loosely parodied the television show, argua-
bly expressed ideas. Nonetheless, the relatively minimal expres-
sive content of the parodies cannot outweigh the inescapable
commercial flavor of the defendants' sales operations. Thus, the
"Miami Mice" parodies were commercial. 433 The same is true of
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.'s "Petley Flea Bags" and "Garbage
Pail Kids" stickers, which parodied the Tetley Tea trademarks
and the "Cabbage Patch Kids" dolls. 43 4 Whatever expressive
content there may have been beyond the humor of the stickers
pales by comparison with the magnitude of the commercial oper-
ations in which Topps sold the stickers. The mere labeling of a
trademark parody as commercial, however, does not necessarily
mean that the parodist is or should be liable to the trademark
owner.
435
The previously noted and now settled litigation instituted by
Miller Brewing Co. against the Doctors Ought to Care (DOC) or-
ganization 436 provides a useful illustration of a parody that is, on
balance, noncommercial, despite possessing some arguable com-
mercial characteristics. The "Killer Lite" t-shirts sold by DOC
contained arguably humorous parodies of Miller slogans and
trademarks. These parodies were designed to communicate-
432. For a discussion, however, of whether the court was correct in the re-
sult it reached in the case, see infra notes 451-52 and accompanying text.
433. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. T-Shirt Gallery, Ltd., 634 F. Supp.
1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Casey & Casey, Inc., 622 F.
Supp. 201 (S.D. Fla. 1985). The same commercial classification should be given
to the "Genital Electric" t-shirts because of the minimal degree of expression in
comparison to the obvious commercial nature of the defendant's operation. See
General Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1036 (D. Mass.
1979).
434. See Tetley, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 785
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (Petley Flea Bags); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (Garbage Pail
Kids).
435. There should be no liability unless the trademark rights theory at issue
is established. See, e.g., Tetley, 556 F. Supp. at 792-93 (no liability for trademark
infringement because no likelihood of confusion). First amendment considera-
tions may also dictate a finding that the use, though commercial, does not give
rise to liability. See infra notes 448-68 and accompanying text.
436. For a discussion of this case, see supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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and did in fact effectively communicate-DOC's critical attitude
toward the marketing practices of Miller and other producers of
alcoholic beverages. The parodies, when coupled with a listing
on the t-shirts of health risks associated with alcohol consump-
tion, helped to express DOC's view that alcohol abuse is a signifi-
cant public health problem. Although DOC sold the shirts, it
used the proceeds to fund its mission of advocacy on public
health issues, most notably the dangers posed by alcohol and to-
bacco. 437 DOC itself was a nonprofit organization. 43 8 The strong
expressive content of the parodies, the forces motivating DOC,
and the nature of the DOC organization are factors which lead to
a conclusion that the parodies were noncommercial, even though
the shirts were actually sold rather than given away.
When parodies appear on posters, commercial/non-
commercial line-drawing is especially difficult. Consistent line-
drawing is even more difficult. Posters are troublesome in this
context because they are both ornamental products sold in the
marketplace and potential vehicles for literary, artistic, or edito-
rial expression. Poster manufacturers are not customarily consid-
ered part of the organized press in the same sense as newspapers
and magazines, which we necessarily tend to label noncommer-
cial. Yet on the spectrum of potential communicative tools, pos-
ters lie closer to newspapers and magazines than t-shirts, for
example. 439 Girl Scouts of United States v. Personality Posters Manufac-
turing Co. and Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc. are the leading
cases involving parodies on posters.440 The parodies in these
cases possessed commercial and noncommercial traits: both were
sold in the marketplace and both contained an expressive and ar-
guably humorous content.
Although the distinction between the two parodies is admit-
tedly narrow, the parody in Girl Scouts should fall on the noncom-
mercial side while that in Coca-Cola should be treated as
commercial. 44 1 The "Be Prepared" poster, with its picture and
437. See id. Unlike the defendant in Mutual of Omaha, DOC also carried out
its advocacy in ideological literature. See DOC News and Views, supra note 86.
438. See DOC News and Views, supra note 86.
439. See Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d
501 (1968) (extending first amendment protection to producer of poster of co-
median running tongue-in-cheek campaign for presidency, even though pro-
ducer of poster did not have comedian's consent).
440. See Girl Scouts of United States v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F.
Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) ("Be Prepared" poster); Coca-Cola v. Gemini Ris-
ing, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) ("Enjoy Cocaine" poster).
441. The distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech is
[Vol. 36: p. I
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accompanying inscription, uses humor as a vehicle for implicit
commentary on larger social issues such as the sexual "revolu-
tion," teenage pregnancy, and availability of contraceptives to mi-
nors.442 The expressive and artistic components of the "Be
Prepared" poster exceed those of the "Enjoy Cocaine" poster.
Although the use of illegal drugs is a matter of obvious public
concern, it is difficult to construe the "Enjoy Cocaine" language
as any sort of intended or meaningful commentary on the appro-
priateness or inappropriateness of drug use. Instead, the poster
is merely a witty juxtaposition of a familiar product name and the
name of an unwholesome, illegal substance.443 This juxtaposition
may have some expressive value, 444 but not enough to outweigh
the otherwise commercial character of the poster.445
As has been shown, the making of the commer-
cial/noncommercial distinction in trademark parody cases is nec-
essary, but sometimes difficult. Once the parody at issue has been
properly categorized, the next consideration is how to properly
accommodate the respective first amendment interests of com-
mercial and noncommercial parodists.
Some of the trademark parody decisions discussed earlier
have begun the process of developing a first amendment frame-
work for trademark parody cases. None of them, however, has
completed the job. This is primarily because a court must confine
its rulings to the issues in the case before it. For instance, in L.L.
Bean, the court's first amendment discussion was, for the most
part, restricted to the context of a noncommercial parody and a
often narrow in parody cases. For first amendment reasons, courts must there-
fore restrict the operation of certain trademark rights theories. See infra notes
448-90 and accompanying text.
442. See Girl Scouts, 304 F. Supp. at 1234-35. The poster in Girl Scouts merits
different treatment from that given the t-shirts and other items in Mutual of
Omaha because in the latter case, the defendant effectively had a "line" of Mu-
tant of Omaha merchandise. See supra note 431 and accompanying text.
Although the poster company admittedly had a profit motive, the Girl Scouts
poster was more of a one-time artistic expression. Additionally, a producer of
posters is closer to a traditional purveyor of artistic expression than was the
defendant in Mutual of Omaha.
443. See Coca-Cola, 346 F. Supp. at 1189. In addition, the "Enjoy Cocaine"
poster reflected little use of the defendant's own artistry as it was an almost
exact reproduction of the trademark owner's script format for the Coca-Cola
name. See id.
444. For discussion of the expressive value of trademark parodies, see supra
note 337 and accompanying text.
445. The defendant in Coca-Cola had sold approximately 100,000 copies of
the poster, which was arguably in competition with Coca-Cola's attempts to
"sell" its trademark and image on clothing and various other items. Coca-Cola,
346 F. Supp. at 1189, 1190 & n.10.
91
Langvardt: Protected Marks and Protected Speech: Establishing the First Amen
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
dilution claim, under which likelihood of confusion is not an is-
sue. 446 In Cliffs Notes, the court's first amendment analysis was in
the context of a noncommercial parody and a section 43(a) claim
under which likelihood of confusion is necessary. 447 Additionally,
no court has meaningfully explored the proper first amendment
analysis of a case involving a commercial parody and a claim
brought under an anti-dilution statute.
The next two subsections set out a comprehensive first
amendment framework that accounts for the differences in types
of parodies and the differences in the elements of trademark
rights theories. The proper accommodation of first amendment
concerns in trademark parody cases will be considered first with
regard to commercial parodies and then with regard to noncom-
mercial parodies.
C. Accounting for First Amendment Concerns in
Commercial Parody Cases
1. When Trademark Owner's Claim Is Brought on Infringement or
Section 43(a) Theory
Assuming that the parody before the court has been classified
as commercial and that the plaintiff's claim is for trademark in-
fringement or for an alleged violation of section 43(a), there is
obviously no need to reach the freedom of expression issue if the
court concludes that the parody did not create a likelihood of
confusion. In that event, the defendant would not be liable under
the trademark rights theory at issue. 448
If the commercial parody is attacked on infringement or sec-
tion 43(a) grounds and the court properly concludes that a likeli-
hood of confusion was shown, the parodist's first amendment
defense must fail. A commercial parody is a form of commercial
speech, which receives no first amendment protection whatsoever
if it is misleading. Logically, a commercial parody that creates a
likelihood of confusion as to source, endorsement, sponsorship,
or affiliation must be treated as misleading speech.449
446. See L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 31-32.
447. See Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 493-97.
448. For a discussion of misleading commercial speech and first amend-
ment protection, see supra notes 262, 265-66, 388-91 and accompanying text.
449. When traditional trademark law imposes liability on a defendant
whose commercial use of the plaintiff's trademark has created a likelihood of
confusion, the result does not violate the first amendment. See San Francisco
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535 n. 12
(1987); Denicola, supra note 27, at 159, 165-66.
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Note that the analysis in the preceding paragraph was based
on a court properly concluding that the commercial parody created
a likelihood of confusion. As noted earlier, some courts in trade-
mark parody cases have adopted a rather loose view of what con-
stitutes likelihood of confusion, often because of the courts'
distaste for the defendant's parody. 450 Such a hasty and unrea-
soned finding of likelihood of confusion creates constitutional dif-
ficulties, because an incorrect finding on that issue necessarily
leads to an improper denial of the partial first amendment protec-
tion a commercial parody would otherwise receive.
In order to minimize the potential first amendment difficul-
ties created by a cavalier approach to the establishment of likeli-
hood of confusion, courts must give careful attention to the
critical likelihood of confusion element. Courts must give special
attention to this element in cases involving parodies such as those
in Mutual of Omaha and Coca-Cola which are predominantly com-
mercial, but also contain a significant noncommercial compo-
nent.45' The careful attention urged here should translate into a
disinclination to find likelihood of confusion unless the evidence
demonstrates a realistic probability of confusion, not merely some
possibility of confusion.452
2. When Trademark Owner's Claim Is Brought on Dilution Theory
A common strategy of trademark owners is to sue parodists
on a dilution theory. Unlike the trademark infringement and sec-
tion 43(a) theories, the dilution theory does not require proof of
likelihood of confusion as to source, endorsement or affilia-
tion.4 53 This is precisely why trademark owners prefer the dilu-
tion doctrine. It is also why the dilution doctrine poses a
potentially greater threat to the first amendment freedoms of par-
odists than do the infringement and section 43(a) theories.454
450. See supra notes 95-110 and accompanying text.
451. For a discussion of Mutual of Omaha and Coca-Cola, see supra notes 92-
94, 96-100, 312-32, 440-45 and accompanying text.
452. See 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23:1(C).
453. For a discussion of the dilution theory, see supra notes 132-38 and
accompanying text.
454. It should be noted here, however, that the misappropriation doctrine
also does not require proof of likelihood of confusion, and thus would seem an
additional threat to the first amendment rights of trademark parodists. As previ-
ously noted, however, it is questionable whether the misappropriation doctrine
has a proper place in trademark law. See supra notes 189-97 and accompanying
text. Given the doctrine's already uncertain status in the trademark realm, its
nebulous nature and its potential for creating first amendment difficulties in
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The absence of a likelihood of confusion "check" in the dilu-
tion doctrine creates a strong prospect of conflict with protected
speech.455 This potential threat to expression must be kept in
proper perspective, however. In noncommercial parody cases in
which the trademark owner seeks relief under a dilution theory,
the threat to first amendment rights may be quite serious. 456 In
contrast, with respect to commercial parodies, the danger posed to
the parodist's first amendment rights by a dilution claim is gener-
ally less serious. The difference in the degree of threat to first
amendment rights posed by the dilution doctrine is tied to the
different levels of protection given to commercial and noncom-
mercial expression.
It must be remembered that a commercial parody does not re-
ceive the full first amendment protection accorded noncommer-
cial speech. When a commercial parody is attacked on dilution
grounds, any affected speech associated with the parody will nor-
mally be entitled to the partial first amendment protection given
commercial speech because the parody probably will be unlikely
to cause confusion. 457 This partial protection is made plain by
the Supreme Court's test for governmental restrictions on com-
mercial speech. Under this test, the partial protection given to
commercial speech means that government action restricting
commercial speech does not violate the first amendment if the
government possesses a substantial underlying interest and the
government action directly advances the underlying interest by
narrowly tailored means.458 If the government passes this test, its
trademark rights litigation, this article urges that courts refuse to allow trade-
mark owners to assert misappropriation as a separate and distinct theory.
As for the small number of trademark parody claims litigated on defamation
and/or disparagement theories, the first amendment interests of parodists
(whether commercial or noncommercial) are adequately protected by the ex-
isting constitutional treatment of those torts. There is no need, therefore, to
propose new requirements for such causes of action. For a discussion of the
constitutional aspects of defamation and injurious falsehood law, see supra notes
203, 209 and accompanying text.
455. The absence of this "check" creates a danger that nonmisleading
speech will be subject to liability under a dilution theory. Nonmisleading com-
mercial speech, however, receives some first amendment protection, and non-
commercial speech, misleading or not, receives full first amendment protection.
See supra notes 223-30, 249-52, 262-66 and accompanying text.
456. For discussion of the threat to first amendment rights in noncommer-
cial parody cases, see infra notes 472-73 and accompanying text.
457. The parody challenged on dilution grounds is unlikely to cause confu-
sion because if it were likely to cause confusion, there would be liability on an
infringement theory and a dilution claim would be superfluous.
458. For the formulation of this test, see Board of Trustees of the State
University of N.Y. v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3032-35 (1989) and Central Hudson
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action restricting commercial speech automatically passes first
amendment muster even though the affected speech was
nonmisleading.
In a commercial parody case involving a dilution claim by a
trademark owner, the application of the Supreme Court's com-
mercial speech test should proceed in the following manner. The
relevant government action would be the imposition of liability
on the parodist for the alleged violation of an anti-dilution stat-
ute. There would logically be a substantial government interest
underlying the enforcement of the anti-dilution statute. For
many years, states and the federal government have passed legis-
lation on intellectual property matters in order to prevent unfair
business competition. 45 9 State anti-dilution laws thus have a sub-
stantial purpose. Enforcement of an anti-dilution statute by in-
junctive relief-the form of relief typically allowed by such a
statute-logically advances the state's interest underlying the stat-
ute and is reasonably tailored to the state's achievement of that
interest.460
Therefore, when the governing test for the constitutionality
of commercial speech restrictions is applied to trademark parody
cases involving a commercial parody and a dilution claim, there is
unlikely to be a first amendment bar to the entry of judgment in
favor of the trademark owner. This assumes, however, that the
court will properly apply the dilution doctrine. In order for the
dilution doctrine to avoid running afoul of the partial protection
given the commercial parodist, the dilution doctrine must be ap-
plied with caution. If it is not cautiously applied, judicial enforce-
ment of the anti-dilution statute will not be sufficiently narrowly
tailored to further the proper objectives of the statute and, as
such, may prohibit commercial speech that should otherwise be
protected. 46'
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commissions, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
For a discussion of Fox and Central Hudson, see supra notes 263-68, 282-94 and
accompanying text.
459. For a discussion of various trademark legislation, see supra notes 37-
183 and accompanying text.
460. The relaxed approach employed by the Fox Court in evaluating com-
mercial speech restrictions would most likely result in a court sustaining the ap-
plication of an anti-dilution statute in this type of commercial parody case.
Further, in the commercial speech setting, the Supreme Court generally does
not regard injunctions against speech as raising prior restraint problems. See
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522, 532-41 (1987).
461. See Fox, 109 S. Ct. at 3035.
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How, then, should the dilution doctrine be limited in applica-
tion so not to create first amendment problems by restricting too
much commercial speech? Courts should begin by interpreting
less expansively the typical anti-dilution statute's alternative
routes to a finding of dilution. For cases in which the trademark
owner claims dilution by loss of distinctiveness, courts should be
skeptical of any such claim if the defendant's use was a one-time
use rather than a repeated use or a use that would be repeated
with frequency if not enjoined. A defendant's isolated use, partic-
ularly parody, is considerably less likely to "whittle away" at the
distinctiveness of the plaintiff's mark than is a recurring use.462
For example, assume that a Kentucky Fried Chicken advertise-
ment parodies, in an obvious fashion, the familiar Ronald Mc-
Donald character belonging to fast food rival McDonald's. 463
The single advertisement would not be sufficient to support a di-
lution by loss of distinctiveness claim unless McDonald's could
demonstrate an ongoing use of that sort by Kentucky Fried
Chicken or could produce clear evidence that Kentucky Fried
Chicken would engage in a long-term use if not enjoined. Ronald
McDonald would be no less clearly identified with McDonald's af-
ter the rival's single advertising "jab" than before the advertise-
ment.46 4 To uncritically assume that isolated parodies in the
commercial sense necessarily diminish the distinctiveness of the
parodied trademark is to overextend the permissible reach of the
dilution doctrine at the expense of legitimate commercial
expression.
As a second appropriate limit on dilution claims, courts
should be reluctant to find dilution by tarnishment simply be-
cause the trademark owner-and perhaps the court as well-does
not like the defendant's parody. Simply because the plaintiff may
find the defendant's humorous commentary unwelcome does not,
necessarily make the context unwholesome and therefore a possi-
ble candidate for a dilution by tarnishment claim. 465 An example
of a court's falling into this trap is the previously discussed litiga-
462. For a discussion of isolated uses of trademarks and dilution by loss of
distinctiveness, see supra notes 154-63 and accompanying text.
463. This "hypothetical" is hypothetical only in part. Kentucky Fried
Chicken advertisements of this sort were in fact televised, but there was no legal
action by McDonald's. See McCarthy, supra note 90.
464. Hence, there would be no loss of distinctiveness, and, therefore, no
dilution.
465. For a discussion of how the presence of an unwholesome context is
the key factor for most courts finding dilution by tarnishment, see supra notes
166-79 and accompanying text.
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tion over the "Garbage Pail Kids" stickers, which parodied the
"Cabbage Patch Kids" dolls. In that case, the court rushed to find
dilution by tarnishment, seemingly because neither the plaintiff
nor the court was pleased with the connotations suggested by the
Garbage Pail Kids. 466
By nature, however, a parody is not pleasing to the object
thereof. Even though commercial parodies are not fully pro-
tected under the first amendment, their partially protected char-
acter must allow them reasonable latitude to offend, as long as
any offensiveness stems from ideas expressed in the parody rather
than from a truly unwholesome context. 467 The parody in the
Garbage Pail Kids litigation was hardly unwholesome when com-
pared to the contexts more commonly considered to be unwhole-
some: those displaying sexual explicitness or referring to illegal
drug use.468
D. Accounting for First Amendment Concerns in
Noncommercial Parody Cases
The question of how to accommodate first amendment inter-
ests in trademark rights cases involving noncommercial parodies
has an easy and tempting answer: Courts need not worry about
first amendment issues in such cases because trademark owners
do not have valid claims against noncommercial users of their
marks. Thus, the trademark owner's claim against the noncom-
mercial user should be succinctly dismissed without the court's
having to address potentially complicated constitutional
questions.
This answer was given by the court in Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High
Frontier.469 In Lucasfilm, the owner of the "Star Wars" trademark
failed to obtain relief on a variety of theories against a public in-
466. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642
F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
467. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988)
(speech does not lose protected character simply because offensive).
Comparative advertising is another example of commercial speech that may
be offensive to the party whose product is adversely compared by a competitor
to the competitor's product. The offensiveness is, however, likely to be unwel-
come because of ideas contained in the parody rather than because of an un-
wholesome context. Dilution claims against such comparative advertising
should thus not be recognized even though the advertising may involve the use
of a competitor's trademark or a parodied version of the mark. See Denicola,
supra note 27, at 202.
468. For a discussion of cases involving these unwholesome contexts, see
supra notes 168-77 and accompanying text.
469. 622 F. Supp. 931 (D.D.C. 1985).
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terest group that used the term "star wars" in political advertise-
ments protesting the Reagan administration's strategic defense
initiative. 470 The answer was an appropriate one in the context of
that case, where the defendant's use of the mark was as unam-
biguously noncommercial as possible. Not all uses that are classi-
fied as noncommercial for purposes of first amendment analysis
are exclusively noncommercial, however. For instance, books,
magazines, newspapers, movies and similar items are properly
given the noncommercial label even though they have the argua-
bly commercial feature of being sold in the marketplace. 471
Courts have concluded that trademark rights theories have
the potential to reach predominantly noncommercial uses when a
secondary commercial component of the sort just noted is pres-
ent. The Second Circuit has recently recognized that a movie title
and a parody in book form were assailable under section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act. 472 First amendment concerns, however, were
sufficient on the facts of each case to keep liability from being
imposed. Some noncommercial parodies-though not always
recognized as noncommercial by courts-have been the subject of
trademark rights litigation won by trademark owners. 473 Trade-
mark owners have prevailed in these cases despite the full first
amendment protection that noncommercial parodies should
merit. These decisions demonstrate the need for a suitable
framework to accommodate freedom of expression concerns.
1. When Trademark Owner's Claim Is Brought on Infringement or
Section 43(a) Theory
When a parody is properly classified as noncommercial for
first amendment purposes and the trademark owner proceeds on
an infringement or section 43(a) theory, the familiar likelihood of
confusion element of course becomes critical. To properly ac-
count for the full first amendment protection given to noncom-
mercial parodies, a shift in focus on the likelihood of confusion
element is needed. Whereas a commercial parody that is likely to
cause confusion obtains no first amendment protection, 474 a non-
470. Id. at 933-36.
471. For a discussion of these forms of noncommercial speech, see supra
notes 226-30, 327-73, 405, 410-11 and accompanying text.
472. See Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d 490; Rogers, 875 F.2d 994. For a discussion of
Rogers and Cliffs Notes, see supra notes 338-73 and accompanying text.
473. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
124 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
474. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1979).
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commercial parody that may cause confusion does not necessarily
forfeit first amendment protection. In the realm of noncommer-
cial speech, there is considerably greater tolerance for misleading
statements and even falsehoods.
In the unusual event that a noncommercial parody is found
to create a likelihood of confusion,475 the first amendment should
nevertheless insulate the parodist from liability. In the Rogers
case, for instance, there was reasonable evidence tending to indi-
cate that the movie title used by the defendants created consumer
confusion concerning whether the movie was about or endorsed
by Ginger Rogers. Despite this evidence, the Rogers court held
that the first amendment protected the defendants from liabil-
ity.4 76 In doing so, the court called for an approach that balanced
the extent of the harm to the plaintiff, who claimed a violation of
section 43(a), against the strength of the expressive interests of
the defendants. 477
Although Rogers was not a trademark parody case, its similari-
ties make it useful in the trademark parody context. The balanc-
ing approach contemplated by Rogers provides a useful means of
giving analytical substance to the full first amendment protection
the noncommercial parodist receives. In balancing the harm to
trademark owners against the expressive interests of the noncom-
mercial parodist, it is also necessary to commence this balancing
process in an uneven fashion by placing heavier weight on the
parodist's side of the scale. 478 This balance can be achieved by
establishing a rule that the trademark owner cannot prevail on an
infringement or section 43(a) claim against a noncommercial par-
odist unless he or she proves a strong likelihood of confusion.
This proposed standard of strong likelihood of confusion 479 is
475. One would normally expect that the noncommercial context of the
parody would go a long way toward dispelling any likelihood of confusion. See
Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 494-97.
476. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997, 1001 n.8.
477. Id. at 999-1001.
478. This uneven balancing requirement is necessary in light of the full first
amendment protection the noncommercial parodist is entitled to receive. See id
at 999.
479. See Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 497 (reference to "strong" likelihood of
confusion). Although it appears that in using the word "strong," the Cli fs Notes
court was not necessarily intending to adopt "strong likelihood of confusion" as
the governing standard, this article urges that such a gloss be imposed on the
ordinary trademark infringement and § 43(a) standard when the defendant's
speech is predominantly noncommercial. Application of this proposed standard
would help make proper allowance for the longstanding notion that if speech is
noncommercial, its possible misleading character is not by itself a reason for the
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consistent with the constitutionally valid notion that it should be
quite difficult for a trademark owner to win an infringement or
section 43(a) claim against a noncommercial parodist. If full first
amendment protection means that government action restricting
the content of such speech cannot pass constitutional scrutiny un-
less it is necessary to the fulfillment of a compelling government
interest, it would seem that any government interest that is not
intended to prevent a strong likelihood of confusion should not
suffice. 480
2. When Trademark Owner's Claim Is Brought on Dilution Theory
The absence of a likelihood of confusion element-let alone
an element of strong likelihood of confusion-makes the dilution
theory a potentially broad-ranging device that may extend far into
the realm of protected speech. Because first amendment con-
cerns are so strong with respect to noncommercial speech, the
threat posed by the dilution doctrine to freedom of expression is
even greater in the noncommercial context. Therefore, it is nec-
essary to restrict the dilution doctrine within appropriate limits
and to again employ a version of the Rogers balancing approach.
In restricting application of the dilution doctrine in the non-
commercial setting, it would be appropriate to begin by limiting
the use of the dilution by loss of distinctiveness theory to cases
against commercial users of the plaintiff's trademark. The dilu-
tion by loss of distinctiveness theory is ill-fitting in the noncom-
mercial parody context because it contemplates commercial
trademark-like uses by a defendant rather than what is customa-
rily seen in the noncommercial setting. In addition, the noncom-
mercial parody is unlikely to reflect the repeated use factor that is
often important to loss of distinctiveness claims. Thus, results
such as that in Dallas Cowboys, where dilution by loss of distinctive-
ness was found,48' would be eliminated by this approach.
The dilution by tarnishment theory is more problematic.
The L.L. Bean court apparently would eliminate this possible basis
speaker to lose the first amendment protection he or she would otherwise
obtain.
480. For a discussion of the constitutional scrutiny applied to restrictions
on noncommercial speech, see supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
481. In Dallas Cowboys, the district court expressly found dilution by loss of
distinctiveness. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,
467 F. Supp. 366, 377 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979). The Sec-
ond Circuit also stated that the plaintiff was entitled to prevail under the anti-
dilution statute, but did not specify which type of dilution it was applying. Dallas
Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 205 n.8.
100 [Vol. 36: p. I
100
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss1/1
1991] PROTECTED MARKS AND PROTECTED SPEECH 101
of liability in the noncommercial parody context.482 It is not nec-
essary, however, to ban all such claims from the noncommercial
context as long as courts restrict tarnishment claims to instances
where the alleged tarnishment of the trademark's reputation
stems from a truly unwholesome context in which the mark was
used by the parodist, and not from the unwelcome impact of the
ideas being expressed. 483 For example, if the Miller Brewing
Company suit against Doctors Ought to Care (DOC) had gone to
trial instead of being settled, 48 4 dilution by tarnishment would
not have been found in that case under this proposed restriction.
Any tarnishment of the Miller name and slogans came from the
striking content of the ideas and viewpoints expressed by DOC.
To impose dilution liability in such an instance would penalize the
noncommercial parodist for exercising legitimate and substantial
expressive rights and would hardly be consistent with the first
amendment prohibition against content restrictions on fully pro-
tected speech.48 5
Cases resembling Pillsbury and Dallas Cowboys make analysis of
a dilution by tarnishment claim more difficult. In these cases, the
offensive parodies appeared, respectively, in a sexually explicit
magazine and a sexually explicit movie. 48 6 It is more difficult for
parodists in such factual settings to argue credibly that the power-
ful force of their ideas caused the trademark owner to complain.
Although the parodies in Pillsbury and Dallas Cowboys presumably
were not devoid of ideas, they were not brimming with profound
content. 48 7 Any arguable tarnishment of the parodied trademarks
in such cases would seem to stem from the unwholesome context
482. See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32-33, appeal
dismissed, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987).
483. See Denicola, supra note 27, at 202-05.
484. For a review of the basic facts of this case, see supra note 86.
485. For a discussion of this and other first amendment requirements, see
supra notes 220-48, 263-94, 321-73 and accompanying text.
486. For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 168-69 (Pillsbury), 101-
10, 302-10 (Dallas Cowboys) and accompanying text.
487. This is not to say, however, that speech must be profound and full of
meaningful ideas in order to merit the first amendment protection accorded
noncommercial speech. (If that were a necessary criterion, much of what is ut-
tered by political candidates during the course of election campaigns would not
qualify for protection.) No such requirement exists, as sensibly recognized by
the L.L. Bean court. See L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 34. For a discussion of this aspect
of L.L. Bean, see supra note 330 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, noncom-
mercial speech expressing a minimal level of ideas may be somewhat more vul-
nerable to a dilution by tarnishment claim if stated in an unwholesome context,
because the supposed tarnishment is less likely to result from the minimal ideas
contained in the expression.
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of the parodies, not from the expression of the parodists' ideas or
viewpoints.
The analysis should not stop at this point. Even if it appears
that the unwholesome context of the noncommercial parody
(rather than the unwelcome content of the ideas expressed
therein) is the apparent "culprit," the court should not immedi-
ately find dilution by tarnishment. Instead, the Rogers balancing
approach must be applied. In applying this approach, the court
must take a serious, realistic look at the likelihood of tarnishment
and whether there is meaningful evidence tending to show this
likelihood. Without such evidence, a successful dilution by
tarnishment claim would seem to rest primarily on a knee-jerk re-
action to the parody's unwholesome context. Regrettably, such a
poorly grounded ruling is not uncommon in trademark parody
litigation,488 but is constitutionally inadequate because it ascribes
too much weight in the balancing process to the supposed harm
to the trademark owner and too little weight to the first amend-
ment interests of the noncommercial parodist. 48 9
As a further means of keeping dilution by tarnishment claims
against noncommercial parodies within permissible first amend-
ment bounds, the court should also consider the audience. For
instance, if the parody appeared in an adult magazine, as in Pills-
bury, the court should consider the likelihood of tarnishment issue
in terms of whether the magazine audience's attitude toward the
mark would be adversely affected. If the answer to this question
is "no"-the answer one would expect in a Pillsbury-like case-the
court should be reluctant to find a genuine likelihood that the
mark's reputation would be tarnished. 490 This careful scrutiny of
dilution by tarnishment claims is warranted by the first amend-
ment. It demands the conclusion that the mere placement of a
trademark parody in an unwholesome but noncommercial con-
text should not automatically give rise to a meritorious dilution by
tarnishment claim by the trademark owner.
488. The Pillsbury and Dallas Cowboys cases are notable examples.
489. Such a ruling is constitutionally inadequate because the noncommer-
cial parodist obtains substantial first amendment protection regardless of
whether there is a wealth of ideas expressed in the parody. See supra note 478
and accompanying text.
490. It would seem unlikely that most persons who choose to read adult
magazines would hold less respect for a company's trademark after it has ap-
peared without the trademark owner's consent in such a publication. If any-
thing, these readers' regard for the trademark might be increased. Courts,
therefore, should not ignore reality in deciding these cases when first amend-
ment interests are at stake.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Trademark parody cases present a significant conflict be-
tween the property rights asserted by trademark owners and the
freedom of expression concerns advanced by parodists. The en-
tertaining facts of these cases sometimes belie the seriousness of
the constitutional issues at stake. It is noteworthy that some of
the very recent trademark parody decisions display a judicial will-
ingness to address the first amendment aspects of these cases on a
more principled basis than had often been displayed previously.
Nevertheless, the cases reveal a need for a coherent analytical
framework that accommodates the different first amendment con-
siderations present in different varieties of trademark parody
cases. This article has offered proposals to that end.
The analytical framework explained herein recognizes and
accounts for the practical and constitutional differences between
parodies that are commercial (meriting at best partial first amend-
ment protection) and parodies that are noncommercial (meriting
full first amendment protection). The article has also addressed
the proper implementation of these respective levels of protec-
tion in the differing contexts of the infringement, dilution and
federal statutory claims brought by trademark owners against par-
odists. It has urged the adoption of appropriate modifications of
or restrictions on these trademark rights theories in order to min-
imize their potential for reaching too far into the realm of pro-
tected expression. If courts adopt this article's analytical
framework, trademark parody decisions will reflect the drawing of
a far better balance between trademark owners' property rights
and parodists' first amendment interests than has generally been
the case until now.
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